How did the rise of extremism affect international relations? — Paper 4 — A Level History 9489 topical questions

Question 1

Assess the impact of Mussolini’s foreign policy on Italy. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 Assess the impact of Mussolini’s foreign policy on Italy. 30 Responses may consider the significance of events such as the Corfu Incident, the Stresa Front, attempted Anschluss by Germany in 1934, the Abyssinian Crisis, The Rome Berlin Tokyo Axis, the Munich meetings, the Pact of Steel and the Cavallero Memorandum. When looking at the foreign policy actions of Mussolini it is important to look at his aims, actions, and the outcomes of his policies. His aim to create a strong man image and the boast of recreating the Roman Empire need assessing and his increasing isolation from Britain and France and the ever- closer relationship with Germany. His aim to be a power broker and particularly his courting by Britain and France in the policy of Appeasement as for example by the reluctance to impose sanctions over Abyssinia or his help in organising the Munich Conference. Responses ought to assess what benefits and what negative consequences came about from his policies and in particular being drawn into a disastrous World War Two, which Italy was not prepared to fight and which lead to his fall from power and allied occupation of Italy.

Question 2

Assess the aims of Hitler’s foreign policy in the period 1933–41. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 Assess the aims of Hitler’s foreign policy in the period 1933–41. 30 Hitler had a variety of motives in the period. Revising the Treaty of Versailles, creating a Greater Germany, Lebensraum in Eastern Europe, and arguably racial imperialism. Domination of Europe, military strength, and then arguably global conquest. He also wanted to avoid a two- front war with the Soviet Union for as long as possible and until Western Europe was defeated. His foreign policy was also designed to increase his own popularity at home, at least in the early years and finally he wanted to make Germany economically self-sufficient using Autarky from 1936 to allow war to be followed as a policy. He intended to make himself the Master of Foreign Policy replacing traditional diplomats such as Von Neurath with Von Ribbentrop and military tactics, replacing Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch with Keitel. From 1933 he wanted German equality and revoked the Treaty of Versailles, left the World Disarmament Conference and then the League of Nations. 1935 saw the Saar Plebiscite and the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, 1936 the reoccupation of the Rhineland, a decisive step, which showed neither France nor Britain would stand up to him at this stage. The Spanish Civil War was simply a chance to test his air force. The Rome- Berlin-Tokyo Axis was an anti-Soviet alliance and the Hossbach Memorandum of 1937 set out his future plans. 1938 saw the Anschluss and then the Munich Agreement handing Germany the Sudetenland. Hitler in his foreign policy was playing on the Pro-Appeasement policies of Britain and France whilst regaining territory taken at the Treaty of Versailles. 1939 was a decisive year in his occupation of Rump Czechoslovakia and the Nazi- Soviet Pact of August 1939. The Pact of Steel with Italy might be mentioned here too. September 1st and the invasion brought war and then Hitler’s aims were to quickly conquer Western Europe which he did apart from Britain. In 1941 Germany launched Operation Barbarossa which has racial and economic and political motives.

Question 3

Assess the impact of the Prague Spring on US–Soviet relations. [30]

Accepted Answer

9 Assess the impact of the Prague Spring on US‒Soviet relations. 30 Pursuing détente with the Soviet Union was very important to President Lyndon B Johnson; it was an opportunity to end his presidency on a positive note. However, the Soviet invasion to crack down on political reform in Czechoslovakia put the negotiations on hold and it destroyed Johnson’s last chance to leave a legacy he could be proud of. He did not want to upset the Soviets and in the process pursued a policy of no resistance and demonstrated that the United States was not prepared to defend democracy if it was not in its interests. Nevertheless, it soured the relationship between the two superpowers. Johnson was under so much pressure at home with his attempts to create the ‘great society’ and resistance to American involvement in Vietnam. The assassinations of civil rights leader, Martin Luther King, and presidential candidate, Robert Kennedy, also reduced people’s faith in the political system. Success with détente would help to raise his standing and give the Americans a chance to establish an exit strategy for Vietnam. On 20 August 1968 Johnson was making his final preparations for a nuclear arms limitation summit meeting with the Soviet leaders on the following day. The Soviet invasion coincided with the planned meeting This forced him to postpone his plans and his hopes of being recognised as a great peacemaker; it was left to Richard Nixon to receive that honour. Johnson made every effort to protect his personal and political goals by his minimal reaction to the invasion. However, the United States did protest about the invasion in the UN Security Council. It also gave a diplomatic warning to the Soviet Union that it would be more forceful if there were similar action in Romania. Romania had been pursuing a more independent foreign policy and the United States hoped that Romania might become a neutral state in the Cold War. It also resulted in fresh commitments across the NATO alliance, with the United States confirming that it would continue to station its troops in West Germany. Czechoslovakia returned to full Soviet control and the successful invasion saved the shattering of communism in Eastern Europe. Johnson’s fixation on détente enabled the Soviets to escape any direct intervention from the United States. Events clearly demonstrated that both Brezhnev and Johnson were prepared to put their own interests first. Brezhnev prioritised maintaining Soviet control of the satellites against pursuing détente. For him détente was just delayed by a few years; for Johnson it had a permanent effect on his legacy. It also led to the Brezhnev Doctrine whereby the Soviet Union maintained its right to intervene in any country where communism had been threatened. While the Prague Spring played a pivotal role in delaying détente, it also increased Soviet confidence that it could deal with its satellite unimpeded by the United States. On the other hand, it was also a wake-up call to the United States that Johnson had given the impression that in his determination to attain the co-operation of the Soviets he would allow the Warsaw Pact to do as it pleased.

Question 4

Evaluate the reasons why Mussolini was appointed Prime Minister in 1922. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 Evaluate the reasons why Mussolini was appointed Prime Minister in 30 1922. There were many significant reasons as to why Mussolini was appointed in 1922. The discussion could be between the problems in Italy, the leadership qualities of Mussolini, and the relative importance of the elites. Mussolini was appointed because Italy had an indecisive King, and the Prime Minister, Facta, hesitated to act against the Fascists which led to violence, the nation’s fear of Socialists and the aftermath of World War Ⅰ. By the autumn of 1922, he was in contact with major politicians of the formation of a new government, which would include the Fascists. King Victor Emmanuel Ⅱ was a weak man and quite incapable of providing any firm leadership for the country, as he was convinced of his own powerlessness. Most of the King’s family sympathised with the Fascist movement, including his cousin, the Duke of Aosta, and his mother. However, like many of the elite, the King overestimated the strength of the Fascists. The army also gave the King contradictory reports from his generals about the army’s attitude to a Fascist march. The King, on the other hand, is primarily to blame for Mussolini’s appointment, as it was him who sent the telegram offering Mussolini the position of Prime Minister. Facta led a weak Liberal government in February–October 1922 which did very little to impede Fascism’s development. Liberal governments had failed to confront Italy’s internal problems since Unification, and not much had changed by the time Facta was Prime Minister. He was asked to stay on as Prime Minister. He urged the King to grant martial law and allow the army take steps to crush the fascist revolt, but it was too little too late, and no effective stand could be made against the Fascists. Many ex- soldiers joined Mussolini in the Fascist movement. These soldiers were angry about the ‘mutilated victory’ that Italy had suffered at the hands of a Liberal government. The violence of the Fascists was a main factor in Mussolini’s appointment as Prime Minister. Mussolini organised a private army of several hundred Blackshirts who had arms provided for them. This allowed Mussolini to take control politically over central and northern Italy. The Fascists had gained not only the support of industrialists and the elite, but also the Pope. Mussolini gained respect among Italians as he grew more power and developed a good impression. The main reason why Fascism was successful was the fear that the Socialists had created. The leadership qualities of Mussolini, he was a highly talented and recognisable leader. He was also very talented when it came to altering his policies to gain more support form new types of Italians. In 1919, the Fascists primarily appealed to workers, poorer people and socialists whilst alienating other groups of people such as industrialists and religious organisations. Mussolini was also a very gifted speaker, and this was used effectively in propaganda that allowed the movement’s profile to rise considerably. His skill as politician allowed him to exploit the squadristi and boost his respectability and negotiate better with other politicians. 1 Mussolini also recognised the fear of Socialism in Italy and acted upon it quickly. Some argue that the success of the Fascists was purely down to Mussolini as the Socialists were a greater party. It could be argued that Mussolini was appointed by entirely constitutional means by King Victor Emmanuel. A telegram was sent inviting Mussolini to be a member of a coalition government, as the King hoped it would preserve law and order. However, others must share the blame for Mussolini’s appointment, namely Prime Minister, Facta, and his Liberal government. Although it seemed that Mussolini’s appointment as Prime Minister was inevitable, if the King or politicians had acted differently in events leading up to Mussolini’s appointment, it could have been a very different story. In theory, the idea of bringing the Fascists into a coalition government seemed logical, and that it could be used to tame the movement. However, the Fascists were not tamed, and King Victor Emmanuel’s appointment was a miscalculation.

Question 5

‘Propaganda was the main reason for the growth of support for Nazism.’ Discuss this view in relation to the period 1929–33. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 ‘Propaganda was the main reason for the growth of support for 30 Nazism’. Discuss this view in relation to the period 1929–33. This question requires an examination and assessment of the role of propaganda and its impact on increasing popularity in the period 1929– 1933, but also an examination of other factors. This includes the Great Depression, rising unemployment, the collapse of the Grand Coalition, the appeal of the Nazis with consideration of Hitler, the role of the Sturmabteilung (SA), fear of the rise in popularity of the communists (KPD), support of Big Business and electoral pacts (Harzburg Front), and left-wing divisions. The electoral success of the 1930 and 1932 Reichstag elections, and Hitler’s performance in the 1932 Presidential Election, demonstrated the increasing popularity. Because more normal politics were rejected, the failures of Bruning, Von Papen, and Von Schleicher increased the popularity of the Nazis. His promises to provide Arbeit und Brot (work and bread), revise the Treaty of Versailles, return Germany to being a great power, regain former German territory, rid Germany of the communist threat and his anti-Semitism appealed to many Germans. He was skilled at tailoring his message to specific audiences, attempting to appeal to both workers and bosses, men and women, old and young, as well as farmers. The Goebbels, Nuremburg rallies, the swastika image, uniforms of the SA, use of his plane to campaign all over Germany, and a simplistic and beguiling message all played important roles in propaganda. Bullock’s summary of propaganda as ‘the greatest demagogue in history’ is apt here. The Nazis benefited from the left-wing, KPD and SPD’s inability to co-operate. The essay must look at the stated factor, other factors and then make a reasoned assessment.

Question 6

‘Mussolini’s agricultural policy was his greatest economic success.’ Discuss this view. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 ‘Mussolini’s agricultural policy was his greatest economic success’ 30 Discuss this view. This question requires candidates to examine and assess the various economic policies and judge the success and failure of Mussolini’s agricultural policy and which policy was the most successful. Agriculture was in crisis from 1925–1935 and the fascist regime focused on it. The Battle for Grain was announced in 1925 and aimed at self-sufficiency. Wheat production increased 50% and large farms in the North did well by benefiting from mechanisation and fertilisers, but olives, fruit and vegetables were neglected, and animal farming was neglected as fodder was expensive. Meat and egg production fell, and prices increased and living standards declined. Italy was still dependent on imports. The Battle for Land aimed at land reclamation to increase agricultural land and provide jobs. New Towns were built on reclaimed land and the Pontine Marshes were drained. However, the plan failed to meet the targets, only 58% of reclamation projects were completed, few people resettled, and small farmers benefited least. The Battle for The Lira was started as the value of the lira was falling against other currencies, and in 1927, Mussolini pegged the lira at a higher level that big business wanted. Exports decreased because they became difficult, and unemployment rose. It did benefit steel, chemicals, and armaments because imports were cheaper, but overall Mussolini was a failed policy. Industry saw economic growth, for example, Alfa Romeo, the oil industry at Bari and Livorno, and the Ansaldo steelmaking and shipbuilding firm. Another economic policy was the development of transport, for example, the autostrada, which improved travel links and provided employment. Electrification of the railways with over 5000 km electrified linking Milan, Rome, Naples, Austria, and Switzerland. In the South, transport was still inadequate. Fiscally, Italy imposed tariffs to protect against foreign trade, and imposed The Decree Law of 1927 which allowed the state to deduct from workers’ pay to contribute towards social benefits. Taxes remained low, but these deductions squeezed workers’ pay and negatively affected living standards. The Corporate State as a concept and in practice could also be looked at. Having examined a variety of policies, it is important that candidates evaluate them and reach a reasoned verdict on success and failure and the stated policy of agriculture in relation to other policies.

Question 7

Assess the extent to which Hitler’s economic priority was rearmament in the period 1933–39. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 Assess the extent to which Hitler’s economic priority was rearmament 30 in the period 1933–39. Hitler’s economic policies had various strands and motivations. Amongst these might be included rearmament, Autarky, solving unemployment, buttressing his popularity, building the infrastructure of Germany, and ensuring that the economy served his ends as well as providing for agriculture. Reducing unemployment was a key aim and promise. This was achieved by the Reich Labour Service, compulsory military service from 1935, removing women from the workforce and offering families loans provided the wife stayed at home. Public Work Schemes such as civic reconstruction and autobahn construction in conjunction with a massive expansion in the car industry and a shortened working week so that more people needed to work also helped. Unemployment was virtually eliminated by 1938. Schacht’s New Plan aimed at a recovery through trade and how far that was seen as an essential prerequisite for funding rearmament before the more obviously rearmament-based Four Year Plan could be discussed. Economically the Nazis tried to support the Middle Class, forbidding large department stores from opening new branches, but also government needed Big Business to support rearmament. Agriculture seen as very important and followed a ‘blood and soil’ policy. Reich Food Estate set up under Darré, production increased 25% by 1939 and Germany was 83% self-sufficient in food. The Reich Entailed Farm Law prevented smaller farms being broken up and was unpopular with farmers because it prevented the creation of more efficient larger farms. Small farmers and the Middle Class did not benefit as expected. The large department stores were never closed, and Big Business and Reich Food Estate did not reduce its influence which annoyed farmers because this limited what they could charge for their crops. Rearmament was a key policy with Mefo Bills to fund. In 1936, Goring put forward a Four-Year Plan to prepare for war and develop synthetics, and by 1938, gained Austrian industry and later Czech industry too, including conscription, building up the army, air force and navy. Rearmament was a key policy, as it underpinned Hitler’s foreign policy aims, but he also wanted to solve unemployment. He wanted both ‘guns and butter’. Answers must address the various strands of the Nazi economic policy and reach a sustained judgement on the stated factor of rearmament.

Question 8

Assess how far the nuclear arms race was responsible for the Cold War tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. [30]

Accepted Answer

9 Assess how far the nuclear arms race was responsible for the Cold 30 War tension between the Soviet Union and the US. Cold War tensions arose from the conflicting ideologies of capitalism and communism, as well as superpower ambitions to expand their sphere of influence. President Truman was determined to contain communism and maintain the US’ superiority over the Soviet Union. The nuclear arms race may have, at times, exacerbated tension between the superpowers, but much of the tension was caused by their desire to protect and expand their sphere of influence. The Cold War remained a propaganda war punctuated by proxy wars in which the US and the Soviet Union supported opposing sides, such as in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Middle East, like Africa and Latin America, became an area for Cold War rivalry. In Europe, the 1958 Berlin crisis resulted in the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The nuclear arms race occurred because neither side wanted the other to gain the upper hand. The Soviet Union tested its first atomic weapon in 1949 which spurred Truman to authorise the development of hydrogen bombs. However, the Soviet Union had its own hydrogen bomb by 1953. Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’ foreign policy included using nuclear weapons, massive retaliation, and the use of brinkmanship. Khrushchev established the Warsaw Pact in 1955, and its members devised plans to wage nuclear war against NATO. In 1957, the Soviets launched their first intercontinental ballistic missile, which created US fears of a missile gap between the Soviet Union and the US. With the launch of Sputnik 1, the first satellite, the Soviet Union also began the space race with the US. There was a great fear in the US that the balance was in favour of the Soviet Union, even though the opposite was true. In 1958, the US launched its own satellite, Explorer 1 and developed its own ICBMs. This competition inevitably increased tension. In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis further fuelled the tensions between the two superpowers with fear that the world was on the brink of a nuclear war. The nuclear arms race helped to bring the two sides together. Khrushchev had spoken of peaceful co-existence, and both Eisenhower and Dulles realised that a dialogue needed to be established with the Soviet Union. In 1959, Khrushchev visited the US briefly to meet Eisenhower at Camp David. Reports praised ‘the spirit of Camp David’ showing that both superpowers were willing to talk. In 1963, the Limited Test-Ban Treaty was signed in Moscow by the US, the Soviet Union, and the UK. This Treaty banned all tests of nuclear weapons except those conducted underground. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed on 1st July 1968. In 1972 and 1979, the SALT Ⅰ and SALT Ⅱ agreements were signed by the two powers which aimed to restrict the nuclear arms race. However, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, President Carter withdrew the SALT Ⅱ treaty from the Senate. When President Reagan assumed office, he referred to the Soviet Union as an ‘evil empire’ and he felt that he should negotiate from a position of strength. In 1983, President Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). Gorbachev was willing to negotiate a reduction in nuclear weapons, and in December 1987, he and Reagan signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty calling for the elimination of intermediate-range missiles. In July 1991, the US and the Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Act by which time the Cold War was over.

Question 9

Analyse the impact of Mussolini’s policies towards the Church. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 Analyse the impact of Mussolini’s policies towards the Church. 30 As the Roman Catholic Church held such sway in Italy, it was vital that Mussolini foster a strong link with the institution, regardless of his beliefs or that of his dictatorship. He had to take note of the sheer amount of power the Church levied and could not afford to anger it. Mussolini opted to work with, rather than against, the Church, therefore ensuring that the Italian general public did not have to choose between his leadership and their religious beliefs. He set about encouraging the Roman Catholic Church to accept a Fascist state, while promising to fulfil the Church’s requests. He also made public swearing a crime and shut the doors of many shops selling alcohol. He made public his disapproval of contraception, something that the Roman Catholic Church felt strongly about, and pushed for the institution of divorce to be banned across Italy. However, despite all these efforts, the relationship between the Church and Mussolini was not always smooth. One of the major issues that the two disagreed strongly over was that of education. Both the Church and Mussolini wished to have the power to control education in the country and the efforts to resolve this disagreement took three years to come to fruition and serve their purpose. In 1929, agreements called the Lateran Treaties were signed, which set out who would control education in Italy, as well as a host of other agreements. While the Roman Catholic Church had lost much of its land when Italy was unified in 1870, it was compensated to the tune of £30 million in 1929 and given land in Rome in which to construct the Vatican, the new papal state. On top of this, the Pope was given a small army, rail station and police force. The Lateran Treaties also specified that the Roman Catholic faith was to be the state religion, in a section called the Concordat. This set out rules around religion in Italy in that children in both primary and secondary schools had to have religious education at school. The Church was also given control over marriage and the appointing of bishops, though the latter still had to be agreed by the Government before the appointment could be finalised. Mussolini’s efforts to retain a relationship with the Church seemed to have paid off during these years, and his popularity with members of the Italian general public – who did not have to split their loyalties between the Church and the Government – grew. The two were to still have disagreements though – one of the key ones being the Charter of Race, which was rolled out in July 1938 and removed the Italian Jews right of Italian nationality. These Jews had several restrictions placed upon them, including not being permitted to take state jobs, teach or be members of the Fascist Party. They could also not marry non-Jewish Italians. Such was the unpopularity of these rules that Mussolini received a protest from the Pope on behalf of the Italian Jews. By 1939, relations between the Catholic Church and Mussolini had deteriorated badly.

