Cambridge A Level History 9489 — 2021 May/June Paper 3 · Variant 1

1 Read the extract and then answer the question. In December 1920 Lloyd George made a famous speech in which he argued that the nations had ‘drifted, or rather staggered and stumbled’ into war. As late as 1936 he still maintained, ‘No sovereign or leading statesman in any of the belligerent countries sought or desired war – certainly not a European war.’ This ‘slide to war’ thesis makes careful examination of the July Crisis unnecessary: no motive, no intention, no responsibility. We suggest instead a consistent pattern, multiple instances of moves for engagement, and we argue that the very essence of decision-making is a matter of choice. And so it was in 1914. For decades European leaders had assessed the likely scenarios for conflict on the Continent. In each case, they rejected the notion that a war could be localised or isolated. They recognised the danger of diplomatic escalation leading to armed conflict. They knew the dangers of a general European war. In each case they accepted those risks and dangers in July and August, and they decided for war with the full expectation of winning and thereby solving the problems that prompted them to consider armed conflict in the first place. That is what made the July Crisis radically different from previous crises, such as the two Moroccan crises, the two Balkan wars, and the Tripoli crisis. In fact, there was a surprising single-mindedness of purpose in the decision-makers of 1914. Almost all of them recognised that the strategic argument of perceived decline or threat demanded the call to arms. The murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand quickly disappeared from their considerations. Instead, the leaders in Vienna and Berlin, St Petersburg and Paris, persisted in their view that war alone could resolve their perceived insecure positions in the European balance of power. And when two monarchs, Wilhelm II and Nicholas II, at the last moment tried to draw back, the governing cliques in Berlin and St Petersburg forced them back on course. The ‘slide to war’ thesis is also disproven by the various actions, especially in the three critical capitals, Vienna, Berlin and St Petersburg, to block possible mediation of the crisis. As early as 3 July Berchtold boldly informed the German ambassador in Vienna of his government’s need for a ‘final and fundamental reckoning’ with Serbia. Kaiser Wilhelm endorsed that with his note, ‘now or never’. Vienna refused a state funeral for Franz Ferdinand in part because it might have offered the crowned heads of Europe an opportunity to coordinate their responses to the assassination. Vienna was determined to strike out at Belgrade; Berlin seconded that initiative. And once Russia had decided to block the proposed ‘punitive expedition’ against Serbia, Foreign Minister Sazonov prevented further discussion and possible resolution of the crisis by instructing the chief of the General Staff to smash his telephone! Perhaps the last word on the ‘slide to war’ thesis should go to one of the pivotal players, the chief of the German General Staff. Already in March 1913, Moltke confided to the Italian military attaché Germany’s intention to violate Belgian neutrality in case of war. The next war, he stated, would be between France and Germany. In brutal terms, he stated that this war would be ‘a question of life or death for us. We shall stop at nothing to gain our end. In the struggle for existence, one does not bother about the means one uses.’ And in retirement in June 1915, Moltke in a private letter spoke of ‘this war which I prepared and initiated’. No drift, no slide. What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the origins of the First World War to explain your answer. [40]

Mark scheme: Question Answer Marks 1 The Origins of the First World War 40 Interpretation/Approach The main interpretation is that in 1914, European leaders deliberately chose to go to war because they feared that their prospects of success would deteriorate if they waited. Showing complete understanding of the interpretation will involve discussion of both these aspects. The interpretation is an explicit rejection of Lloyd George’s ‘slide to war’ thesis. It places prime responsibility on Germany, Austria, and Russia as the three states that could have prevented war but chose not to. However, this is a sub-message of the extract. Glossary: Interpretations soon after World War Ⅰ tended to blame Germany, but this was quickly countered by a variety of interpretations that blamed other nations. This may be termed revisionism. The turning point in the historiography was Fischer’s work of the early 1960s, which went back to blaming Germany – sometimes known as anti-revisionism. Since then, there has been a vast variety of interpretations, looking at the importance of culture, individuals, contingent factors, etc., with no clear consensus. Even so, most historians would still place a significant burden of responsibility on Germany. What counts is how appropriate the use of this kind of terminology is in relation to the extract, and how effectively the extract can be used to support it.