Question 10

‘The Great Depression was the key factor in Hitler’s rise to power.’ Evaluate this view. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 ‘The Great Depression was the key factor in Hitler’s rise to power.’ 30 Evaluate this view. This question requires an examination and assessment of the various causes for Hitler’s rise to power and then a reasoned judgement on the significance of the Great Depression amongst other causes. This is a broad ranging essay, but factors to be examined might include: the impact of the Great Depression; appeal of the Nazis’ policies; appeal of Hitler and his oratory; collapse of the Grand Coalition; instability in the period 1930–1933; ruling elite intrigues to look at Von Papen; Von Schleicher; Hindenburg; or fear of the communists. Hitler’s use of propaganda, Goebbels, use of posters, the Swastika, films as well as the role if the Sturmabteilung (SA) all need examining. Lessons learned from 1923 Munich Putsch, funding, appeal, trying to make the Nazis a national party and the publication of Mein Kampf. The answer might usefully look at the lack of electoral success in 1928 with only 12 Reichstag seats, yet by 1930 it was 107 Reichstag seats, and by 1932 there were 230 Reichstag seats in the first elections. The answer may instead look at Hitler’s very good showing in the 1932 Presidential election, or the formation of the Harzburg front. Clearly, the Great Depression must be analysed with the massive increase in unemployment and the loss of confidence in the Weimar Republic. It could be argued that democratic government ends in 1933, as Brüning had to resort to Article 48 regularly to govern and people were increasingly pushed to political extremes of the NSADP and KPD. The inability of the KPD and SPD to work together was crucial. The question invites a look at long term factors, such as policies of revising the Treaty of Versailles, returning Germany to being a great power and anti-communism and anti-Semitism, then a tighter focus on the period 1929–1933 and the impact of the Great Depression, gaining support of Big Business fear of communism and inability of the traditional Weimar politicians to solve the economic problems, and finally the events of 1932–1933 that lead to Hindenburg reluctantly appointing Hitler Chancellor in January 1933.

Question 11

Assess the extent to which Khrushchev was responsible for causing the Cuban Crisis. [30]

Accepted Answer

9 Assess the extent to which Khrushchev was responsible for causing 30 the Cuban Crisis. Khrushchev’s determination to help Castro, spread communism and appear militarily stronger than the US as well as his secrecy in deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba so close to the US created a situation that the US found impossible to ignore. However, Kennedy’s obsession with defeating Castro provided Khrushchev with the opportunity to become involved. The Cuban Revolution in 1959 brought Fidel Castro to power; he had close links with Moscow and began to establish a left-wing dictatorship. In February 1960, Cuba signed an agreement to buy oil from the Soviet Union. The US-owned refineries in Cuba refused to process the oil and Castro seized the firms. The US broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba. Castro proclaimed himself a communist, formally allied his country with the Soviet Union, and seized remaining American assets. Kennedy inherited from Eisenhower the CIA’s Bay of Pigs plan to overthrow Castro which proved to be a complete failure. Kennedy believed that the US needed to be uncompromising with dictatorships like those of Castro. He also believed that Castro would support communist revolutions throughout Latin America and that Castro’s Cuba was a dangerous extension of Russian influence so close to the US. Kennedy pledged to take strong action to overthrow Castro, if elected president, and once elected he felt compelled to support the CIA plan. Kennedy made a mistake by not listening to those who were against the plan. He believed it would work because he thought Castro would be assassinated. However, he not only tried to remove Castro through the CIA-engineered assault on the Bay of Pigs, but he also launched another top-secret CIA programme directed against Cuba, Operation Mongoose. He was obsessed with defeating Castro and removing any communist threat so close to the US. This provided the opportunity for Khrushchev to become involved to protect Cuba and try to secure a cold war victory. Khrushchev certainly misjudged the situation in 1962. He felt justified in helping to spread communism and protecting Castro. The crisis began with his decision to install intermediate and medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. Kennedy saw U2 pictures of the missiles on 16th October 1962 which had been secretly deployed by Khrushchev in April. The Americans had been lied to about the Soviet intentions making a US response inevitable. Such missiles could threaten most US cities. It has been argued that Khrushchev saw Kennedy as a weak president and took advantage of this to gain domestic approval. However, he could have defended Cuba and Castro with conventional weapons. It seems likely that Khrushchev wanted to appear to have greater military strength than the US, particularly when U2 spy flights had shown that there was a missile gap in the US favour. Domestically, Khrushchev was under pressure to adopt a more hard-line approach to the West and he needed to be successful to silence his critics. 9 Appearing to defend the Cuban Revolution gave Khrushchev the opportunity to try to score a nuclear success over the US. He felt justified in his actions as the US had stationed Jupiter missiles in Turkey so the US would not have strong grounds for objecting to his actions. However, he underestimated the US’ reactions to threats in their own backyard and he also underestimated Kennedy. Kennedy did not want to be accused of weakness at home nor to be seen as weak in deterring the communist threat.

Question 12

Assess the extent to which Fascist indoctrination was the main aim of Mussolini’s leadership. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 Assess the extent to which Fascist indoctrination was the main aim of 30 Mussolini’s leadership. The question asks for an assessment of the main aim of Mussolini’s leadership, chiefly whether the focus was fascist indoctrination or other factors. Benito Mussolini coined the term ‘fascism’ in 1919 to describe his political movement. He established the first fascist regime and believed in Absolute Power of the State, Rule by a Dictator, Corporatism. Extreme Nationalism, Superiority of the Nation’s People, Militarism, and Imperialism. Mussolini chose Giovanni Gentile as Minister of Education. He reorganized Italy’s school system and argued that the private desires and interests of the individual came second to the ‘common will’ of the people. He explained that self-sacrifice and obedience to the state enabled the individual to achieve unity with the ‘common will.’ He argued that rights do not belong to the individual but to the people as a whole and that the ‘common will’ of the people is the law of the state. Therefore, individuals must submit to the fascist state in order to be truly free. He declared it is the natural right of the stronger to conquer and rule the weaker. War has another function in the fascist state: It unites the people and proves their superiority as a nation. Mussolini called new elections for the Italian parliament in 1924 and after the election, Mussolini closed opposition newspapers and banned public protest meetings. He declared all political parties illegal except for his own Fascist Party. He outlawed labour unions and strikes. He also established a political police force, the Organization for Vigilance and Repression of Antifascism. A Fascist Grand Council rubber-stamped Mussolini’s decrees and made parliament irrelevant. By 1925, Mussolini had adopted the title, Il Duce (the Leader). He delivered emotional public speeches, swaying back and forth, puffing his chest, and holding his hands on his hips. The crowds chanted back fascist slogans such as ‘Il Duce is always right!’ and ‘Believe, obey, fight! ‘Opponents of Mussolini coined the term ‘totalitarianism’ to describe his quest to control not only the political system but also the economy, schools, police, courts, military, and more. Ironically, Mussolini liked this term and began to use it himself to persuade Italians to come together under his leadership for a rebirth of society. Mussolini compared the ‘new man’ of Italy to the hardened soldiers of ancient Rome. As for women, Il Duce saw their role as giving birth and caring for a new generation of warriors. The Fascist Party organized youth organizations for all boys and girls aged 8–18. These groups promoted physical training, military drills (for boys), and the ideals of the fascist state. Mussolini had little use for religion. Italy, however, was a strongly Catholic country. Gentile, as minister of education, continued the teaching of Catholic doctrine in the elementary schools. But he replaced it with philosophy at the secondary level. The Catholic Church objected to this reform. Hoping to keep the church from opposing his fascist regime, Mussolini adopted pro-Catholic policies against abortion and divorce. Then in 1929, he signed a treaty with the church that made Catholicism the state religion. This agreement also restored the teaching of Catholic doctrine in secondary schools. For its part, the church accepted Mussolini’s fascist state and ended its involvement in Italy’s political affairs. 1 Mussolini wanted to create an economic system that provided a ‘third way’ and in the 1930s, he organized industry, agriculture, and economic services into state-controlled labour unions and employer associations called ‘corporations.’ Government officials appointed the heads of each union and employer corporation. They negotiated wages and working conditions with each other. This ‘third way’ corporatism attempted to unify workers and employers by requiring them to set aside their private interests in favour of the best interests of the fascist state. In practice, however, the employers usually benefited more than the workers did. Police crackdowns on dissent were mild compared to fascism in Hitler’s Germany. But a special court tried anti-fascists, those working against Mussolini’s regime. The Jewish population of Italy was small, and neither Mussolini nor most other Italians were very anti-Semitic. Jews had fought for Italy in the First World War and participated in Mussolini’s march on Rome. Even so, Il Duce came increasingly under the influence of Hitler in the late 1930s. Mussolini finally agreed to anti-Semitic decrees such as banning Jews from certain occupations. When the Germans occupied parts of Italy during the Second World War, they transported 20 percent of Italy’s Jews to Nazi concentration camps. While Italians hid many Jews, Mussolini did nothing to stop the Nazi deportations. Before the Second World War, popular support for Mussolini’s fascist state was high. His charismatic style of leadership convinced many that Italy was on a path to greatness.

Question 13

‘Nazi youth policies were a failure.’ Discuss this view. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 ‘Nazi youth policies were a failure.’ Discuss this view. 30 This question requires and examination of the aims, successes, and failures and then a reasoned overall judgement to be made. The Nazi policies towards young people could be viewed as one of the most successful aspects of Nazi Germany. This is due to a variety of reasons. The Nazis took advantage of the need for German youth groups and used what teenagers wanted to slip in Nazi ideals, took over the education system to portray Nazi views, and used the school system to glorify war; they also often alienated children from their parents. However, it did have its flaws as there were several groups of youths who opposed Hitler such as the ‘Edelweiss Pirates’. The Hitler Youth group played a major role in Nazi control of youths especially in 1939 when it became compulsory to attend. The Nazis took what the children wanted such as group activities, hiking, camping, and singing and added in extra activities such as marching, learning about Nazi policies and practicing military exercises. Many of the members were merely drawn to the youth group due to the leisure opportunities it offered and some just did not have a choice as other organisations were shut down and made illegal. As the Nazis wanted to control each aspect of a child's life, they realised that education played a very important role. They altered textbooks to include Nazi history and Nazi views of History. Students were taught about the injustice of German government and how the Jews were slowly taking over. The Nazi’s also managed to glorify the military in each school subject. They also made sure that the students had to study race and ideology every day. As the Nazis needed to control each aspect of a child's life to have full hold on the child, they realised that it was a necessity to control a child's home or family life, in many cases this meant isolating a child from his/her family. It became increasingly common in Germany for the children of the household to be much more pro-Nazi than their parents. This is because the children grew up being controlled by Nazi forces and therefore found such things as routine household checks normal, whereas older family members found it an invasion of privacy. During the late 1930's the number of members in the Hitler Youth group drastically increased however as the war progressed the number of enrolments dropped as the group became more war centred rather than leisure activities. In fact, anti-Hitler Youth groups were set up. One of these was called the ‘swing’ movement. This was a group of teenagers who rebelled against the Nazi regime by listening to banned music from the US and England and dressing in a more western fashion. Perhaps one of the policies that infuriated the Nazis the most was the fact that the ‘swing’ movement members allowed Jews in their clubs. Another group which the Nazis greatly feared was the Edelweiss Pirates. This group of Youths carried out some very similar activities to the Hitler youth group such as singing however the Edelweiss Pirates' songs were criticising the Nazi regime and mocked their ideas of the German superpower. They also often attacked Hitler Youth group members and indulged in activities that the Nazis looked down upon such as the act of sex and making the group include both male and female members.

Question 14

Assess the extent to which Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence eased Cold War tensions. [30]

Accepted Answer

9 Assess the extent to which Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful 30 coexistence eased Cold War tensions. Khrushchev’s adoption of the policy of peaceful coexistence with the West, alongside his de-Stalinisation policy, signalled a thaw in the Cold War. In 1955 he agreed to negotiate an end to the post-war occupation of Austria and allow a neutral country to be created. In the same year he told Tito, the Yugoslav leader, that ‘there are different roads to communism’. He also called for a reduction in defence expenditures and reduced the size of the Soviet armed forces. On 24 February 1956, at the Communist Party’s Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev made a speech denouncing Stalin. It became known as the ‘secret speech’ as it was read in a closed discussion but the US State Department soon obtained a copy. It seemed as if there would be a relaxation of Cold War tensions. In the late 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union initiated a cultural exchange programme and, in 1959, Nikita Khrushchev visited the United States briefly meeting Eisenhower at Camp David. Predictions of improved future relations were reported which praised ‘the spirit of Camp David’ showing both superpowers were willing to enter into dialogue. It seemed that Khrushchev never intended peaceful coexistence to end competition between the two superpowers, merely that it would be peaceful competition. Both sides remained suspicious of each other’s ideological stance. Eisenhower’s New Course’ foreign policy included the use of greater nuclear weapons, a policy of massive retaliation and brinkmanship. In 1955 Khrushchev set up the Warsaw Pact and its members had plans of how to wage nuclear war against NATO. Khrushchev also rejected Eisenhower’s ‘Open Skies’ proposal at the Geneva Summit in 1955 which proposed that United States and the Soviet Union exchange maps indicating the exact location of every military installation in their respective nations. In addition, the United States was suspicious of Khrushchev’s intentions, especially after he sent troops into Hungary in 1956 to crush the revolts there. In 1957 the Soviets launched their first intercontinental ballistic missile which created US fears of a missile gap between the Soviet Union and the United States and began the space race with the launch of Sputnik 1, the first satellite. The problem of Berlin caused tension too; in November 1958, Khrushchev announced that unless the West removed its forces from West Berlin within six months, he would allow the East Germans to control the access routes. The West stood firm and Khrushchev eventually backed down but West Berlin remained an area of tension. A summit meeting in Paris in 1960 was stopped by the shooting down of a U2 spy plane over Moscow and in 1961 Khrushchev ordered the building of the Berlin Wall after Kennedy’s ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ speech. 9 Moscow also took every opportunity to promote its interests in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In January 1961, Khrushchev declared at an informal summit meeting in Vienna that Moscow would provide active support to national liberation movements throughout the world. The Cuban Crisis of 1962 saw the two sides on the brink of nuclear war. The crisis ended when Khrushchev agreed to remove Russian missiles from Cuba in exchange for a promise from the United States to respect Cuba’s territorial sovereignty. It also led to a hot line being established between the Kremlin and the White House and the Limited Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty was signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963, by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.

Question 15

‘Preventing the spread of communism was the main reason for the United States’ growing involvement in Vietnam.’ Assess this view. [30]

Accepted Answer

10 ‘Preventing the spread of communism was the main reason for the 30 United States’ growing involvement in Vietnam.’ Assess this view. US intervention in Vietnam was a gradual process ranging from economic aid, diplomacy and eventually the use of military force to save South Vietnam from communism. The United States believed in the containment of communism and feared the domino theory becoming a reality. However, as time went on, it was more evident that the United States was also fighting a proxy war as part of the wider Cold War. In addition, the United States became increasingly determined to maintain its own credibility. From 1947 the United States backed the return of the French in Vietnam. It considered Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Vietminh, to be a communist. By the time of the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, Washington had spent almost $3 billion trying to save Indochina from communism. The Geneva Accords of 1954 agreed a two-year division of Vietnam until elections and reunification in 1956. However, the Americans wanted this division to be permanent. Ngo Dinh Diem was appointed Prime Minister of South Vietnam; he was provided with massive US support. He was an anti-communist catholic who was opposed by the Buddhist peasants in South Vietnam. It was his assassination in 1963 and the anarchy it created that led to rising US involvement. South Vietnam was largely a failed state incapable of defending itself and the North was aiming to achieve reunification. In the late 1950s, the Viet Cong unleashed a number of terror attacks on the South. In the 1950s and early 1960s the aim of the US was to defend South Vietnam from communism without direct military involvement. Another reason for the increasing involvement of the United States was the fact that the communists in Vietnam were supported and guided by the Soviet Union and China. Therefore, the war could not be separated from the Cold War and the struggle to contain communism around the globe. They did not see the strength of Vietnamese nationalism and believed that the aim was the spread of communism. Eisenhower’s domino theory was adhered to by his successors and hence Johnson escalated the war starting with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in which Congress authorised him to use military force without declaring war. The United States gave economic and military aid to South Vietnam, while the Soviet Union and China offered similar assistance to North Vietnam. Thus, the Cold War power struggle between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China was significant in shaping the Vietnam War. The presidents themselves also influenced the role played by the United States. Eisenhower doubted that the United States could fight a land war in Southeast Asia but Kennedy felt he had to prove his resolve to defeat communism. Johnson considered the war as a test of his courage; it was he who instigated the bombing of North Vietnam and sent the marines to the South in early 1965 when there was little opposition to the war effort. When a North Vietnamese torpedo boat attacked a US destroyer in the Gulf of Tonkin, Johnson persuaded congress to give him unlimited power to direct events in Vietnam. ‘Operation Rolling Thunder’ was launched against North Vietnam; factories, fuel dumps and supply routes were bombed. He sent in large-scale ground forces to fight the Vietcong. There was soon increasing opposition at home to US involvement and Johnson lost support.

Question 16

Analyse the impact that the rivalries between the Cold War superpowers had on the civil war in Angola. [30]

Accepted Answer

11 Analyse the impact that the rivalries between the Cold War 30 superpowers had on the civil war in Angola. Rivalries between the superpowers turned the civil war in Angola into a Cold War battleground; support for opposing groups from the United States and the Soviet Union and their proxies inevitably helped to escalate and prolong the war but the military groups themselves failed to reach agreement they could not agree on power-sharing. Portugal, too chose to withdraw its troops from Angola. Three main military movements had been fighting for Angolan independence since the 1960s, the MPLA, a Marxist organisation, the FNLA based in the north of the country and UNITA led by Jonas Savimbi. The Alvor Agreement with Portugal in January 1975 provided for a three-way power sharing government. However, each group wanted to attain sole power and civil war erupted. UNITA declared war on the MPLA on 1 August 1975. When MPLA leader Neto announced 11 November 1975 as the day of Angolan independence, Lisbon decided to withdraw its troops on that day. Angola soon became a Cold War battleground with the superpowers giving military assistance to the groups they supported. Both the United States and the Soviet Union sought influence in Angola, a country with rich agricultural and mineral resources. The superpowers and their allies gave military assistance to the groups they favoured which resulted in a Cold War contest by proxy. The United States provided aid and training to both FNLA and UNITA. The CIA made its first major weapons shipment to the FNLA in July 1975. Zaire and China also helped FNLA. The Soviet Union supported MPLA with military training and equipment. The MPLA also had ties with Castro in Cuba and UNITA had asked South Africa for military help; South Africa wanted to prevent the use Angola as a base for rebels fighting for the independence of Namibia. The US Government had encouraged the South African intervention, but preferred to distance itself from the apartheid regime. Some members of the US Congress were reluctant to intervene and Ford’s request for additional funds was rejected in 1976. South Africa withdrew its forces in the spring of 1976 and the MPLA remained as the official government of Angola. However, UNITA continued the civil war; the fighting lingered on intermittently until 2002. 11 Henry Kissinger claimed that the United States was forced to intervene in Angola because the Soviet Union was already providing military aid to the MPLA by using Cuban troops. However, later evidence showed that the Kremlin was reluctant to become involved and that it was the United States who backed a two-pronged invasion by FNLA from Zaire and from South Africa in support of UNITA. At the time of the crisis the United States and Soviet Union were still pursuing a policy of détente. The Ford Administration believed that Cuba had intervened in Angola as a Soviet proxy and thus was breaking the rules of détente but this was later shown to be false. The MPLA was the most organised and best led of the three factions but the United States did not want a negotiated settlement as the Soviet Union supported the MPLA. In August 1985, the Reagan administration won a repeal of the 1976 prohibition against US military aid to rebel forces in Angola. Military assistance began to flow to UNITA in January 1987. Finally, in September 1992, elections were held, but when it became apparent that the MPLA would be the winner, Savimbi refused to accept the result and the civil war resumed. In May 1993, Washington finally recognised the Angolan government.

Question 17

‘The fear of Communism was the main reason for the rise of Mussolini by 1922.’ Discuss this view. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 ‘The fear of communism was the main reason for the rise of Mussolini 30 by 1922.’ Discuss this view. The support which Mussolini gained from key elements of the Italian elite, landowners, industrialists, elements in the state and the royal family, and also perhaps from the Church may have derived from the fear of socialism and communism. The Russian Revolution was seen as dangerous and the existing social tensions before 1914 surfaced again after the strains and disappointments of the First World War. The Left gave Mussolini and his squads an enemy and took the edge off the radical side of fascism for many of the Italian establishment and middle classes who were fearful of strikes, trade unionism, political violence and revolution. These fears could be equated with communism even if socialism was stronger. So, fear of communism was greater than the potential of actual communism. The alternative explanations for the rise of Mussolini might include the organisation of the Fascists and the personal appeal of Mussolini and an ideology which went beyond simply being opposed to communism and offered nationalism and social harmony. However, the impact of war combined with the disappointments of Versailles, produced hostility to the liberal politicians, revived pre-war national aspirations and resentments about Italia irridenta. This might be seen as a more compelling explanation. The ‘trench spirit’ and the disillusion with the liberal establishment’s failures brought Mussolini a popular support which went beyond fear of communism. This was nourished by post war economic problems and social conflicts in the countryside as well as urban centres. The actual accession of Mussolini to the premiership depended however less on mass support per se and the sort of trasformismo politics that Giolitti and others had deployed to reduce the threat from the left before 1915.The political system of Italy allied to the compliance of the King advised by the Duca d’Aosta could be seen as a long term failure of liberal Italy to achieve stability and need to be weighed against the special characteristics of fascism and its leader and the far of communism, though answers which go beyond a list of factors may see interconnection as well as arguing for the priority of one element.

Question 18

‘The main reason for the growth in Nazi support between 1929 and 1932 was the growing economic crisis in Germany.’ Assess this view. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 ‘The main reason for the growth of Nazi support between 1929 and 1932 30 was the growing economic crisis in Germany.’ Assess this view. There is a strong case for this explanation. Even with signs of electoral gains in 1928 and a strong infrastructure, the actual electoral support for the NSDAP was not great. However, as depression hit from the Autumn of 1929, the votes for both Communists and Nazis grew in response to increased disillusion with the politicians’ response to rapidly rising unemployment, bank, and business failures. The high point of Nazi electoral success in 1932 coincided with a peak in unemployment and deflationary policies, which left millions lacking basic necessities and hope for the future. Nazi propaganda found scapegoats for the economic problems (the Treaty of Versailles, the November Criminals, the Jews, the American plutocrats) and unemployment increased. Combined with the threat of communism, which alarmed the Mittelstand and the German elites, it seems there is an unassailable connection between economic problems and the support for the Nazis both locally and nationally. The German farmers had already been facing falling prices and now saw a massively reduced market. The Mittelstand already hit by the inflation of the 1920s now saw a collapse of international and national consumption, and business failures. The industrial workers saw mass unemployment and lost the safety net of Weimar welfare as cuts were made. The counter argument is more to do with the Nazis’ ability to exploit the crisis which might be seen as more important than the crisis itself. By 1928 support was rising, especially in depressed rural areas. The party had developed an impressive organisation. It had a flexible ideology, which encompassed all sorts of grievances, and wrapped them round with some powerful themes; anti Semitism, the Hitler myth, the betrayal of the nation by the politicians, and nationalist traditions. This ideological hold all meant that all sorts of people could support Nazism even if their interests seemed incompatible. The NSBO had gained a foothold among industrial workers while monarchists were inspired by nationalist rhetoric and visions of a golden age. National revival propaganda went beyond simply job creation, and the 1920 programme held anti-Capitalist as well as anti-Communist views. Hitler’s personal appeal did not really depend on economic policy (which was vague) as much as castigation of enemies, and a powerful emotional appeal for renewal and rebirth. None of this was new, so it could be argued that it only struck a mass chord when economic crisis seemed to show that Germany had been betrayed. But it was the interplay between the rising economic crisis and the sort of appeal that had been developing since 1920. Developed analyses might see these connections, and weight the relative importance of the strictly economic factors with other explanations.

Question 19

Evaluate the significance of terror in the establishment of a dictatorship under Mussolini. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 Evaluate the significance of terror in the establishment of a 30 dictatorship under Mussolini. Answers might draw a distinction between the use of violence in the rise to office of Mussolini in 1922 and the subsequent establishment of dictatorial rule which used the powers of the state against political dissent. In the rise to power fascist groups were adept in using terror against enemies and it was the willingness to use violence against the forces of the left and in peasant seizures that helped to gain Mussolini the political support of the elite that was a major factor in his accession to office. However, there were other significant factors such as the more positive propaganda, the unpopularity of many government policies, the disillusion with the peace settlement and ongoing economic problems. Terror alone could not have gained power without the willingness of political leaders to pursue traditional trasformismo tactics and invite Mussolini into office. The March on Rome was merely a dramatic gesture though terror was an important element in making Mussolini enough of a threat to make it worthwhile trying to neutralise him. Terror did play a greater role in the transition from prime minister to dictator. The single most important element could be seen as the murder of Matteotti, in the context of political violence and the refusal of Mussolini to disown violence. The deployment of the repressive apparatus of the state was a result of the willingness of the Italian political parties to accept the Acerbo law though and the failure of key elements to oppose state and party violence and the acceptance by many of a more dynamic and successful regime seemingly capable of bringing more economic stability and foreign policy successes – or perhaps an apathy among many to political authority which was seen as alien and oppressive whoever wielded it. Though the dictatorship depended to an extent on repression – the arrest and exile of opponents, enforced censorship and banning of opposition and the watch kept on opposition by the OVRA and party activists, the level of repression was not as high as in Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany. Alliance with key conservative elements such as the monarchy and church, a divided opposition, effective propaganda and a sense of innovation and renewal with prestige projects and a greater international respect for Italy have to be considered and the relative significance evaluated.

Question 20

Assess the impact of foreign policy on the economy in Nazi Germany in the period 1933–39. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 Assess the impact of foreign policy on the economy in Nazi Germany 30 in the period 1933–39. Foreign policy had a consistent and clearly expressed aim of overturning the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles and ensuring that Germany resumed its status as a great European power. The conduct of foreign policy changed from traditional diplomacy to a more aggressive and threatening form and behind it was the geopolitical aim of achieving living space for a new racial state. All this depended on rearming and preparation for self-sufficiency. The example of the First World War had shown that dependence on resources from outside the Reich had made Germany vulnerable to blockades. Economic weaknesses had undermined the military effort and made foreign policy aims unrealisable. Thus, in Hitler’s mind, foreign policy aims and the means to achieve them were inextricably linked to economic policy. In the more orthodox phase of economic policy, foreign policy was linked to the recovery of trade – hence in the New Plan Schacht aimed to develop reciprocal trade agreements. Reassuring foreign policy moves like the Treaty with Poland in 1934 and the Anglo German naval agreement helped to develop a context in which trading links and investments could grow. As the world economy recovered and with some help from government public works the German economy recovered especially in terms of employment aided by a foreign policy that was clear in its aims but did not seem too far removed from that of the late 1920s, except for the withdrawal from the League of Nations. Hitler did not try to invade Austria in 1934 and was not supportive of Japanese expansion. However, as the regime established itself, a more aggressive foreign policy required greater moves to rearm. Schacht’s orthodoxy was replaced by the Four-Year Plan and as there seemed little chance that foreign powers would stop rearmament, German industry pushed forward and there were more restrictions on prices, wages, imports, and the allocation of raw materials. The economy was geared more towards war as foreign policy made that more likely with the Anschluss and the annexation of the Sudetenland in 1938 and the acquisition of Bohemia and Moravia in 1939 and the invasion of Poland. The economic benefits of the Nazi Soviet pact might be considered. While full autarky was not possible, there was greater self-sufficiency but also problems as there were labour shortages, some overheating and inflationary pressures. It was unlikely that economic development which was so geared to serve foreign policy ends could be sustained without gains from foreign conquests so in a sense the economy was having an impact on foreign policy as well as vice versa. Some may argue that foreign policy was not the only element to have an impact on the economy but that increases in social spending and infrastructure; the removal of women from elements of the workplace, anti-Semitic measures, the ending of the influence of trade unions and the recovery of world trade had an impact independent of foreign policy and the attendant rearmament.

Question 21

‘Economic problems were the main reason for the rise of political extremism in Britain.’ Discuss this view. [30]

Accepted Answer

4 ‘Economic problems were the main reason for the rise of political 30 extremism in Britain.’ Discuss this view. In terms of the British political context, extremism was mainly seen as the Communist Party and the British Union of Fascists, reflecting the rise of extremes to left and right that emerged in Europe as a result of the First World War. These models for British enthusiasts were obviously partly a result of economic issues as Russians faced severe economic problems prior to the Bolshevik take over and post war Italy suffered from both long- and short-term economic ills. The links between the rise of Hitler after 1929 and the effects of the great depression are obvious. In Britain, the post-war boom was short lived, and sectors of the economy suffered depression. Poverty and economic decline were a fuel for support both for Communism and Fascism and after 1929 the increase in unemployment and the serious decline of heavy industry could be said to have raised interest in and support for alternative political systems which offered far more radical solutions than traditional parties. However, there was not always a direct correlation between economic hardship and extremism. Fascism was strong in London rather than in the depressed areas of the North. Like Nazism it attracted many lower middle-class supporters worried about the rise of Communism and attracted by ideology. Surprising support could be found in unlikely areas like South coast resorts like Worthing. It could be argued that the impoverished middle classes aware of the seeming successes of Mussolini and attracted by love of Empire and admiration for the unity and military spirit often found in the First World War were not primarily motivated by economic concerns. The anti-Semitism in London was based on long standing tensions in some areas and admiration for a strong potential leader who had broken with a dull political establishment might be seen as another strong motive. Communism produced no Mosley figure and no Lenin equivalent. Given the widespread economic discontent it did not attract mass working-class support. It had roots in ideological enthusiasm for Marxist theory from the 1880s and attracted discontented middle and even upper-class elements as well as many politically aware and self-educated workers. The alienating effects of a Russian based creed were less apparent to them and even acted as a positive stimulus. The relatively small numbers of active supporters and the lack of mass electoral support despite economic hardship might suggest that other factors were needed to interact with economic problems to explain support for parties which fell outside customary British political life and traditions.

Question 22

Evaluate how far attempts to control nuclear weapons improved US–Soviet relations. [30]

Accepted Answer

9 Evaluate how far attempts to control nuclear weapons improved US– 30 Soviet relations. The nuclear arms race occurred because neither side wanted the other to gain the upper hand. However, Khrushchev had spoken of peaceful co- existence and both Eisenhower and Dulles realised the need for a dialogue with the Soviet Union. In 1959, Khrushchev visited the United States and met Eisenhower at Camp David indicating both superpowers were willing to talk. However, in 1962 the Cuban Missile Crisis further fuelled the tensions between them; many believed that the world was on the brink of a nuclear war. Following the Cuban Crisis, the Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1963 by the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. A hotline was also set up connecting the leaders of the United States and Soviet Union. In 1967, Johnson initiated the SALT talks and met Kosygin in New Jersey. Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, argued that limiting the development of both offensive and defensive strategic systems would make relations between the two countries more stable. The Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty was signed on 1 July 1968. Richard Nixon, also believed in SALT, and on November 17, 1969, the formal SALT talks began in Helsinki. Nixon and Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and interim SALT agreement on 26 May 1972 in Moscow. For the first time during the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union had agreed to limit the number of nuclear missiles in their arsenals. The two superpowers had entered the era of détente. Negotiations for a second round of SALT began in late 1972. At the Vladivostok Summit in 1974, Ford and Brezhnev agreed on the basic framework of a SALT II agreement. On 17 June 1979, Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II Treaty in Vienna but Carter withdrew it from the Senate. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union did not improve until Gorbachev came to power. He was willing to negotiate a reduction in nuclear weapons with Reagan and in December 1987, they signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty calling for the elimination of intermediate-range missiles. In July 1991 the Strategic Arms Reduction Act was signed by which time the Cold War was over. Both powers continued to build up arms in the 1960s. During the late 1960s the United States was concerned that the Soviet Union was aiming to achieve parity with the United States by building up ICBMs. In January 1967 President Johnson announced that the Soviet Union had begun to construct a limited ABM defence system around Moscow. Even after the Vladivostok agreements, the two nations could not resolve the two other outstanding issues from SALT I, the number of strategic bombers and the total number of warheads in each nation’s arsenal. There were also rising tensions in different areas of the world. Conflicting alliances during the 1973 Yom Kippur War drew the two powers to the brink of confrontation. Sino–US relations were improving while the Sino–Soviet split continued. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, President Carter withdrew the SALT II treaty from the Senate. 9 The United States boycotted the 1980 Olympics in Moscow and the Soviet Union retaliated by boycotting the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles. When President Reagan assumed office, he referred to the Soviet Union as an ‘evil empire’ and he felt that he should negotiate from a position of strength. It seemed once again that US–Soviet relations had deteriorated. In 1983, President Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). The intent of this programme was to develop a sophisticated anti-ballistic missile system in order to prevent missile attacks from other countries, specifically the Soviet Union.

Question 23

‘Mussolini’s use of propaganda was highly effective.’ Evaluate this claim. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 ‘Mussolini’s use of propaganda was highly effective.’ Evaluate this 30 claim. The argument for effective propaganda could be based on the scale and nature of appeals to the public – rallies, posters, broadcasts, newsreels the promotion of nationalism and the development of the cult of the Duce – Mussolini ha sempre ragione. The ideological content increased in the 1930s, as did the appeal to support for imperial expansion in Africa. Fascist symbols were widely used, and the regime was linked to military success, greater prestige in Europe, big public projects and opposition to Communism, as in Spain. Control of the media was maintained and groups such as young people were targeted. From the 1920s propaganda made use of film with the LUCE organisation and IRI in 1937. Propaganda was coordinated by a special Ministry of Popular Culture in 1937. Mussolini’s personal image of strength and authority was potently promoted while the ideology of the Corporate State was the subject of propaganda campaigns. Economic policy was promoted in terms of ‘battles’ with vivid images of supposed success. The issue is however not necessarily the volume or even energy of propaganda campaigns and their messages but their actual impact in sustaining support for the regime and the ideology. Counter arguments might include the ongoing influence of the Catholic Church with its different emotional appeal and organisations such as youth movements which meant hat Fascist secular propaganda did not have a monopoly. Also, creative artists, while not allowed to criticise the regime were given greater freedom than in say Soviet Russia, limiting the cultural propaganda. Though there was a Syndicate of Artists many worked independently of state propaganda. The gains of more stable government, reduction of corruption, more efficient public services, foreign policy successes, assaults on crime could be celebrated by propaganda as could Mussolini’s Vatican agreements because they were generally approved of. But propaganda could not be as effective when there was less public approval, for instance for racial policies or the closer relationship with Germany after 1944, and the decision to enter war and send forces to the USSR. Evidence of successful ideological indoctrination is patchy and the failure of Mussolini to remain in power and the ebbing of any support after the dismissal of 1943 might indicate that in contrast with Nazi Germany the propaganda efforts were only effective when policies were seen to be delivering what Italians wanted. The use of terror might be used to argue that propaganda was not totally effective as there was opposition.

Question 24

Assess the aims of Soviet foreign policy in the period 1924–41. [30]

Accepted Answer

2 Assess the aims of Soviet Foreign Policy in the period 1924–41. 30 The tension in Soviet policy was between the promotion of world revolution and the undermining of capitalism and the practical needs of the USSR for security from invasion and outside intervention while creating a socialist economy and society. Stalin’s policy of socialism in one country was based on a realistic estimate of the state of the USSR’s military resources and the failures of revolutionary movements after the First World War, together with the need to create enough industry to develop the proletariat in whose name the Bolsheviks had taken power. Thus, it was important to establish what links were possible with other European powers through arrangements like those established with Germany in the Treaty of Rapallo and with trade agreements such as made with Britain in 1924. Also, this meant establishing relations even with regimes hostile to Communism such as Nationalist China and not giving much support to destabilising revolutionary groups despite the ideological opposition. The rise of the right-wing dictators changed the situation and made isolation dangerous, but the promotion of united fronts with left wing groups in Europe promoted by Litvinov was problematic in terms of results. Intervention in Spain caused unrest and fed into the Fascist propaganda machine of a Soviet threat. In France the Popular Front did not secure a very strong alliance in 1935, but this was enough to intensify isolation and Soviet foreign policy changed course with the appointment of Molotov. The primary aim was to increase security against a rapidly rearming Germany with stated aims of colonising Russian territory. Better relations with the democracies proved impossible so a volte face in terms of the Nazi Soviet pact was made. This led to the fulfilment of an aim to overturn the isolation established by the cordon sanitaire of Versailles and to regain lost territory which would act as an effective defensive buffer in the form of Eastern Poland the Baltic States. So, a clear aim was to regain the land and power lost as a result of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk and the hostility of the victors of World War I to the new Soviet state. The aim of establishing Soviet domination of the leftist political parties through a Popular Front had not proved so successful. The aim of bringing about worldwide ideological change remained more a pious hope than a guide to actual policy, pursued by covert underground activities rather than a clear and open foreign policy and specifically rejected in 1939 when exiled German communists were handed over to Hitler and a pact linking the Communist state to its most bitter ideological foe for reasons of realpolitik was adopted. It could be argued that aims changed, or it could be argued that security against western attack after the trauma of allied intervention and the overturning of the Paris settlement remained constant.

Question 25

‘The main reason that the Nazi regime maintained its control of Germany in the period 1933–39 was its use of terror.’ Discuss this view. [3…

Accepted Answer

3 ‘The main reason why the Nazi regime maintained its control of 30 Germany in the period 1933–39 was its use of terror.’ Discuss this view. There is a case for terror being at the heart of Nazi control: Terror eliminated all other possible power bases – the Communists and Trade Unions, the other parties even the nationalists, it ended the authority of the states and even the elements within the movement which might have been a threat as in the Night of the Long Knives. Dissenting voices faced an efficient Gestapo, the threat of the Concentration Camps, ‘protective custody’ which undermined court verdicts which went against the wishes of the regime. Violence accompanied the consolidation of power 1933–4 and repression was seen as highly effective under Himmler and Heydrich. The SS organisation which developed into a virtual state within a state was widely feared. Small expressions of dissent or even lack of commitment to the regime could result in quite savage punishment. However, the primacy of terror as a means of control has been questioned: Local studies have revealed that Gestapo numbers were not huge and there was a reliance on people informing and playing an active part in the suppression of ‘anti-social behaviour’. There was quite widespread interest in and support for the police and the SS and the repression affected ‘out groups’ like socialists and Jews much more than the bulk of the German people who refrained from political activity and offered compliance. This was obtained often by popular policies like the reduction of unemployment, welfare schemes and foreign policy successes. The Hitler myth meant that criticism and discontent was directed more at the party than at the Führer who was seen as being above injustices and cruelties. This was a powerful incentive to remain loyal which was not dependent on violence alone. Also, the considerable propaganda machine which built on the obvious progress being made in many ways accentuated the positive rather than the threats, real as these were. Terror alone could bring about cowed and sullen acquiescence but not the genuine popularity of Hitler and many aspects of the regime and indeed the numbers in concentration camps fell and visitors to the Olympics of 1936 did not see a nation ‘under the cosh’. As pressures mounted with war preparations and greater Nazification, especially in terms of racial policy and obvious threats of war, the need for repression might have increased, but dissent was limited and positive belief in the Fuhrer, even if mixed with fear of war remained high.

Question 26

Evaluate the impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis on US–Soviet relations. [30]

Accepted Answer

9 Evaluate the impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis on US–Soviet 30 relations. Both sides in the crisis believed that they had won a victory. Khrushchev had saved Cuba from invasion by the US and secured a secret deal for the removal of the US Jupiter missiles from Turkey. On the other hand, Kennedy had stood up to the Soviet Union and kept nuclear missiles out of Cuba. Neither side had lost face, and both kept to the agreements they had made and were keen for a dialogue between them to continue. As a result of the crisis, Kennedy became convinced of the dangers of nuclear brinksmanship. A Moscow-Washington hotline was set up giving a direct phone link between the White House and the Kremlin. The crisis also provided the impetus to renew the test ban negotiations which had first started in 1955. Kennedy, in his letter of 28 October 1962 to Khrushchev, suggested that it was necessary to put greater efforts toward limiting nuclear arms testing and the Soviet Union agreed. In 1963, the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by the US, Britain, and the Soviet Union. The treaty banned nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. More progress was made in 1969 with the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. Both countries promoted the idea of ‘peaceful co- existence’. The resolution of the crisis made Khrushchev unpopular with the hardliners in the Soviet Union; they were opposed to his withdrawal of weapons but unaware of his secret agreement with Kennedy. Whereas Khrushchev had made his decisions to withdraw the weapons from Cuba public, Kennedy had made a secret agreement over the Jupiter missiles which left Khrushchev facing mounting criticism leading to him being ousted from office two years later; he was accused of reckless decision-making and of lacking the ability to lead the Soviet Union with the crisis being listed among his greatest mistakes by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. His deal was seen as a retreat from the standoff, and a great victory for the US. His successor, Brezhnev sought to ease tensions with the US. The Cuban Missile crisis did pave the way for a period of détente at the beginning of the next decade and there was closer co-operation between the superpowers on human rights, nuclear disarmament, and trade. However, while both sides were keen to avoid a repetition of the crisis, this did not prevent them from continuing to build up arms. Brezhnev and Kosygin led the Soviet Union on a massive military build-up. The Soviet government increased their research and funding of ICBMs in the years that followed, leading to a stockpiling of advanced missiles capable of hitting targets in the US. Similarly, the US continued to build up its military hardware and resources in the years to come. Within a year of the crisis, Secretary of Defense McNamara announced that the US would triple its ICBM fleet to 1700 by 1966. Kennedy felt encouraged to be more assertive against the Soviet Union’s Communist allies in Vietnam and US policy makers used the crisis as justification for the nuclear arms build-up which was to become an essential part of the foreign policy towards the Soviet Union.

Question 27

Assess the extent to which ideological differences affected Sino–US relations during the Cold War. [30]

Accepted Answer

10 Assess the extent to which ideological differences affected Sino–US 30 relations during the Cold War. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) replaced the Republic of China (ROC) after the Chinese Communists won the civil war and drove the Nationalist government to Taiwan. The PRC leaders persisted in proclaiming ‘Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought’ as the ideological foundation of China during the Cold War. In October 1949, the PRC, comprising a quarter of the world’s population, had extended the Cold War to East Asia as the US was determined to prevent the spread of communism. China stood out as the world’s leading revolutionary state and a threat to western democracy. Mao believed that a strong coalition of Third World countries could be decisive in Cold War confrontations and supported national liberation struggles both to force out the remaining colonial regimes and to overthrow those independent Third World governments most closely allied with the West. Lack of economic assistance and military equipment meant that it wasn’t successful, but it was an example of China trying to spread revolutionary ideology, which the US vehemently opposed. This clash inevitably led to the two nations being on opposing sides in the Cold War. The US did not formally recognise the PRC until 1979. Instead, it maintained diplomatic relations with the ROC government on Taiwan, recognising it as China’s sole legitimate government. However, it was not ideological differences alone that led to tension. The entry of China in the Korean War in 1950 led to a change from minimal support of the Nationalist government in Taiwan to US protection for it. The CCP believed a Soviet alliance could offset the US threat; the Sino-Soviet Treaty was signed in 1950. Mao announced that the New China would ‘lean to one side’. The US perceived the PRC as a major threat to its key interest in Asia, and to the security of Japan. It aimed to isolate the PRC politically. Sino-US relations remained hostile until the 1970s with Mao frequently referring to the US as a dangerous imperialist power. However, it was more than a war of words between the two nations. In 1954 the PRC’s shelling of Jinmen aimed to foil the US -Taiwan security treaty as Beijing was concerned about the division between mainland China and Taiwan. Both countries felt that they needed to maintain contact and the ambassadorial talks began in August 1955 on issues such as Taiwan, US embargo of China, and cultural exchanges with little progress. They continued in the 1960s. The Sino-Soviet split pushed Mao into improving relations with the US in the early 70s. Despite its previous confrontations with the US, the Sino-American rapprochement resulted in limited détente in the 70s. In 1971, the PRC was admitted as a UN member and a permanent member of the Security Council. Kissinger made visits to Beijing in 1971 followed by Nixon in 1972. The focus was on the common concerns over the Soviet threat. Deng Xiaoping became China’s leader in the late 70s; he wished to combine successful reform and openness to capitalistic international economy with the continued one-party rule of the CCP. Deng virtually ended China’s remaining practical support for revolutionary movements abroad and reduced China’s aid to the Third World. The ideological differences could be ignored once both sides stood to benefit.

Question 28

Evaluate the success of Mussolini’s economic policies. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 Evaluate the success of Mussolini’s economic policies. 30 Detailed economic policy did not play a large part in the appeal of Fascism prior to 1922 though they were critical of government failures, post war depression and unemployment. Initial policy tended towards orthodoxy. De Steffani, the finance minister reduced taxes and offered fiscal incentives for overseas investment. Despite the rise of dictatorship, economic and financial policies remained liberal and the role of the state in price controls and subsidies was reduced. The new regime benefited from an upsurge in trade and economic activity and a rise in employment. However, purely economic considerations did not guide policy and the prestige of the lira was put before the economic consequences of overvaluation. For Mussolini a strong lira was a symbol of the renewal of Italian strength and overseas power but the revaluation in 1926, after De Steffani’s dismissal in 1925 from 100 to 90 lira to the pound undermined export growth. Long term sluggishness and the fall in world agricultural prices in the 1920s left Italy vulnerable to the great depression and unemployment once again rose. Rather than deficit spending the dictatorship pursued orthodox financial policies, cutting spending and doing little directly to stop unemployment and underemployment becoming a problem. A more interventionist policy produced a drive for self-sufficiency. Reclamation schemes like the draining of the Pontine Marshes and drives to increase production such as the Battle for Grain offered effective propaganda material and the impression of action to overcome depression. However, they did little for productivity and while wheat imports were reduced, there was more limited action taken in other agricultural sectors. Real wages of agricultural workers fell by 50% by the mid-1930s. Faced with pressure from falling industrial production and the demands of industrialists for support, the regime fell back on direct control. Larger firms were encouraged to take over small firms in difficulties with the depression. In 1933 the Institute for industrial Reconstruction as established and by 1940 the Fascist state had a fifth of the capital holdings of increasing large industrial firms like Fiat. This form of state capitalism was evident in firms which were key to preparation for imperial expansion in war- aviation, shipping and fuel, As in Germany public works – Land reclamation, rail electrification, the building of autostrada was undertaken but the overall domestic demand fell and industrial growth and even survival became dependent on the state. Existing problems of poverty especially in the South were not effectively addressed by raising demand despite an increase in spending on regional development. The lira was devalued in 1936 and by 1937 the mixture of a relative shortage of goods and high sending had begun to cause inflationary pressures. However, the wars in Ethiopia and Spain and the increase in arms spending did create more growth. The disappointing results of autarky – impossible given Italy’s resources and heavy dependence on state spending with falling real wages and limited stimulus from internal demand did not produce an economy well equipped for the demands of a major world war. 1 Some answers may consider that the development of the Corporate State is an economic policy in the sense that attempts at cooperation and harmony did have some economic motivation. There were 22 Corporations set up but their overall effect was to increase the power of employers and link them more closely to the state at the expense of workers and while production was not interrupted by strikes there was limited effect on productivity as such and the depression of wages resulting from reduced workers’ rights had a negative economic effect.

Question 29

Evaluate the effectiveness of Nazi youth policy in achieving its aims. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 Evaluate the effectiveness of Nazi Youth policy in achieving its aims 30 There were various aims behind youth policy: young people had to be militarised and prepared for war; linked to this was the need for them to buy into the long-term ideology and mission for a greater Germany led by an all- powerful leader and guided by racial aims. The demarcation of roles for boys and girls in this mission-led totalitarian ideal had to be clear and accepted. Boys needed to be as hard as steel and relentlessly obedient and committed to the racial and military aims. Girls needed to see their importance as wives and mothers and also to rise to any demands made by the state. Both boys and girls needed to be able to put the Volk and its needs as expressed by the racial state before private lives and considerations. So not only formal education but also party led organisations worked hard at highly ambitious goals central to the long-term vision. It is easier to outline the structures and methods the control of the curriculum, the racial segregation, the youth movements, camps, rallies, propaganda and the establishment of a cult of youth, with far more opportunities for responsibility for younger people and support by the party for those who embraced the ideals but were not strong in school subjects. Many did relish the stress on physical activities against formal learning, the comradeship of the movements, the freedom from traditional restraints of home or dull jobs. The perverted idealism found its supporters. Many girls relished the traditional values and also found in the party unexpected opportunities for responsibility. For others there was frustration and a sense of being exploited. Hitler and the leadership flattered the young and gave them a sense of importance and through to the bitter end many young people showed a loyalty to the regime. However, in practice there was much boredom and disillusion. The pushing of complex ideology was often seen as tedious, and the youth movements often lacked skilled leaders. There was a lot of bullying. The creation of elite party schools did not reach the majority of youngsters and the requirements of military and labour service were not always welcome. Much has been made of opposition groups, but these were often more the result of wartime breakdown of discipline than of principled resistance. The notorious Edelweiss Pirates were seen more as juvenile delinquents and were never a national movement. Reaction to the demands and opportunities of youth policy varied considerably and generalisation is difficult especially as the demands of war imposed their own disciplines on young people.

Question 30

Assess the impact of Mussolini’s social policies on young people. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 Assess the impact of Mussolini’s social policies on young people. 30 Indicative content Youth was an important element in the rise of Fascism with the Avanguardia movement which became part of the Fascist organisation in 1921. The anthem ‘Youth’ was the national song and ‘Believe,Obey, Fight’ was intended to inspire young people. Aims for boys and girls were different once in power with the aim of militarising males and ensuring females produced stable homes and increased the birth rate. The younger children were in the Ballila (created April 1926). Though younger children enrolled as ‘Songs of the Wolf’. Initially popular, the youth movements lost appeal. They were underfunded and lacked good leaders. Also, the advancement which parents hoped for enrolling their children often did not materialise. Training was heavily militaristic, and girls participated but could not rise through the ranks. The ideology was conservative socially and the youth movements from Figli del lupo to Ballila to Avaguardisti to Young Fascist were rigidly hierarchy and lacked much in imaginative appeal. Training guides were produced centrally by the party – there were commands to memorize and utter acceptance of authority was alienating for many. The ideal of putting state before family loyalty was not an easy one to impose in family-orientated Italy and other loyalties like religion had to be considered. Youth movements had a chaplain attached to appease the catholic church. Fascist leaders were often seen as corrupt and unpopular. By the early 1930s the party was reporting that membership of youth movements was a matter of conforming to ensure jobs and benefits rather than a matter of passion and commitment. Money was not always there for uniforms or activities. An attempt at rejuvenating the movement under Starace was made in 1938 and a new organisation ther Gioventu Italiana di Littorio was established. Youth activities discriminated against girls and many families disapproved of the participation of girls in fascist activities designed to give confidence and strength to young people. As well as specific fascist youth groups, Gentile’s education reforms took the values of the regime into schools. The government passed La riforma Gentile on March 15, 1923 and implemented it throughout the 1920s. Some of the reforms were positive. The new endorsed curriculum modernized the schools, simplified the administrative reform, and fired inefficient teachers and officials. The reform set out the duty of teachers from kindergarden to university of instilling the values of their culture and nation. Students were obligated to attend school until they were fourteen, rather than the previous age requirement of twelve. It extended elementary schools to last five years instead of the previous four, so students entered secondary schools when they were eleven years old. Students who pursued secondary school education had several choices: the gymnasium-lyceums, the Scuola Complementare e Normale, or technical schools. Gentile was abandoned in 1931 and education became more ideological, geared for war and military service and the influence of party hardliners in education increased. There were fewer opportunities for girls and in contrast with the secularism of Gentile, the role of the church increased. 1 The reforms of Bottai in 1939 produced even tighter control and race became a feature of education with anti-Semitic elements in the curriculum from 1938. The rigidity was alienating for many and the impact varied depending on the pull of other elements – family, local traditions, dislike of authoritarian methods, boredom and resentment. Limited enthusiasm for war and military service and the suddenness of the collapse of the regime in the light of events in the war in contrast to the German experience might suggest the patchy long-term impact of the social policy.

Question 31

Analyse the effectiveness of Nazi economic policy in dealing with the effects of the Great Depression. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 Analyse the effectiveness of Nazi economic policy in dealing with the 30 effects of the Great Depression. Indicative content The effects of the Great Depression on Germany could be seen as primarily a rise in unemployment to over 6 million at the height of the crisis. The banking system ran into a period of instability and there were business failures. The middle classes already hit by the inflation of 1923 now found the opposite problem with deflation. Government retrenchment policies meant a cut back in the widespread expenditure by local government on welfare and exacerbated the restriction of demand. Certain sectors already suffering from structural problems like elements of agriculture and smaller trades – the so-called Mittelstand – found themselves suffering as much as the industrial working classes as both internal and external demand fell. Trade and exports were hard hit as the Depression became global. There were considerable hardships both physical and psychological. The Nazis made considerable political capital out of this hardship and blamed Germany’s dependence on international trade and finance, the capitalist system and also Jewish economic domination. The socialist side of the movement attacked the role of big business but once in power, the policies tended towards economic orthodoxy rather than radical economic restructuring. Schacht’s New Plan aimed at a trade-based recovery and he was suspicious of deficit finance and public works, though these did feature in a raft of measures. The restructuring and even anti-Semitic side of the rhetoric was not translated to immediate action and measures against department stores were limited for fear of further economic disruption. Cyclical recovery was already happening by the end of 1933 though this took a while to translate to a large fall in unemployment. Immediate moves by restricting women in work and by anti-Semitic measures gave the impression of action to protect male workers. Government spending on infrastructure and the financing of rearmament played some role in recovery. There were somewhat belated measures to protect agriculture and ensure hereditary properties were not broken up by forced sales or foreclosures. The recovery of world trade helped, and the confidence created by the new government and the rhetoric of national revival together with measures to alleviate elements of unemployment like the Reich Labour Service were effective in changing the public mood and encouraging more investment and consumer demand. However, the rearmament –led policies were probably of greater significance in terms of creating jobs. Attempts to deal with the dependence on foreign imports, the dangers of which were seen in the Depression were addressed by a programme of Autarky which was less than effective. The economy was not put into state hands but became increasingly dependent on state spending and the priorities of rearmament and it could be said that the problems of the Great Depression gave way to different economic problems. Not all policies were equally effective and not all of the recovery depended on Nazi policy though the propaganda claimed credit for recovery for well- publicised public works like the autobahn programme. The bitter poverty and sense of despair and of being at the mercy of fluctuations in the capitalist system however did not reappear and to that extent Nazi policies can be seen as effective even if the price tag was huge.

Question 32

‘US reaction to the Cuban Revolution was the main cause of the Cuban Missile Crisis.’ Assess this view. [30]

Accepted Answer

9 ‘US reaction to the Cuban Revolution was the main cause of the Cuban 30 Missile Crisis.’ Assess this view. Indicative content The Cuban Revolution brought Fidel Castro to power. US refusal to accept his rule and failure to overthrow him drove Castro into an alliance with the Soviets. The United States wanted to retain their influence in Cuba and during the 1950s had supported the corrupt and oppressive rule of Batista. Much of Cuba's industry was owned by US business and its main export, sugar, was controlled by the United States. Batista’s government was very unpopular, and Fidel Castro led a revolution against him in 1958. Havana fell in 1959 and Batista fled from Cuba. Castro formed a government, but he wanted to be free from US influence. He nationalised businesses and geared the economy to help the poorer Cubans. US refusal to accept Castro’s communist government drove Castro to seek Soviet support. However, the United States regarded itself as the protector of South and Central American countries from outside interference and believed that if Cuba remained communist, this would also spread to Latin America affecting US interests. The United States stopped selling arms to Cuba and considered banning the purchase of sugar and Castro asked the Soviet Union to buy it instead. Some of Batista’s supporters formed part of a US plan to invade Cuba in 1961 and overthrow Castro. The Bay of Pigs landing proved to be a humiliating failure, but Castro was certain that the United States wanted to overthrow him. Kennedy and the CIA then approved Operation Mongoose whereby Cuban exiles and the CIA attacked industry and farmland and assassinated members of Castro’s government. Kennedy was obsessed with defeating Castro and removing any communist threat so close to the United States. The US provided the opportunity for Khrushchev to protect Cuba. Khrushchev was unpopular in the Soviet Union; it was felt that he would not be able to bring about a worldwide communist revolution. By the late 1950s, he was losing support in Russia. He was disliked for his ‘Secret Speech’ in which he criticised the communist regime and many of its leaders. He also faced rebellions in Poland and Hungary in 1956 and the Berlin Wall, erected in 1961, showed that he had to imprison citizens to prevent them from escaping from East Germany. Relations had also deteriorated with China. The opportunity to assist Cuba made it look as if he was helping a communist state in danger and he might have the chance to spread communism to Latin America. He had also underestimated Kennedy and thought that he could risk putting intermediate-range ballistic missiles on Cuba in 1962. He believed that Kennedy was weak because of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Kennedy had not taken military action after the building of the Berlin Wall and Khrushchev believed he would not be able to deal with Soviet military presence in Cuba. Khrushchev certainly misjudged the situation in 1962. He felt justified in helping to spread communism and protecting Castro. The crisis began with his decision to install intermediate and medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. Kennedy saw U2 pictures of the missiles on 16 October 1962; they had been secretly deployed by Khrushchev in April. The Americans had been lied to about the Soviet intentions making a US response inevitable. Such missiles could threaten most US cities. 9 However, he could have defended Cuba with conventional weapons. It seems likely that Khrushchev wanted to appear to have greater military strength than the United States. Appearing to defend the Cuban Revolution gave Khrushchev the opportunity to try to score a nuclear success over the Americans.

Question 33

Assess the extent to which Cold War tensions influenced the civil war in Mozambique. [30]

Accepted Answer

11 Assess the extent to which Cold War tensions influenced the civil war 30 in Mozambique. Indicative content The civil war began in 1977, two years after Mozambique gained its independence from Portugal. Mozambican nationalism became intertwined with the politics of the region and the Cold War. External interests - American, Soviet, Cuban, South African, Rhodesian - sought to advance their own agenda and future vision of the country. The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) led by President Machel controlled the central government and was strongest in the cities and major towns while the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) operated mainly in the countryside. FRELIMO adopted a Marxist-Leninist one-party-state system which RENAMO was opposed to. Mozambique was surrounded by two white minority governments in Rhodesia and South Africa who did not want to co-exist with a country that was prepared to support independence struggles in their own countries. RENAMO was first created by Ian Smith's white minority rulers in Southern Rhodesia. Robert Mugabe and African freedom fighters used areas within Mozambique as staging grounds for attacks against Smith's white minority regime. Southern Rhodesia's army supported a civil war that would turn Africans against each other. The apartheid regime of South Africa feared a thriving African regime next door in Mozambique would undermine its argument that Africans were incapable of self-rule. It used RENAMO to deliberately discredit the regime. As the war continued both sides began using brutal tactics including land mines. RENAMO however attempted to decimate the country and its people by burning cooperative farms, destroying infrastructure, killing doctors and teachers who worked with FRELIMO, and destroying schools. Its Rhodesian and South African controllers wanted to show Mozambican peasants that FRELIMO could not protect them. Mozambique became one of Moscow's closest allies in Africa. In 1977 a 20- year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed with the Soviet Union. In return for military advisers and Soviet weapons, FRELIMO, gave the Soviet navy access to ports and supported Soviet-backed insurgents. Some Western nations, including the United States, provided funding for RENAMO, in opposition to the socialist FRELIMO, thus making it an area of Cold war tension. However, President Machel met President Reagan in the early 1980s; Reagan was impressed with him and he ordered the United States to oppose right-wing efforts within South Africa to overthrow him. Mozambique became an exception to Reagan's ‘constructive engagement’ policy that normally supported the white minority apartheid regime in South Africa and its efforts to influence politics in its surrounding area. Machel and South Africa signed the Nkomati Accord in 1984. Machel pledged to oust ANC militants from Mozambique and South Africa promised to stop arming, training, and funding RENAMO. Right-wing South African soldiers never intended to honour this agreement and the United States dropped its ban on bilateral aid to help Machel. Joachim Chissano became president in 1986 after Machel’s death. By 1990, neither side seemed to be winning the war. Developments outside Mozambique, however, would soon bring an end to the fighting. By 1990 South Africa was moving toward a black majority- controlled nation and the Soviet Union had fallen. 11 FRELIMO and RENAMO were losing their major supporters and arms suppliers. In 1990, Mozambique adopted a new constitution that included multiparty elections. In 1992, a peace accord was signed in Rome which allowed UN peacekeepers to enter the country.

Question 34

‘Maintaining good relations with the Catholic Church was the main reason for Mussolini’s popular support.’ Assess this view. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 ‘Maintaining good relations with the Catholic church was the main 30 reason for Mussolini’s popular support.’ Assess this view. Indicative content Answers might draw a distinction between the support Mussolini gained from conservative Catholics in his stance against the anti-clerical left and the more official agreement made in the Lateran Treaties which ended the tensions between Church and state that had divided Italy since the Risorgimento and the loss of the papal states to the new Kingdom of Italy. Recognising the special position of the church in the state meant that Catholics could serve and support the state without reservations and has been seen as a major achievement by Mussolini. There were distinct political advantages as the Pope accepted that there would be no criticism of state policies and especially foreign policy. So, while the Pope had concerns about the Ethiopian War in 1935, they were not expressed, helping Mussolini gain support. The concrete expression of the links between the independent Vatican which gained financial support and was opened to the public and the Italian state was shown in a new road between the palace and the city centre. There is no doubt that Mussolini exploited the propaganda value of this reconciliation to a great extent. However, it could be argued that changes in the late nineteenth century and the national effort of the First World War had made catholic alienation less important and that the main reasons for popular support lay elsewhere. The personal appeal of an energetic leader who raised Italian prestige aboard and ended the political conflicts that had worried so many middle-class Italians could be seen as key. There was also the use of propaganda for a resurgent Italy, well-publicised public works schemes, the impression of greater economic growth with the ‘battles’ for wheat and measures to encourage birth rate and the publicity given to social cooperation and harmony in the Corporate State. It could be argued that the vision of unity of progress was the overriding factor and the Lateran Treaties were part of a wider appeal rather than necessarily being a ‘main cause’. Alternatively, it might be seen that the acceptance of the dictatorship by the church and the links between state and traditional elements like the church and monarchy were the key elements.

Question 35

‘Reducing unemployment was the main aim of Nazi economic policy.’ Discuss this view. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 ‘Reducing unemployment was the main aim of Nazi economic policy.’ 30 Discuss this view. Indicative content The rise in unemployment was a major reason for the growth in support for Nazism and could not be ignored when Hitler gained office and power. Despite the use of force, the new government had to deliver on its economic promises but full employment was part of a wider economic aim to increase production to allow for rearmament to fulfil wider foreign policy and geopolitical aims which would lead to an expansion of the Reich to ensure self-sufficiency. Full employment would be a result of this projected expansion, so it was both an aim and a means to wider economic aims – autarky and military expansion. Also, in the period before war preparation became a much more central and overt aim, economic policy was directed towards more than simply providing direct projects to reduce unemployment. Schacht was concerned less with deficit finance and public works than more orthodox plans for recovery through trade and private enterprise. The new Plan might have had unemployment reduction as an aim as part of a general economic recovery but did not target this. So measures such as the reduction of women workers and Jews in employment and policies towards department stores had ideological aims and while might have created some jobs did not play a major role in unemployment which was falling in any case as a result of as cyclical upturn. The creation of a Reich Labour Service and some public workers schemes did target disguising and reducing unemployment. Also financing schemes for rearmament like the famous Mefo Bills and then the Four-Year Plan and moving away from fiscal orthodoxy with the dismissal of Schacht might have reduced unemployment in practice – indeed there was a labour shortage from 1936 in some areas and women returned to the work place. However, it is more plausible to see these policies being driven by concern about the dependence of the Reich on foreign imports which had been seen as one of the reasons for the loss of the Great War. Also, the mobilisation of the economy for a future war was more of a priority for Hitler who was explicit in his view that the economy is there to serve the state and not the other way round. So, neither full employment in its own right or even economic stability which might have protected full employment was the aim by the late 1930s, as the economy overheated with rearmament pressuring the supply of labour and raw materials.

Question 36

Evaluate the extent to which the Berlin Crisis of 1958–61 led to increased tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. [30]

Accepted Answer

9 Evaluate the extent to which the Berlin Crisis of 1958–61 led to 30 increased tension between the United States and Soviet Union. Indicative content It seemed that Khrushchev never intended peaceful coexistence to end competition between the two superpowers, merely that it would be peaceful competition. Suspicion existed between both sides even before the Berlin crisis. Eisenhower’s ‘New Course’ foreign policy included the use of greater nuclear weapons, a policy of massive retaliation and brinkmanship. In 1955 Khrushchev set up the Warsaw Pact with plans of how to wage nuclear war against NATO. However, the Berlin crises exacerbated the tension as both sides came close to war. Just ten years after the agreement on the ending of the Berlin Blockade, on 10 November 1958, Khrushchev announced that within six months he would declare this agreement ‘null and void’ and place all of Berlin under Soviet control. He maintained that there would be war if the West resisted. By the autumn of 1958 East Germany had lost 2 million people who were using East Berlin as an escape route and Khrushchev was determined to stop this. Hopes of an agreement between the United States and Soviet Union were soon dashed when the Soviets shot down a U-2 spy plane capturing the pilot, Gary Powers. Democrats in the United States spread reports that the Soviets were ahead of the United States in ICBMs. Eisenhower believed this to be false based on the evidence produced by U-2 spy planes but he ordered one more flight to take place in May 1960. The plane was shot down by the Soviets and Eisenhower, assuming that Powers was dead, lied and said that the plane must have veered off course but the Soviets learnt the truth from Powers. Thus, suspicion and distrust were exacerbated by Eisenhower’s actions. Khrushchev cut off talks with Eisenhower hoping that the new administration in the United States might achieve a resolution. In the summer of 1961, he met Kennedy in Vienna but no solution was found to the Berlin problem and Khrushchev again gave the United States 6 months to withdraw from Berlin. Kennedy responded by preparing for a potential conflict. Khrushchev’s own response was seen on 13 August 1961 when a barbed wire fence was erected on the order of Walter Ulbricht separating East and West Berlin making the city the heart of the Cold War. It can be argued that Khrushchev was only bluffing in 1958 and that he was in no position to alienate the United States. The fact that the two sides agreed to talks suggests they wanted to avert war. Khrushchev returned from his talks at Camp David with an agreement from Eisenhower to a summit in Paris the following year. Berlin and disarmament would be discussed. In January 1960, he gave a public speech to the Supreme Soviet, laying out a disarmament plan in which the Soviets would unilaterally withdraw 1 million troops from Eastern Europe and invite NATO to respond in kind. He would also destroy all Soviet missiles and discuss on-site inspection to verify that the United States did the same. Kennedy did not agree to a resolution as he was prepared to defend the interests of capitalism. A standoff between US and Soviet troops on either side of the diplomatic checkpoint led to one of the tensest moments of the Cold War in Europe. The United States stationed tanks on its side of the checkpoint, pointing towards the East German troops just beyond the wall. 9 Concerns that US forces would either attempt to take down the wall or force their way through the checkpoint led the Soviet Union to station its own tanks on the East German side. However, Kennedy suggested that Khrushchev remove his tanks and the US Army would reciprocate. The standoff ended peacefully but the Cuban Crisis of 1962 saw the two sides on the brink of nuclear war.

Question 37

Assess the success of Italian foreign policy in the period 1922–41. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 Assess the success of Italian foreign policy in the period 1922–41 30 Indicative content Given the criticisms of the liberal governments after 1918 for showing weakness in securing Italian gains in the peace settlement and in having to hand back Fiume to the new Yugoslavia after the d’Annunzio occupation, a key aim of foreign policy after 1922 was to restore prestige, extend territory and make Italy a more important player in world affairs. In the 1920s it could be argued there was a degree of success. However, when Mussolini embarked on a more ideologically driven and expansionist policy in the 1930s this was more problematic. Success criteria should be established and in the 1920s the stated aims of making Italy more respected feared and influential were achieved. Compensation was gained from Greece after the bombardment of Corfu. Fiume was gained from Yugoslavia. Italy was involved in key European discussions at Locarno and was being seen as a major European power. Right up to the Stresa Front, Mussolini was seen by Britain and France as a key stabilising influence in protecting the status quo in Austria. Italy’s influence over Austria and the Balkans had grown. Mussolini prevented the Anschluss with Germany in 1934 by a decisive action not shown by other powers. This influence continued into the late 30s when Italy played an important role in Munich and in 1940 some in the British cabinet wished to use him as a way to establish a peace. However, the invasion of Ethiopia put a rift between Italy and Britain and France and drove Mussolini into closer ties with Hitler. Greater ideologically based policies led to a costly and not very productive intervention in the Spanish Civil War with the somewhat humiliation treatment of submarine activity in the Mediterranean being curtailed by the other powers at Nyon. There was the success of colonisation in Ethiopia but to the detriment of Italy’s reputation and with somewhat doubtful gains in terms of resources. Italian forces did not distinguish themselves in war but new land was gained again in Albania and from France in 1940. The cost however was to be shackled to Germany and the bill had to be paid by entry into the war and subsequent humiliating defeat in North Africa and Greece and costly and unpopular participation in the invasion of the Soviet Union. By 1941 Italy was no longer respected or greatly feared and had become inextricably involved in a war that was to topple the regime and led to considerable death and destruction and to the loss of the lands gained since 1922.

Question 38

Evaluate the success of Nazi policies towards the Christian churches. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 Evaluate the success of Nazi policies towards the Christian churches. 30 Indicative content Much depends on how the aims are seen. One aim was to neutralise any opposition from the churches, particularly the Catholic church as its political Zentrum party was needed for support for the Enabling Law and then was dissolved with the other parties. The tradition of cooperation with the state by the Evangelical church made it less pressing, but a general aim was the coordination of organizations in the Reich. The Concordat was a short-term success in gaining the acceptance of the hierarchy for the dictatorship. The emphasis on ending the Communist threat was successful and the demise of the Catholic political party was accepted. The Evangelical church was divided by the attempt to form a separate church – the German Christians. Again, political opposition to the dictatorship was contained. In a wider aim of ending all alternative allegiances to the Nazi movement and eroding values in Christianity which went counter to the ideology of racial violence, expansionist war and unrestrained force to achieve ends untainted by compassion, there was more variable success. Despite campaigns against Christianity, there was continued allegiance to religion and local Nazi reports refer to clashes of loyalty. While utmost war could be waged against the Jews, more care had to be taken with Christians. The open criticism of Archbishop Galen against euthanasia had to be accepted – Goebbels hoped for a reckoning in the future, but the programme was officially ended – or disguised – marking an unusual victory for opposition, however limited. The German Christian movement was not successful in dominating protestant religion and critics emerged here, too, though often like Niemoller they were suppressed. The need for unity in the war meant that the wider aims for suppressing religion and ensuring that any spiritual life was conducted through the Nazi ideology were not implemented. Army chaplains were important and religion was needed when civilian suffering increased through allied bombing and heavy casualties in the East. The state never achieved the suppression of religious institutions and an alternative value system surfaced in many acts of dissent – most famously the White Rose – but also in individual acts of kindness towards Jews or foreign labourers. Some groups notably the Jehovah’s Witnesses would not conform and suffered persecution.

Question 39

Evaluate the view that Mussolini had failed to achieve his economic aims by 1941. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 Evaluate the view that Mussolini failed to achieve his economic aims 30 by 1941. It would be helpful to set out what Mussolini’s economic aims were before judging the extent to which they were achieved. It is reasonable to say that his initial economic policies were designed to secure his political position. A more ambitious programme of economic transformation developed, including the creation of a corporate state to tackle Italy’s long standing economic weaknesses. From the mid-1930s, priorities changed towards autarky and military preparations. Under the guidance of De Stefani, early policies were traditional and designed to reassure industrialists, with limited government intervention and taxes on war profits reduced or abolished. From 1922–25, generally improving conditions across Europe led to a period of ‘boom’ in the economy. The economic battles had mixed results. The Battle for Lira aimed to increase Mussolini and Italy’s prestige by fixing the price of the Lira but harmed the economy by making exports more expensive and lowered wages. The Battle for Grain was meant to make Italy self-sufficient and reduce the balance of trade deficit. It led to a fall of wheat imports by 75% but harmed other forms of agriculture and increased bread prices in Italy. The Battle for Land provided jobs and improved public health, but there was limited land reclaimed, other than the showpiece project at the Pontine Marshes. The Corporate State was meant to revolutionise the economy, but it can be argued that it was little more than a propaganda exercise as the corporations had little real power and were unbalanced towards employers. They were also very costly, requiring a vast bureaucracy. Italy was not as badly affected by the Great Depression as some other European nations, although the Corporate State was not responsible. The creation of the IRI could be deemed successful in this regard. Autarky was largely unsuccessful, with Italy depending on imports for many basics and with domestic production in 1939 meeting only one-fifth of its raw material needs, for instance oil, coal and iron ore had to be imported in large quantities. Even if self-sufficiency in grain was achieved, it could be argued that autarky was an unattainable goal for Italy. Modern industries such as electricity, steel, engineering, chemicals were developed and there was modest growth in the economy, although no major transformation was achieved. A balanced assessment of the extent to which aims were met is expected to reach the higher levels.

Question 40

‘Weimar politicians were mostly responsible for Hitler’s rise to power in January 1933.’ Discuss this view. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 ‘Weimar politicians were mostly responsible for Hitler’s rise to power 30 in January 1933’. Discuss this view. This question requires a balanced discussion of the factors behind Hitler’s appointment as chancellor in 1933. The misjudgements of Weimar politicians between 1929 and 1933 should be balanced against other alternative explanations. It should be possible at the higher levels to show how these factors can be interconnected. Examples which could be used in support of the statement: The failures of successive governments, led by Müller, Brüning, von Papen and von Schelicher to deal with the economic problems facing Germany as a result of the Great Depression. The nature of coalition government and divisions, for example of the rate of unemployment benefit in 1930. The increasing reliance on emergency decrees to rule. The miscalculation made by Hindenburg and Papen in appointing Hitler as chancellor in January 1933, based on the assumption that they would be able to control him. Alternatives which could be advanced to create a balanced argument include: The unpopularity of the Weimar Republic, initially relating to the armistice and Treaty of Versailles, and unfamiliarity with democratic government. Discussion of events prior to 1929 should be linked to the growth of support for Nazism in the years 1929–33. The Weimar constitution which allowed for coalition government through its use of proportional representation and for emergency decrees to be passed through Article 48. This led to increased disillusionment with democracy and allowed the Nazis to promote its destruction for the greater good of Germany. The impact of the Great Depression on Germany, leading to bankruptcies, unemployment and a banking crisis, and to a growing feeling that parliamentary democracy was unable to cope with the scale of the crisis. This could link to the arguments in favour of the statement. The growth of support for communism in Germany, which meant that many sections of society were seeking a saviour. This particularly led to support from the middle classes and from business and land owners, including powerful financial backers. The appeal of Hitler and Nazism, offering a dynamic response to the problems facing Germany. The promises of work and bread, to crush the communist threat and to restore German pride were popular with many people and were skilfully presented through effective propaganda campaigns.

Question 41

‘Opposition to the Shah’s attempts to westernise Iran was the main cause of the Iranian Revolution.’ Assess this view. [30]

Accepted Answer

12 ‘Opposition to the Shah’s attempts to westernise Iran was the main 30 cause of the Iranian Revolution.’ Assess this view. The Iranian Revolution replaced a pro-Western semi-absolute monarchy with an anti-Western authoritarian theocracy in 1979. A number of factors demonstrated that it was a conservative backlash against the westernising and secularising efforts of the Western-backed Shah. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi became Shah in 1941. He maintained close ties with the United States and pursued a westernising, modernising economic policy as well as a pro-western foreign policy and had the guarantee of US protection. US culture was seen as influencing that of Iran. In 1951 a new prime minister was elected, Mohammad Mosaddegh. He promised to nationalise Iran’s oil industry. He also wanted to reduce the powers of the Shah. Mosaddegh was supported by Iran’s Communist Party and the CIA decided that they needed to remove him from power. A coup was orchestrated with the backing of the Shah adding to the Shah’s unpopularity. Through the 1960s, the Shah rushed through unpopular modernisation programmes in the ‘White Revolution’. The reforms led to rapid urbanisation and westernisation. They were economically successful, but changes to social norms and traditional institutions were widespread. The Shah’s reforms also chipped away at the traditional bases of clerical power with the development of secular courts and emphasis on secular education. However, it was the increasing arbitrariness of the Shah's rule that provoked both religious leaders, who feared losing their traditional authority, and intellectuals and students seeking democratic reforms. The most notable critic was Ruhollah Khomeini, exiled in 1964, whose theories of clerical governance and network of government dissidents brought about the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. Opponents criticised the Shah for violation of the constitution, which placed limits on royal power and provided for a representative government. The Shah's regime suppressed and marginalised its opponents with the help of Iran's security and intelligence organisation, the SAVAK. It became increasingly oppressive, brutal, corrupt, and extravagant. It also suffered from basic functional failures that brought economic bottlenecks, shortages, and inflation. That the revolution replaced the monarchy with Islamism and Khomeini is partly due to the spread of the Shia version of the Islamic revival and to the underestimation of Khomeini’s Islamist movement by the Shah and the secularist opponents of the government. Outlets for political participation were minimal, and opposition parties such as the National Front and the pro-Soviet Tūdeh Party were marginalised or outlawed. Social and political protest was often met with censorship, surveillance, or harassment. The secular intellectuals abandoned their aim of reducing the authority and power of the Shiʿi ulama (religious scholars) and argued that, with their help, the Shah could be overthrown. Khomeini preached that revolt and martyrdom, against injustice and tyranny was part of Shia Islam, and that Muslims should reject the influence of both liberal capitalist and communist ideas that inspired the revolutionary slogan ‘Neither East, nor West – Islamic Republic’. In October 1977 demonstrations against the Shah, begun by several million Iranians, developed into a campaign of civil resistance that included both secular and religious elements. Between August and December 1978, strikes and demonstrations paralysed the country. The Shah left Iran for exile on 16 January 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini was invited back to Iran by the government.

Question 42

Assess the view that Mussolini’s economic response to the Great Depression was ineffective. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 Assess the view that Mussolini’s economic response to the Great 30 Depression was ineffective. Like all Western European states, Italy was affected by the world slump from 1929. American loans were withdrawn, farmers were hit by the fall in grain prices, industry suffered from the collapse of demand and unemployment rose from under half a million in 1928 to two million by 1933. Mussolini’s response was to increase state intervention in the economy. Large-scale public works schemes, such as the building of motorways and hydroelectric power plants, land reclamation and electrification were also begun to provide work for the unemployed. Further state intervention came through the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI) which was a government agency set up in 1935 to help industry to taking over shares previously owned by banks. By 1939, 20% of industry was controlled by the IRI. In effect, many companies were state controlled to prevent their collapse, and attempted to restructure and rationalise business to make them more efficient. The IMI was set up to support banks and to avoid the banking collapses in Germany and the USA. Government welfare schemes, most notably family allowances were extended in the 1930s and shorter working hours helped to share out the work to partly alleviate unemployment. In comparison to many other countries, Italy was not as badly hit by the Great Depression, with GDP declining by 5.4% from 1927–33, compared to 7.1% on average for the rest of Western Europe. However, public debt rose from 100 billion to 150 billion lira between 1929 and 1938. The general failure of the Corporative State was also apparent during the 1930s as living standards declined, following the revaluation of the lira and imposition of wage cuts, meaning that real wages fell in the mid-1930s.

Question 43

‘Stalin’s main aim in foreign policy was to defend the Soviet Union from attack.’ Discuss. [30]

Accepted Answer

2 ‘Stalin’s main aim in foreign policy was to defend the Soviet Union 30 from attack.’ Discuss Stalin shifted foreign policy away from the promotion of world socialist revolution, which was espoused by Lenin and Trotsky, towards ‘Socialism in One Country. He argued that the Comintern would not achieve revolution elsewhere and that it was not necessary to foment world revolution for socialism to be successfully built in the Soviet Union. Stalin was, therefore, changing the focus of the Comintern to protecting the security of the Soviet state, rather than aiming to achieve world revolution. Stalin’s preferred policy was consistently that of collective security against Nazi Germany. The Soviet Union joined the League of Nations in 1934 and signed mutual assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935. The Comintern no longer denounced social democratic and Labour parties as ‘social fascists’ and aimed to create anti-fascist popular fronts, for example in France and Spain. It was only with the Munich Conference in 1938 that it became apparent that the Soviet Union could not expect support from Britain and France and that appeasement showed that collective security had failed. A new policy would be required, and this led to the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939. Good relations between Germany the Soviet Union continued until 1934. It was Hitler rather than Stalin who departed from this stance. There was continued contact between the Soviet Union and Germany and negotiations between the nations continued between 1933 and 1937. Molotov was an advocate of improved relations with Germany rather than collective security. Stalin had no clear preference, was flexible and was prepared to reach whichever agreement was most beneficial to the Soviet Union. An agreement with Germany would allow the Soviet Union to carry out an aggressive foreign policy by expanding territory and sphere of influence into Poland and the Baltic States. There was some inconsistency in Stalin’s attitude to both China and Japan. Conflict with China in 1929 over the Manchurian Chinese Eastern Railway and in 1934 with the Soviet Invasion of Xinjiang gave way to a Non-Aggression Pact in 1937 supplemented by military and financial aid for China. This was influenced by the deteriorating relationship with Japan, following the 1931 Invasion of Manchuria and, particularly, the Anti-Comintern Pact signed between Germany and Japan in 1936. This might be said to have partially influenced the signing of the Nazi- Soviet Pact in 1939.

Question 44

Analyse the reasons for limited opposition to the Nazi regime within Germany in the period 1933–41. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 Analyse the reasons for limited opposition to the Nazi regime within 30 Germany in the period 1933–41. The proposition is that there was a lack of widespread opposition to the Nazi regime. The question does not, therefore, require an analysis of the extent of opposition. It is expected that a range of reasons will be advanced for this situation, with a judgment made on relative significance. The regime’s use of terror and oppression were successful in silencing potential opponents. Reference could be made to the use of the SA, SS, Gestapo, SD, concentration camps to explain this factor. The widespread nature of propaganda could also be explained as a factor which limited opposition and persuaded many of the success of the Nazi regime. References could be made to examples, such as the control of the media, such as newspapers or radio, rallies such as those at Nuremberg, or sporting events such as the 1936 Olympic Games. The apparent success of Nazi policies could be advanced as a relevant example. Economic developments, such as the rapid decrease in unemployment and the creation of major public works schemes, for instance the autobahns, might be put forward to support this point. Foreign policy success in rebuilding German military strength and in defying the Allies over aspects of the Treaty of Versailles might be used. The apparent legality of Hitler’s rise to power and the creation of a dictatorship might also be used as an argument and could be allied to the lack of a tradition of ‘loyal’ opposition in Germany. What opposition there was bitterly divided. The Left between the Liberals, Socialists and Communists. The biggest group was the Communists and Stalin destroyed its leadership on at least two occasions. There was also no major figure on either the Left or the Right who could command serious respect of loyalty outside a limited number of people. The Right was bitterly divided between monarchists, nationalists, and those who believed they could manage Hitler and use him for their own ends and those who ultimately were prepared to adopt Nazi ideas and support Hitler openly.

Question 45

‘A period of limited social change.’ Assess this view of Italy from 1925 to 1941. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 ‘A period of limited social change.’ Assess the view of Italy from 1925 30 to 1941. Indicative content The extent to which Mussolini succeeded in transforming Italian society can be viewed through his policies relating to the Catholic church, education and youth and women and families. He wanted to recreate Italian society in the fascist mould: tough, disciplined and obedient. Relations with the church were cemented by the Lateran Treaty and Concordat of 1929. There were, however, continued tensions, such as the dispute over the Catholic Action youth group in 1931 and Papal opposition to anti-Semitics policies in 1938. Catholicism remained a powerful influence in Italian society, despite fascist dictatorship. Fascism emphasised a traditional role for women and the regime tried to discourage girls from entering higher education and aimed to increase the birth rate through the Battle for Births from 1927. Evidence suggests that women generally did not accept their limited role, with many Italian women maintaining their role in the economy and with marriage and birth rates not increasing. There was some change in education policies, as the teaching profession was regulated by the Fascist Teachers’ Association, textbooks were re-written, and the cult of personality was heavily promoted. The ONB was set up as a youth organisation to further indoctrinate children, with attendance made compulsory in 1935. Education had some impact in decreasing illiteracy rates, as government spending on education increased and more children attended school for longer. The impact of fascism on young people’s attitudes was variable, with young people either absorbing them, conforming or resisting. Policies to unite all Italians tended not to affect the class structure, as Mussolini was generally keen to maintain the support of the traditional elite groups. Many Italians also took advantage of leisure opportunities offered by the Dopolavoro, with sporting facilities, theatres and drama societies, libraries, holidays etc. Probably the most popular of Mussolini’s social policies, it had 3.8 million members by 1939. An overall analysis of the extent to which Italian society was changed by Mussolini’s policies should be expected in order to assess the statement made.

Question 46

Assess the extent to which superpower involvement affected Ethiopia during the Cold War. [30]

Accepted Answer

11 Assess the extent to which superpower involvement affected Ethiopia 30 during the Cold War. Indicative content The 1974 overthrow of the regime of Haile Selassie in Ethiopia by a clique of Marxist officers known as the Derg shook what had previously been a relatively stable regional order. As political unrest overcame Ethiopia and the Derg grew increasingly radical, ethnic insurgencies by Eritreans, Oromos, Tigrayans, Afars, and Ogadens flared on the borders of the former Ethiopian empire. Eritrea, which been in rebellion since 1960, was home to the most serious insurgency. The burden of these rebellions placed a massive strain on Ethiopia. Ogaden Somalis held deep ties with their kin on the Ethiopian side of the border and Somalia dreamt of a ‘Greater Somalia’ that incorporated ethnic Somalis living in Ethiopia. Barre’s Somali regime initially sought to achieve this goal through irregular warfare. The Ethiopian government in these regions existed in a state of siege and effectively ceded control over the countryside. After guerrilla assaults in the spring of 1977 failed to secure any major towns, Somalia deployed conventional forces to try to achieve its political goal. However, superpower rivalry put more weapons at Somalia’s disposal. As the Cold War heated up, the USSR joined the United States in the struggle for power and influence in the Horn of Africa. In 1963, the USSR signed a military assistance pact with Somalia. In 1964, the First Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia broke out and the Ethiopian government, backed by the United States defeated the Somalis. Fearing the loss of Ethiopia to the Soviets, US arms shipments continued in reduced quantities after Selassie’s fall but the Marxist Derg, needing vast amounts of military equipment because of the Eritrean insurgency, also sought Soviet assistance. In July 1977, defying Moscow, the Soviet-equipped Somali National Army invaded the Ogaden. By August 1977, the Soviets began to come down firmly in support of Ethiopia. They reduced aid to Barre who expelled all Soviet advisers from Somalia in November 1977. Barre believed that the United States would now supply him with arms. Soviet aid poured into Ethiopia and 17 000 Cuban combat troops, arrived tipping the military balance in favour of the Ethiopians. Ethiopia's leaders, already faced with insurgencies and growing opposition to radical policies, feared the country was falling apart. Soviet arms were being used by the Somalis to destroy Ethiopia when the Soviets had assured Ethiopia that it could safely reduce its forces in the east without fear of a Somali attack. The Western powers, appalled at Somalia, cancelled arms sales. In January 1978 the Ethiopian forces unleashed a massive counterattack. With his army expelled from the Ogaden, Barre again called for Western military aid. The shock of the Soviet intervention ultimately led Carter to adopt Somalia as a Cold War ally. The Ogaden War had catastrophic consequences for East Africa. Ethiopia’s victory with Soviet support did not result in improvements for the people. In Ethiopia up to 500,000 were killed as a result of the Red Terror, from forced deportations or from the use of hunger as a weapon under Mengistu Haile Mariam’s rule. The Derg, with continued Soviet backing, pursued an ambitious programme that included collectivisation, intensive farming methods, and the nationalisation of forest areas. These reforms, combined with a drought decimated Ethiopian agricultural output and sparked a severe food shortage. By 1985, an estimated one million Ethiopians had died in the famine. Under Gorbachev aid to Ethiopia was reduced causing more economic hardship.

Question 47

Assess the extent to which persecution of Jews in Europe led to the creation of the state of Israel. [30]

Accepted Answer

12 Assess the extent to which persecution of Jews in Europe led to the 30 creation of the state of Israel. Indicative content During the 19th century, Jews in Eastern Europe faced growing persecution. An independent Jewish national movement first began to emerge in the Russian Empire. In 1896 Theodor Herzl asserted that establishing a Jewish state was the solution to growing antisemitism in Europe. In 1897, the Zionist Organisation was founded with the aim ‘to establish a home for the Jewish people in Palestine’. However, Zionism was regarded with suspicion by the Ottoman rulers and was unable to make major progress. Between 1904 and 1914, around 40 000 Jews settled in the area now known as Israel. Persecution had resulted in many Jews fleeing to Palestine and the Zionist movement spent many years building the political and economic infrastructure for an eventual Jewish state. However, the persecution of Jews during the Holocaust meant that many Jews in the diaspora who had previously been opposed to Zionism were convinced of the need for Jewish statehood. This led many diaspora Jews, especially those in the United States, to become vocal advocates of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. American Jews also provided much-needed money and arms to Jews in Palestine to help them develop and defend such a state. The mass mobilisation of American Jewry in support of Jewish statehood after World War II undoubtedly played a role in persuading the US government to support the partition of Palestine in the UN vote in November 1947, and then to immediately recognise the State of Israel after it was declared. President Truman was concerned about winning the influential Jewish vote in the presidential election of November 1948, and he was subjected to intense lobbying by American Jewish Zionists. American public opinion was deeply affected by the Holocaust, and consequently the United States became more supportive of Jewish statehood in its aftermath. President Truman showed genuine sympathy for Jewish suffering in the Holocaust and for the plight of Jewish Holocaust survivors. However, US foreign policy was driven by the need to resettle up to 250 000 Jewish refugees and displaced persons in Europe and by a desire to avoid a war in Palestine that might destabilise the Middle East and be exploited by the USSR. Some American policymakers also expected a Jewish state to be democratic and pro-Western. In the context of the emerging Cold War US strategic interests shaped American foreign policy more than humanitarian concerns for Holocaust survivors. The British opposed Jewish statehood: they wished to maintain good relations with Arab states whose plentiful oil supplies they needed. Palestine had been under the control of the British since 1917 and formally became a British mandate of the League of Nations in 1923. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 had stated that Britain favoured a national home for the Jewish people but did not want to prejudice the rights of non-Jewish communities. In 1945 the British confirmed that there would be no increase in immigration and no separate Jewish state. The Zionists, however, were convinced that they had international public opinion on their side and decided on a policy of active opposition to British rule in Palestine. After the war they made use of propaganda and lobbied members of the US government and Congress. The British government, unable to reach an agreement, referred the problem to the United Nations in 1947 and announced it would withdraw from Palestine on 18 May 1948. It was this decision to withdraw and relinquish control that enabled the UN decision on partition.

Question 48

Analyse the reasons for the appeal of fascism in the period 1919–25. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 Analyse the reasons for the appeal of fascism in the period 1919–25. 30 Fascism grew rapidly from a splinter group in 1919 to a movement which would have taken complete control of Italy by 1925. There are several factors which help to explain its rapid growth and could be used in an answer: Anti-socialism was an important factor in the appeal of fascism. The events of the Biennio Rosso of 1919–1920 convinced many in Italy that a socialist revolution was imminent and the political and economic elites, including the king, industrialists, large landowners, as well as the middle class, felt that the liberal government was incapable of defending their interests and were attracted by the fascists’ ideas and actions. Nationalist ideas appealed to Italians of all classes following the humiliation of the ‘mutilated victory.’ Mussolini learnt from the success of D’Annunizio and promised to restore Italy’s power and glory and make Italy the major Mediterranean power. Foreign policy success in Corfu in 1923 increased Mussolini’s appeal further. As did his promises to provide strong government and to bring law and order to Italy by curbing left-wing subversion through the use of violence. Mussolini’s own personality and political skills are also relevant. He was charismatic, able to successfully sense the mood of many Italians and was pragmatic and politically flexible. This flexibility was apparent during the period 1919–1921, when policies relating to republicanism, anti-clericalism and nationalization were moderated. There were conciliatory policies towards the Catholic Church in 1923, such restoring Religious Education in elementary schools, which pre-dated the Lateran Treaty, but reassured Catholics. There should be an attempt to explain which were the most important reasons, perhaps by indicating which factors bore most weight on which groups in Italian society.

Question 49

Analyse the view that Hitler’s consolidation of power in 1933–34 was a ‘legal revolution’. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 Analyse the view that Hitler’s consolidation of power in 1933–34 was a 30 ‘legal revolution’. When Hitler was appointed chancellor in January 1933, he was one of only three Nazis in a coalition government. By the summer of 1934 he was Head of State – the Fuhrer. It could be argued that the events and policies carried out between 1933–34 combined a mixture of legality and violence. Arguments which could be used to agree with the statement include how, following the Reichstag Fire, Hitler persuaded Hindenburg to pass the Decree for the Protection of People and the State, suspending constitutional civil rights in order to suppress the KPD. The Enabling Act followed, giving the government the right to issue law by decree, without Reichstag approval for four years. This was agreed by 441 votes to 94 (only the SPD voted against, with the KPD having already been banned). This led to the Law against the Formation of New Parties in July 1933, which made Germany a one-party state. The Concordat with the Catholic Church was passed in July 1933 and in 1934 the Law for the Reconstruction of the State dissolved state assemblies and replaced them with Reich Governors. However, these, ostensibly legal methods, were combined with threats and the actual use of violence, for example there were an estimated 500 murders by the SA in 1934. They were used to intimidate voters in the 1933 election Reichstag members to agree to the Enabling Act. By the end of 1933 there had been some 100,000 arrests. Many state governments had been overthrown by SA violence in March 1933. The laws passed during the following year merely formalised the existing position. The Night of the Long Knives in July 1934 saw the purging of the SA leadership, as well as the murder of Schleicher, Kahr and Strasser. A balanced analysis is expected, with a fully supported judgement to directly answer the question.

Question 50

Discuss the extent to which ideological differences affected Sino-Soviet relations in the period 1949–69. [30]

Accepted Answer

10 Discuss the extent to which ideological differences affected Sino- 30 Soviet relations in the period 1949–69. After the PRC was proclaimed in 1949, the USSR became its closest ally. Both believed in a productive relationship for the advancement of world socialism. In 1950 Mao signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. During the 1950s, thousands of scientists, industry experts and technicians from the USSR lived and worked in China; they played an important role in the industrialisation of China. Beijing committed itself to Stalinist models of development, growth and agricultural collectivisation. However, Mao felt undervalued and disrespected. He did not feel that Stalin treated him as an equal. In mid-1950, he committed forces to the Korean War, believing that Stalin would follow suit, but Stalin confined Soviet involvement to providing air support and supplying aircraft, weapons, and munitions. Mao believed that Stalin had an air of superiority towards China, and he thought that Stalin wanted a weak China that he could dominate. Mao’s interpretation of Marxism focused on using the peasants as the revolutionary class, but Stalin believed in using the urban working class. This soured relations but ideological differences were to worsen under Khrushchev. In 1956 Khrushchev’s ‘Secret Speech’ made a detailed attack on Stalin for his ‘crimes against the party’ and accused Stalin of being engaged in a ‘cult of personality’. Mao believed this was a criticism of his own style of leadership. He believed in world revolution. He also believed that de-Stalinisation was responsible for the protests in Eastern Europe in 1956 and did not want China to face dissent. The USSR and China had their own interpretations of Marxist-Leninism and were competing for ideological leadership. In 1957 Khrushchev held a conference in Moscow of the world’s communist parties; Mao attended and insisted that Moscow was too accommodating to the West and the USSR should abandon revisionism. Mao was suspicious that the USSR wanted to leave China internationally isolated. By far, the major ideological issue was the Great Leap Forward, which represented the Chinese rejection of the Soviet form of economic development. The Soviets were deeply resentful as they had spent heavily to supply China with cutting-edge technology. Moscow began to repudiate the terms of the 1949 military alliance and within a year the 1950 treaty was all but dead. In 1960, the USSR pulled its remaining technical advisors out of China. The war of words continued, including verbal clashes between Chinese and Russian delegates at party conferences in 1960 and 1961. In 1962, following the Cuban missile crisis, Mao accused Khrushchev of being afraid of the United States. When China and India went to war briefly in late 1962 over disputed borders, Moscow supported India. China and the USSR were now engaged in a cold war of their own and relations continued to worsen. In July 1964 Mao withdrew China’s ambassador and cut diplomatic ties with Moscow. The Sino-Soviet split came to a head with a brief border war in the late 1960s. Arguments over a contested border in Xinjiang province in north- western China led to a round of Sino-Soviet talks but these quickly broke down. In the summer and autumn of 1968, both the Chinese and Soviets increased their military presence in the region. There were a number of skirmishes. However, the death of Ho Chi Minh in September 1969 facilitated the restoration of diplomatic contact, but relations remained frosty.

Question 51

Assess the extent to which Mussolini’s regime received popular support. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 Assess the extent to which Mussolini’s regime received popular 30 support. Agreement with the idea of popular support could relate to the limited nature of opposition to the regime, with examples such as the Communist Party and Justice and Liberty having limited scope and impact. The success of propaganda and the cult of personality might also be used in agreement. Reference might be made to use of the mass media, radio, posters, rallies and education. Mussolini’s popularity might also be explained through support for the re-establishment of Italy as a strong nation, emphasised through foreign policy success such as in Abyssinia, or sporting success such as the 1934 and 1938 World Cup victories. Italian people’s enthusiasm for many of the activities offered by the OND might also be used in support, as might the Lateran Treaties and the Concordat of 1929 which were used to gain the support of the Catholic Church and its members. The scale of repression might be argued to indicate that not all Italians willingly supported the regime. The OVRA secret police relied upon a vast network of informants and agents. The Special Tribunals were used to try minor political crimes. About 10 000 political prisoners were kept in internal exile on islands such as Lipari and Lampedusa. There was little active opposition to the regime, but the degree of enthusiastic support is less certain. It could be argued that genuine popularity peaked with the victory in Abyssinia in 1936 and began to decline in the late 1930s. The introduction of anti- Semitic policies began to alienate the population and the response to the Reform of Customs in the late 1930s also indicates a growing divide between the regime and the general population.

Question 52

‘Terror was the most important factor in maintaining Nazi control of Germany in the period 1933–39.’ Discuss. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 ‘Terror was the most important factor in maintaining Nazi control of 30 Germany in the period 1933–39.’ Discuss. The regime’s use of terror and oppression were successful in silencing potential opponents. Reference could be made to the use of the SA, SS, Gestapo, SD, concentration camps to explain this factor. The use of terror in suppressing communists in 1933 following the Reichstag Fire and the SS’s role in purging the SA in the Night of the Long Knives are also relevant examples. Other factors that may be considered include the widespread nature of propaganda could be explained as a factor which helped to consolidate Nazi control and persuaded many of the success of the Nazi regime. References could be made to examples, such as the control of the media, newspapers or radio, rallies such as those at Nuremberg, or sporting events such as the 1936 Olympic Games. The apparent success of Nazi policies could also be considered, notably economic developments, such as the rapid decrease in unemployment and the creation of major public works schemes, for instance the autobahns. Foreign policy success in rebuilding German military strength and in defying the Allies over aspects of the Treaty of Versailles might also be used. Responses may also discuss the apparent legality of Hitler’s rise to power, and the creation of a dictatorship through the Enabling Act might also be used as an argument and could be allied to the lack of a tradition of ‘loyal’ opposition in Germany.

Question 53

‘Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence had little effect on US–Soviet relations.’ Evaluate this view. [30]

Accepted Answer

9 ‘Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence had little effect on US– 30 Soviet relations.’ Evaluate this view. Khrushchev never intended peaceful co-existence to end competition between the two superpowers, merely that it would be peaceful competition. Both sides remained suspicious of each other’s ideological stance and their relationship remained unstable. Eisenhower while prepared to enter into dialogue, remained fiercely opposed to communism. His ‘New Look’ foreign policy included the use of greater nuclear weapons, a policy of massive retaliation and brinkmanship. Thus, while dialogue between the two superpowers improved, there were areas of disagreement which continued to cause tension. In 1955 Khrushchev set up the Warsaw Pact with plans to use nuclear weapons against NATO if there was a war. Khrushchev also rejected Eisenhower’s ‘Open Skies’ proposal at the Geneva Summit in 1955. In addition, the United States was suspicious of Khrushchev’s intentions, especially after he sent troops into Hungary in 1956 and brutally crushed the revolts there. In 1957 the Soviets launched their first intercontinental ballistic missile which created US fears of a missile gap between the USSR and the United States. The USSR also began the space race with the United States with the launch of Sputnik 1, the first satellite, and in 1961 Yuri Gagarin became the first astronaut to orbit the earth. The United States was determined not to be left behind. The problem of Berlin also caused tension; many East Germans had fled into the West from East Berlin and in November 1958, Khrushchev announced that unless the West removed its forces from West Berlin within six months, he would allow the East Germans to control the access routes. President Eisenhower and the West stood firm, and Khrushchev eventually backed down. A summit meeting in Paris in 1960 was stopped by the shooting down of a U2 spy plane over Moscow and in 1961 Khrushchev made the same threat over Berlin. However, after Kennedy’s ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ speech which confirmed that West Berlin would not be deserted, Khrushchev ordered the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The Cuban Crisis of 1962 saw the two sides on the brink of nuclear war. However, Khrushchev’s adoption of the policy of peaceful coexistence with the West alongside his de-Stalinisation policy signalled a thaw in the Cold War. In 1955 he agreed to negotiate an end to the post-war occupation of Austria and allow a neutral country to be created. He told Tito, the Yugoslav leader, that ‘there are different roads to communism’. He also called for a reduction in defence expenditures and cut the size of the Soviet armed forces. On February 24, 1956 at the Communist Party’s Twentieth Congress Khrushchev made a speech denouncing Stalin. It became known as the ‘secret speech’ as it was read in a closed discussion, but the US State Department soon attained a copy. It seemed as if there would be a relaxation of Cold War tensions. In the late 1950s, the United States and the USSR initiated a cultural exchange programme and in 1959, Khrushchev visited the United States briefly meeting Eisenhower at Camp David. Predictions of improved future relations were reported which praised ‘the spirit of Camp David’ showing both superpowers were willing to enter into dialogue. In the United States both Eisenhower and Dulles realised that a dialogue needed to be established with the USSR because of the increased threat from nuclear weapons. Eisenhower wanted to lower conventional arms purchases and concentrate on nuclear weapons. The possibility of Mutually Assured Destruction made peaceful coexistence more attractive as it would reduce the risk of nuclear annihilation.

Question 54

Assess the view that Mussolini’s political skill was the most important reason for his rise to power by 1922. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 Assess the view that Mussolini’s political skill was the most important 30 reason for his rise to power by 1922. Mussolini showed great skill in adapting his political programme in the years between 1919–22 and was able to gain the support of Italy’s elites as a result: his skills were a crucial part of making fascism acceptable. Having begun with a left-wing programme, he quickly began to distance himself from many of the policies in the 1919 programme and exploited the fear of the upper and middle classes about the threat from socialism. He set out to reassure the Catholic Church, having previously promised to confiscate all property belonging to it. By 1921, he was declaring fascism to be opposed to divorce in a bid win support from Catholics. Policies on nationalisation were dropped and deliberate appeals to the conservative elites were made, particularly through Mussolini’s increasingly anti-socialist rhetoric and the actions of fascist squads. Although violence was a key part of the increased appeal of fascism, Mussolini was also careful to disassociate himself from its worst excesses and to suggest that only he could harness it. Other factors which might be considered include the political and economic context in which Mussolini was operating, the impact of the First World War, both economically and politically, the perceived threat of socialism and the apparent failure of liberal democracy to deal with the problems facing Italy. Responses may also consider the mistakes and weaknesses of the king which also help to explain Mussolini’s appointment in 1922. Like many others in the elite, he overestimated the strength of fascism and provided weak leadership. Mussolini also possessed other political skills other than pragmatism and was a highly able figurehead and propagandist.

Question 55

Assess the impact of Nazi policies towards the German workers in the period 1933–39. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 Assess the impact of Nazi policies towards German workers in the 30 period 1933–39. Arguments which can be made to indicate improvements include the eradication of unemployment in Germany between 1933 and 1939, falling to practically zero, having been almost 6 million in 1932. In 1936 the average wage for a worker was 35 marks per week, which was ten times the unemployment benefit received by millions in 1932. It is hard to argue that these workers and their families had not seen their living standards rise. Another improvement was in the increase of average paid holidays from three in 1933 to between six and twelve by 1939. Leisure activities also offered by the regime under the KdF programme allowed for subsidised holidays, sport, cinema and theatre visits. Over 10 million took KdF holidays in 1938. Beauty of Work programmes improved work facilities and conditions, with attention paid to canteens, changing rooms etc. Counterarguments could include how the hours of work increased (on average from 43 to 47 between 1933 and 1939) and how there was little, if any, increase in real wages for many workers. Those in armaments saw higher increase than many other workers, for instance in the production of consumer goods and in agriculture. Generally, increased wages depended upon overtime worked. Workers had lost freedom, with the suppression of free trade unions to be replaced by the DAF, they had little right to protest for improvements. Food consumption in many areas, such as meat, eggs, milk and fish all fell to varying degrees by the late 1930s. The Mittelstand also often failed to benefit in the ways that they might have expected, despite policies such as the Law to Protect Retail Trade and the Reich Entailed Farm Law. Women were forced out of employment in certain sectors and were discouraged from work for most of this period. Jewish people were treated similarly.

Question 56

Evaluate the reasons for the limited impact of political extremism in Britain during the 1930s. [30]

Accepted Answer

4 Evaluate the reasons for the limited impact of political extremism in 30 British politics during the 1930s. In common with many other countries, political extremism from both right- and left-wings grew in Britain during and after the Great Depression as some became convinced that liberal democracy was unable to meet its challenges. However, neither attained the level of support in Britain as elsewhere. Right-wing – British Union of Fascists Oswald Mosely had been a member of the Labour Party but had resigned due to his frustration with the rejection of his proposals on tackling unemployment. He founded the new party, which performed poorly in the 1931 election and convinced him that different approaches were necessary. Accordingly, he founded the BUF in 1932, aiming to establish a corporate state along the lines of that being advanced in Italy by Mussolini. The party attracted some 50,000 members by 1934 and did gain some favourable press coverage (most notably in the Daily Mail, with its headline ‘Hurrah for the Blackshirts’). There was no opportunity to test the party’s popularity in elections, but the movement began to decline after 1936, when the National Government passed the Public Order Act. The party had few obvious policies other than on unemployment and racism. Once the economy began to recover and threat of war with Nazi Germany grew, it became less attractive. Although some were attracted by Mosley, his style of leadership, based on Mussolini and Hitler, proved unpopular with the general public. The Battle of Cable Street in 1936 indicated the opposition that was widely felt to Mosley’s increasingly anti-Semitic ideas. Left-wing – Communist Party of Great Britain The Communist Party was well-funded by the Soviet Union throughout the 1920s and achieved a prominent role in some campaigns such as the National Unemployed Workers’ Movement and protests over rent and conditions in Glasgow and London. Despite gaining support among the intelligentsia, membership of the party only reached 9,000 and little electoral success followed, with a single MP being elected in 1935. An application from the CPGB to join the Labour Party in 1935 was rejected.

Question 57

Assess how far Yasser Arafat’s tactics for achieving a Palestinian state changed in the period up to 1979. [30]

Accepted Answer

12 Assess how far Yasser Arafat’s tactics for achieving a Palestinian state changed in the period up to 1979. After 1948 a number of guerrilla/terrorist organisations were created aiming to replace Israel with a Palestinian Arab state. Among these was Fatah, a group co-founded by Yasser Arafat dedicated to the liberation of Palestine by an armed struggle carried out by Palestinians themselves. Backed by Syria, Fatah began carrying out terrorist raids against Israeli targets starting in December 1964. Fatah launched dozens of raids against civilian Israeli targets from Jordan, Lebanon, and Egyptian-occupied Gaza. In 1964, the Arab League created the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a tool in the war against Israel. Arafat’s Fatah gradually became its dominant faction. Following the defeat of the Arab forces in the 1967 Six-Day War; the PLO decided that it could not rely on the Arab states to achieve its objective of destroying Israel which remained its primary focus for the next ten years with the massive terrorist campaign by which the PLO’s reputation was formed. Fatah established a base in the Jordanian city of Karameh, the target of an Israeli assault planned in reprisal for a terrorist attack against a school bus full of children in March 1968. The Israeli forces met unexpected resistance and the Arab media glorified the Palestinian stand with the effect of stimulating a wave of volunteers seeking to join the PLO. Arafat gained greater prestige which he needed to exert greater influence over the PLO which adopted Fatah's commitment to liberate Palestine by armed struggle alone. A year later Arafat was elected chairman of the PLO. He consolidated his power by bringing most of the militant Palestinian factions under the umbrella of the PLO. Tension with Jordan’s King Hussein, however, culminated in the king’s decision in September 1970 to end PLO presence in Jordan, therefore Lebanon became their main base until 1982. After its defeat in Jordan, Fatah moved to international acts of terrorism through its ‘Black September’ organisation. In September 1972 it seized eleven Israeli athletes as hostages at the Olympic Games in Munich. All the athletes and five Black September operatives later died during a gun battle with the West German police. The insurgency against Israel inside the newly occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip and the international acts of violence failed to gain much success for the PLO, which gradually turned towards political solutions. Arafat tried a diplomatic approach, especially after the Yom Kippur War of 1973. He renounced the idea of liberation of the whole of Palestine and the creation of a democratic state where Muslims, Christians, and Jews would coexist, and Israel destroyed as a state. He accepted the idea of a state comprising the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital. While the United States and Israel considered the group a terrorist organisation refusing any contact with it, some European countries soon began political dialogue with the PLO. Arafat backed an end to the PLO’s attacks on targets outside of Israel and sought the PLO’s acceptance as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians. In 1974 the PLO was recognised by Arab states as the sole legitimate representative of all Palestinians; the PLO was admitted to full membership of the Arab League in 1976. In November 1974, Arafat became the first representative of a non- governmental organisation to address a plenary session of the UN General Assembly.

Question 58

‘The Acerbo Law was the most important tactic used by Mussolini to establish a dictatorship by 1925.’ Discuss. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 ‘The Acerbo Law was the most important tactic used by Mussolini to 30 establish a dictatorship by 1925.’ Discuss. Discussion of the Acerbo Law may consider how, in November 1922, Mussolini won a vote of confidence in Parliament by 306 to 116 and was given the right to rule by decree for a twelve-month period. Only Socialists and Communists opposed this motion. He had justified this demand by arguing that exceptional measures were required to restore law and order. In 1923, the Acerbo Law was passed. This was put into practice in 1924. The party winning the most votes in an election (if at least 25% of all votes) would now gain 66% of the seats. In the 1924 elections, the Fascists increased their representation from 35 to 374. Alternative lines of argument may consider the importance of the ras, particularly in rural areas. Corruption was also widespread, with Fascists sometimes being allowed to vote more than once. The murder of Matteotti led to the Aventine Secession, when Anti-Fascist MPs walked out of parliament in protest against Fascist violence, hoping that the king would encourage the king to sack Mussolini, but he refused. The role of the king’s acquiescence in the creation of a dictatorship is also a valid factor – as is the repression employed in the form of arrests of opponents which followed. Mussolini further strengthened his position by introducing press censorship. Candidates may also consider how, by1926, the last opposition newspapers had been suppressed. Also, from 1924, the radio network was state run and in 1924 the government created LUCE to produced documentaries glorifying Mussolini. Candidates may also discuss the Law on Powers of Head of Government which gave Mussolini great executive powers.

Question 59

Assess the extent to which Nazi economic policies had achieved their objectives by 1941. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 Assess the extent to which Nazi economic policies had achieved their 30 objectives by 1941. The broad aims of Hitler’s economic policies can be divided into recovery from the Great Depression, and particularly to tackle unemployment, and to rearm and prepare for an inevitable future war. In 1932, there were almost 6 million Germans who were unemployed. By 1939, only 35 000 of 25 million male workers were officially classed as unemployed. Investment in the economy through deficit financing had allowed for the building of massive public works programmes, most notably building an autobahn network. Rearmament also led to decreased unemployment, by conscripting men into the army and through creating demand for heavy industry and stimulating increased factory production. However, some methods undermined the extent of this economic ‘miracle’ somewhat. Part-time workers were now counted as fully employed, women were often forced out of their jobs, as were members of minority groups such as Jews. Mandatory work service in the RAD (400 000 in 1934) at low rates of pay was also used to create employment. This success also came at a cost, as average working hours increased from 43 in 1933 to 47 in 1939, while real wages had fallen by 1936. The increasing focus on rearmament meant that living standards were squeezed and many Germans failed to benefit. The turning point was in 1936 when the Four-Year Plan was introduced, aiming at autarky and readiness for war by 1940. Autarky was not achieved by 1939 when war broke out. Germany was still heavily dependent on foreign imports for materials such as iron ore, oil and rubber. Output in various areas failed to meet the ambitious targets set out in the Four-Year Plan. From 1939 to 1941, Blitzkrieg tactics allowed the rapid advance of German armed forces, meaning that foreign countries could be plundered for their resources.

Question 60

Assess how far the policy of détente (1963–79) resulted from the superpowers’ fear of nuclear war. [30]

Accepted Answer

9 Assess how far the policy of détente (1963–79) resulted from the 30 superpowers’ fear of nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 had increased public fear of nuclear war. The issue of Mutually Assured Destruction was also a factor as each side had believed that the other would not launch a first strike and now they were not sure. Towards the end of the 1960s there was a clear easing of US-Soviet tension as both acknowledged the need for negotiation and compromise. However, to the Soviets, détente did not mean an end to competition with the United States but an agreement not to escalate the competition to dangerous levels. Their goal was still global socialism but they wanted to avoid direct confrontation which may result in nuclear war. Improved communication did lead to arms reduction summits, the signing of anti-nuclear proliferation agreements and a reduction in nuclear arms stockpiles. Pressure groups like the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and Greenpeace lobbied nuclear powers against the further production and proliferation of nuclear weapons. In July 1968, the United States, USSR and Britain signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, an international agreement to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and work towards nuclear disarmament. In August 1975, the United States, USSR and 33 other nations signed the Helsinki Accords aimed at enhancing relations between communist nations and the West. Both sides agreed to recognise the current borders of European countries, to respect human rights and freedoms in their countries and to help each other economically and technologically. The SALT talks in 1972 and 1979 outlawed the production of biological weapons and limited the numbers of ballistic missiles. The Space Race also ended with the launching of the joint American-Soviet space mission, the Apollo-Soyuz project in 1975. However, a change of leadership in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Richard Nixon in the United States and Leonid Brezhnev in the USSR, brought more pragmatic politicians to power; they had domestic issues to contend with and the arms race was expensive. The United States was spending billions of dollars on the Vietnam War which faced great opposition from the American people. The OPEC oil embargo of 1973 also hit its economy badly. The Watergate Scandal, resulting in Nixon’s resignation, also distracted the United States from foreign affairs. The USSR was preoccupied with economic problems, such as falling crop yields, internal opposition and problems within the Soviet bloc. Economic changes and conditions made arms spending and direct confrontation costly, dangerous and unpopular and resulted in the United States and USSR choosing negotiation rather than confrontation. The USSR also wanted to increase its trade with the West and was concerned about US improved relations with China. By 1967, Moscow and Beijing were barely communicating. In 1969, border clashes between Russian and Chinese soldiers threatened to plunge the two nuclear powers into a full-scale war. The United States saw advantages in perpetuating the Sino-Soviet split and in 1972 Nixon visited the PRC and met Mao Zedong leading to the restoration of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Washington. The USSR feared a US-China alliance. In May 1972, Nixon visited Moscow, met with Brezhnev and signed trade agreements and two treaties to reduce arms manufacture. However, the United States reacted strongly to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and Carter asked the Senate to postpone action on the SALT II nuclear weapons treaty.

Question 61

Assess the extent to which the policy of containment was the reason for the United States’ growing involvement in Vietnam. [30]

Accepted Answer

10 Assess the extent to which the policy of containment was the reason for 30 the United States’ growing involvement in Vietnam. After the Viet Minh won a decisive victory at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, France surrendered, and the Geneva Accords called for dividing Vietnam in half at the seventeenth parallel. Elections were never held, and the country remained divided with North Vietnam becoming a communist republic led by Ho Chi Minh while South Vietnam was a capitalist republic led by Ngo Dinh Diem. President Eisenhower referred to the Domino Theory in April 1954 believing it would be a disaster if IndoChina fell to communism. From 1958 the South came under increasing attack from communists based in South Vietnam who in 1960 formed the National Liberation Front and had the backing of North Vietnam. Kennedy believed that the United States had an obligation to help build strong non-communist native governments and to help governments and political movements that were trying to resist communist insurgencies. There was also a great fear of communism domestically. Johnson supported the domino theory, and he believed that South Vietnam was the victim of communist aggression from and directed by North Vietnam. If the United States failed to help South Vietnam, it would send a message to the rest of Southeast Asia and the world that the United States was not truly committed to containing communism. However, US involvement must also be set in the context of the Cold War. Cold war rivalries shaped US decision-making. The United States gave economic and military aid to South Vietnam, while the USSR and China offered assistance to North Vietnam. The Cold War power struggle between the United States, the USSR, and China was key in shaping the Vietnam War. In the context of the Cold War power struggle, Americans had to prove that their pronouncements about containing communism and aiding democracy building were credible. Kennedy argued that if the United States did not act aggressively to protect the region, China would come in and dominate it. The United States had a moral responsibility to help resist communist insurgencies. The region was important because in communist hands, it would pose a most serious threat to the security of the United States. Vietnam was the United States’ test case to prove that it could meet the global challenge of communist wars of liberation. Johnson’s anxieties about US credibility, combined with political instability in Saigon, China’s resistance to negotiations, and Hanoi’s refusal to remove troops from South Vietnam and stop aiding the NLF led him to escalate the US military presence in Vietnam from 1964 to 1967. In 1964 American naval forces in the Gulf of Tonkin reported being fired upon by North Vietnamese gunboats. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed by both houses of Congress within days of the naval confrontation. It gave the President broad authority to defend US troops in the region. In March 1965, President Johnson ordered US Marine battalions to defend the American airbase at Da Nang, the first-time combat troops were involved in the war. Operation Rolling Thunder began. The escalation continued throughout 1965 and by the end of 1967 the number of troops had risen from 184 000 to 490 000. However, the Tet Offensive in 1968 turned Americans against the war. From 1969 Nixon reduced the levels of combat troops but there was still considerable support for the war with the belief that Vietnam would be in vain if America simply withdrew from the war but without the combat support Saigon fell in 1975.

Question 62

‘Mussolini failed to solve the economic problems facing Italy.’ Discuss. [30]

Accepted Answer

Question Answer Marks 1 ‘Mussolini failed to solve the economic problems facing Italy.’ Discuss. 30 Candidates might wish to set out the economic problems facing Italy in 1922 before explaining how Mussolini aimed to solve them and reaching judgements about success. At the highest levels of AO2, the responses should take a holistic view of his policies, rather than simply judging each policy in turn to reach a balance sheet approach. The best responses might also set out the stages of economic development in this period. Criteria for making judgements could include Italy’s economic challenges, which might include the weakness of the south and rural poverty, the lack of raw materials and the widespread unemployment and inflation at the end of World War I. They might also set out his aims and how they developed to include autarky and the creation of a ‘Corporate state.’ Some discussion of how far Italy dealt with the problems caused by the Great Depression might also be expected of the better answers. Candidates might provide an account of the economic approach during the early stages of Fascist rule under di Stefani which largely stuck to traditional liberal methods of reducing state intervention and attempting to reduce inflation. There could be a suggestion that Mussolini was fortunate that these years coincided with a general European recovery. There will inevitably be attention paid to Mussolini’s ‘battles’, specifically lira, grain and land. There should be judgements of the individual successes and failures of these policies when measured against their aims, although the best responses will aim to put these into the overall context of Mussolini’s goals. For example, the Battle for Grain should be linked to the desire for autarky and candidates might link this and policies such as the Battle for Lira to the aim of enhancing Italian prestige. Italy’s response to the Great Depression is another area that demands attention. Well informed candidates should be able to discuss the role of the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction and other policies such as the extension of public works schemes to help Italy avoid the worst effects of the crisis. There should also be some references to the Corporate State, its aims and the reality. They may well point out its structures played little role in responding to the Depression and that employers benefitted to the detriment of workers, shorn of trade unions. Candidates should be able to produce a balanced response which makes an overall judgement on the extent of success of policies in dealing with the economic difficulties facing Italy and the extent to which Mussolini’s aims were achieved.

Question 63

Evaluate the effectiveness of the Nazi regime’s responses to the Great Depression. [30]

Accepted Answer

3 Evaluate the effectiveness of the Nazi regime’s responses to the Great 30 Depression. Candidates might wish to outline the extent to which Germany was affected by the slump in trade caused by the Great Depression. There could be some commentary on the impact of Weimar Germany’s reliance on American loans and the scale of the economic problems which affected the country. By 1932, 18 000 farmers had gone bankrupt, 50 000 businesses closed between 1930 and 1932 and there were some six million unemployed, with millions of others having hours and pay cut. The Nazi Party had promised ‘work and bread’ and introduced several policies to create employment. There was an increase in public expenditure and investment to boost consumer demand. The public works programme which had begun in 1932 was extended, with particular attention paid to the building of homes and to the autobahn network, creating employment among the private companies who were given the contracts from state funding. Private sector employers were provided with subsidies to encourage hiring more workers and the size of the government bureaucracy grew. Candidates might consider Nazi agricultural policies and there could be discussion of the Reich Entailed Farm Law and the impact of the Four-Year Plan. Conscription was introduced in 1935, with males aged between 18 and 25 required to complete armed service, further removing men from the unemployment figures. Good candidates will be able to discuss the work of Schacht in using deficit financing, for example mefo bills, to fund these policies. By 1936, rearmament had become the major driver of the German economy, with employment being created in heavy industry as a result. In terms of assessing the impact of these policies, there was clear success in reducing unemployment, as 0.2 million were registered as such by 1938. However, removing women and Jews from the workforce and forcing young men into the RAD, for low pay could be used to argue against this apparent ‘miracle’, as might counting part-time employees as fully employed. There were also limitations in the extent to which agricultural policies succeeded in rejuvenating this sector of the economy, with small farms continuing to struggle. Without unions to defend their interests, workers found their average working hours increasing. Candidates might also make the point that Germany was already beginning to recover before 1933 However, it is reasonable to argue that Germany had recovered well in many respects by 1939, with the apparent creation of full employment.

Question 64

Assess the impact of the death of Stalin on US–Soviet relations. [30]

Accepted Answer

9 Assess the impact of the death of Stalin on US–Soviet relations. 30 Answers might focus on both the immediate impact of Stalin’s death and on the long-term effects. Candidates are likely not only to consider how it led to anticipation of a thaw in relations with Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence and destalinisation policies but also how it had little impact on reducing Cold War tensions. When Stalin died in March 1953, Eisenhower stated his commitment to peace in his first speech entitled ‘Chance for Peace’; he made it clear the USA would not attack the USSR during this vulnerable period. However, his administration was reluctant to see the post-Stalin USSR as anything but an aggressive totalitarian state. Stalin’s heirs, Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov launched a peace initiative but the USA was sceptical about it as they broached the issue of peace while praising Stalin’s legacy. Eisenhower challenged the new Soviet leadership to reject Stalin's style of governance. He wanted to ‘roll back’ the advances of Communism abroad. His ‘New Look’ at foreign policy proposed the use of nuclear weapons and new technology in an effort to threaten ‘Massive Retaliation’ against the USSR for communist advances abroad. In 1954 the Soviets tested a hydrogen bomb and in 1955 set up the Warsaw Pact with plans to use nuclear weapons against NATO if there was a war. Eisenhower’s doctrine of massive retaliation left him without any options other than nuclear war to combat Soviet aggression. This was evident in 1956 when Eisenhower was unable to assist Hungary. Like Stalin, his successor was determined to retain control of the satellites. However, it can be argued that the death of Stalin led to a temporary thaw in the Cold War. The Korean war ended in July 1953. In 1955 at the Geneva Summit the Cold War leaders suggested uniting under a common cause for peace. In 1955 Austria regained its sovereignty and became an independent, neutral nation after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Khrushchev went to Yugoslavia, telling Tito that ‘there are different roads to communism’. The USSR announced plans to reduce its armed forces by more than 600 000 troops. Khrushchev called for ‘peaceful coexistence’ between the East and West. It seemed as if there would be a relaxation of Cold War tensions. On 24 February 1956, Khrushchev made a speech denouncing Stalin at the Communist Party’s Twentieth Congress. He also criticised the idea of the inevitability of war between communism and capitalism stating that communism would eventually prevail. In the late 1950s, the USA and the USSR initiated a cultural exchange programme and in 1959 Khrushchev visited the USA briefly meeting Eisenhower at Camp David. Predictions of improved future relations were reported which praised ‘the spirit of Camp David’ showing both were willing to enter into dialogue. The possibility of Mutually Assured Destruction made peaceful coexistence more attractive as it would reduce the risk of nuclear annihilation. However, suspicion remained as shown by events in Berlin and later the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrating that Cold War hostility was very much alive.

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Questions10 pages

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Questions as text

Q1 · Assess the impact of Mussolini’s foreign policy on Italy 9489/42 Feb/March 2021

Q2 · Assess the aims of Hitler’s foreign policy in the period 1933–41 9489/42 Feb/March 2021

Q3 · Assess the impact of the Prague Spring on US–Soviet relations 9489/42 Feb/March 2021

Q4 · Evaluate the reasons why Mussolini was appointed Prime Minister in 1922 9489/41 May/June 2021

Q5 · ‘Propaganda was the main reason for the growth of support for Nazism.’ Discuss this view… 9489/41 May/June 2021

Q6 · ‘Mussolini’s agricultural policy was his greatest economic success.’ Discuss this view 9489/42 May/June 2021

Q7 · Assess the extent to which Hitler’s economic priority was rearmament in the period 1933–39 9489/42 May/June 2021

Q8 · Assess how far the nuclear arms race was responsible for the Cold War tension between the… 9489/42 May/June 2021

Q9 · Analyse the impact of Mussolini’s policies towards the Church 9489/43 May/June 2021

Q10 · ‘The Great Depression was the key factor in Hitler’s rise to power.’ Evaluate this view 9489/43 May/June 2021

Q11 · Assess the extent to which Khrushchev was responsible for causing the Cuban Crisis 9489/43 May/June 2021

Q12 · Assess the extent to which Fascist indoctrination was the main aim of Mussolini’s… 9489/42 Oct/Nov 2021

Q13 · ‘Nazi youth policies were a failure.’ Discuss this view 9489/42 Oct/Nov 2021

Q14 · Assess the extent to which Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence eased Cold War… 9489/42 Oct/Nov 2021

Q15 · ‘Preventing the spread of communism was the main reason for the United States’ growing… 9489/42 Oct/Nov 2021

Q16 · Analyse the impact that the rivalries between the Cold War superpowers had on the civil… 9489/42 Oct/Nov 2021

Q17 · ‘The fear of Communism was the main reason for the rise of Mussolini by 1922.’ Discuss… 9489/42 Feb/March 2022

Q18 · ‘The main reason for the growth in Nazi support between 1929 and 1932 was the growing… 9489/42 Feb/March 2022

Q19 · Evaluate the significance of terror in the establishment of a dictatorship under Mussolini 9489/41 May/June 2022

Q20 · Assess the impact of foreign policy on the economy in Nazi Germany in the period 1933–39 9489/41 May/June 2022

Q21 · ‘Economic problems were the main reason for the rise of political extremism in Britain.’… 9489/41 May/June 2022

Q22 · Evaluate how far attempts to control nuclear weapons improved US–Soviet relations 9489/41 May/June 2022

Q23 · ‘Mussolini’s use of propaganda was highly effective.’ Evaluate this claim 9489/42 May/June 2022

Q24 · Assess the aims of Soviet foreign policy in the period 1924–41 9489/42 May/June 2022

Q25 · ‘The main reason that the Nazi regime maintained its control of Germany in the period… 9489/42 May/June 2022

Q26 · Evaluate the impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis on US–Soviet relations 9489/42 May/June 2022

Q27 · Assess the extent to which ideological differences affected Sino–US relations during the… 9489/42 May/June 2022

Q28 · Evaluate the success of Mussolini’s economic policies 9489/43 May/June 2022

Q29 · Evaluate the effectiveness of Nazi youth policy in achieving its aims 9489/43 May/June 2022

Q30 · Assess the impact of Mussolini’s social policies on young people 9489/41 Oct/Nov 2022

Q31 · Analyse the effectiveness of Nazi economic policy in dealing with the effects of the… 9489/41 Oct/Nov 2022

Q32 · ‘US reaction to the Cuban Revolution was the main cause of the Cuban Missile Crisis.’… 9489/41 Oct/Nov 2022

Q33 · Assess the extent to which Cold War tensions influenced the civil war in Mozambique 9489/41 Oct/Nov 2022

Q34 · ‘Maintaining good relations with the Catholic Church was the main reason for Mussolini’s… 9489/42 Oct/Nov 2022

Q35 · ‘Reducing unemployment was the main aim of Nazi economic policy.’ Discuss this view 9489/42 Oct/Nov 2022

Q36 · Evaluate the extent to which the Berlin Crisis of 1958–61 led to increased tension… 9489/42 Oct/Nov 2022

Q37 · Assess the success of Italian foreign policy in the period 1922–41 9489/43 Oct/Nov 2022

Q38 · Evaluate the success of Nazi policies towards the Christian churches 9489/43 Oct/Nov 2022

Q39 · Evaluate the view that Mussolini had failed to achieve his economic aims by 1941 9489/42 Feb/March 2023

Q40 · ‘Weimar politicians were mostly responsible for Hitler’s rise to power in January 1933.’… 9489/42 Feb/March 2023

Q41 · ‘Opposition to the Shah’s attempts to westernise Iran was the main cause of the Iranian… 9489/42 Feb/March 2023

Q42 · Assess the view that Mussolini’s economic response to the Great Depression was ineffective 9489/41 May/June 2023

Q43 · ‘Stalin’s main aim in foreign policy was to defend the Soviet Union from attack.’ Discuss 9489/41 May/June 2023

Q44 · Analyse the reasons for limited opposition to the Nazi regime within Germany in the… 9489/41 May/June 2023

Q45 · ‘A period of limited social change.’ Assess this view of Italy from 1925 to 1941 9489/42 May/June 2023

Q46 · Assess the extent to which superpower involvement affected Ethiopia during the Cold War 9489/42 May/June 2023

Q47 · Assess the extent to which persecution of Jews in Europe led to the creation of the state… 9489/42 May/June 2023

Q48 · Analyse the reasons for the appeal of fascism in the period 1919–25 9489/43 May/June 2023

Q49 · Analyse the view that Hitler’s consolidation of power in 1933–34 was a ‘legal revolution’ 9489/43 May/June 2023

Q50 · Discuss the extent to which ideological differences affected Sino-Soviet relations in the… 9489/43 May/June 2023

Q51 · Assess the extent to which Mussolini’s regime received popular support 9489/41 Oct/Nov 2023

Q52 · ‘Terror was the most important factor in maintaining Nazi control of Germany in the… 9489/41 Oct/Nov 2023

Q53 · ‘Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence had little effect on US–Soviet relations.’… 9489/41 Oct/Nov 2023

Q54 · Assess the view that Mussolini’s political skill was the most important reason for his… 9489/42 Oct/Nov 2023

Q55 · Assess the impact of Nazi policies towards the German workers in the period 1933–39 9489/42 Oct/Nov 2023

Q56 · Evaluate the reasons for the limited impact of political extremism in Britain during the… 9489/42 Oct/Nov 2023

Q57 · Assess how far Yasser Arafat’s tactics for achieving a Palestinian state changed in the… 9489/42 Oct/Nov 2023

Q58 · ‘The Acerbo Law was the most important tactic used by Mussolini to establish a… 9489/43 Oct/Nov 2023

Q59 · Assess the extent to which Nazi economic policies had achieved their objectives by 1941 9489/43 Oct/Nov 2023

Q60 · Assess how far the policy of détente (1963–79) resulted from the superpowers’ fear of… 9489/43 Oct/Nov 2023

Q61 · Assess the extent to which the policy of containment was the reason for the United… 9489/43 Oct/Nov 2023

Q62 · ‘Mussolini failed to solve the economic problems facing Italy.’ Discuss 9489/42 May/June 2024

Q63 · Evaluate the effectiveness of the Nazi regime’s responses to the Great Depression 9489/42 May/June 2024

Q64 · Assess the impact of the death of Stalin on US–Soviet relations 9489/42 May/June 2024

Q65 · Analyse the effectiveness of Mussolini’s policies on women and young people 9489/43 May/June 2024

Q66 · Analyse the reasons for the Nazi persecution of Jews and other minorities 9489/43 May/June 2024

Q67 · ‘Mussolini’s foreign policy was largely unsuccessful.’ Discuss 9489/41 Oct/Nov 2024

Q68 · ‘Hitler’s consolidation of power was achieved by gaining the support of the traditional… 9489/41 Oct/Nov 2024

Q69 · ‘The resolution of the Cuban Crisis did little to improve US–Soviet relations in the… 9489/41 Oct/Nov 2024

Q70 · Evaluate the factors that influenced Sino-Soviet relations in the period 1945–69 9489/41 Oct/Nov 2024

Q71 · Assess how far Italy’s post-war social and economic problems led to Mussolini’s rise to… 9489/42 Oct/Nov 2024

Q72 · Analyse the extent to which Nazi policies towards women and children achieved their aims 9489/42 Oct/Nov 2024

Q73 · Assess the reasons why Mussolini was able to consolidate his power in Italy in the years… 9489/42 Feb/March 2025

Q74 · Discuss the view that Stalin had no consistent foreign policy in the years 1928 to 1941 9489/42 Feb/March 2025

Q75 · ‘The Nazi regime was largely successful in controlling the Christian churches in… 9489/42 Feb/March 2025

Q76 · Assess how far the nuclear arms race prevented conflict between the superpowers during… 9489/42 Feb/March 2025