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2 Read the extract and then answer the question. The evidence confirms the impression that the various authorities of the National Socialist regime were ready in late 1941 for the extermination process aimed at reducing the number of Jews. There existed no real capacity to absorb the mass deportations which everybody urged and, further, the campaign in the East, which had reached a stalemate by the winter, offered no prospect for sending the Jews beyond the Urals. There were other reasons as well: the ghettos which had been created in order to isolate and select the Jews for deportation (in occupied Poland, as early as 1939–40) were now spreading destitution and disease, and the Nazis regarded the ghettos as sources of an infection to be wiped out. The Jews had to be ‘exterminated somehow’. This fatal expression recurs again and again in documents of various origins at this stage (late 1941), revealing evidence of the improvisation of extermination as the simplest solution – one that would, with additional extermination camps in occupied Poland, finally generate the potential for the mass murders. If we base our interpretation on the concept that the annihilation of the Jews was thus ‘improvised’ rather than set off by a one-time secret order, it follows that the responsibility and the initiative for the killing were not Hitler’s, Himmler’s or Heydrich’s alone. This does not, however, free Hitler from blame. We know almost nothing about the way in which Hitler spoke about these matters with Himmler and Heydrich, who bore institutional responsibility for the acts of liquidation, and who at this time frequently visited the Führer’s headquarters. Hitler had good reasons that prompted him to hide the full truth even from high-ranking associates; these strictly unlawful measures could be ordered only by verbal instructions on the part of Hitler and not by way of legally binding formal directives. His responsibility for the murder of the Jews can only be established indirectly. The idea that it would be possible to ‘prove’ this by means of some document signed by Hitler, as yet undiscovered, is derived from false assumptions. Hitler, as is well known, rarely processed files himself, and his signature or handwriting on documents, except in the case of laws and ordinances, is hardly ever found. Indications pointing to his responsibility are nonetheless overwhelming. A great number of documents concerning anti-Jewish legislation prove that Hitler concerned himself with numerous details of the measures, and that these were dependent upon his decisions. It could not be hidden from any important functionary of the National Socialist regime that Hitler had the greatest interest possible in the solution of the Jewish question. To assume that such important decisions as the measures for the destruction of Jewry could be taken by any individual without Hitler’s approval is to ignore the power structure and hierarchy of the Führer state. It is especially baseless regarding Himmler, whose loyalty to his Führer was at this stage absolute. Such an idea is also flawed as the preparations for the extermination of the Jews (e.g. transportation and the release of Jews from essential war work) interfered directly with the interests of the Wehrmacht, and could not be implemented without the backing that Hitler alone could impose. Goebbels reveals in his diaries that every important stage of the deportation of the Jews from the capital of the Reich required the approval of Hitler: at the Wannsee Conference (January 1942), which convened to discuss the ‘final solution of the Jewish question’, Heydrich made pointed reference to the necessary ‘previous authorisation of the Führer’. What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40] Section C: Topic 3 The origins and development of the Cold War

Mark scheme: 2 The Holocaust 40 Interpretation/Approach The main interpretation is that the Final Solution was not pre-planned, but that the nature of the Nazi state made it clear that it could not happen without Hitler’s approval. Showing complete understanding of the interpretation will involve discussion of both these aspects. The interpretation addresses Hitler’s responsibility for the Final Solution, but without claiming that it was pre-planned. This may be concluded as a functionalist viewpoint, with the situation in late 1941 closing all alternatives except genocide. An intentionalist conclusion is limited to a maximum of Level 4 and would need to be argued properly using the second aspect of the main interpretation. This applies also to claims that the interpretation is synthesis, which if argued properly could be Level 5 or Level 6. There are also structuralist aspects to the extract, but these are sub-messages in nature. Glossary: Candidates may use some or all the following terms: Intentionalism – interpretations which assume that Hitler/the Nazis planned to exterminate the Jews from the start. Structuralism – interpretations which argue that it was the nature of the Nazi state that produced genocide. There was no coherent plan, but the chaotic competition for Hitler’s approval between different elements of the leadership produced a situation in which genocide could occur. Functionalism – interpretations which sees the Holocaust as an unplanned, ad hoc response to wartime developments in Eastern Europe, when Germany conquered areas with large Jewish populations. Candidates may also refer to synthesis interpretations, i.e., interpretations which show characteristics of more than one of the above. What counts is how appropriate the use of this kind of terminology is in relation to the extract, and how effectively the extract can be used to support it.

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3 Read the extract and then answer the question. America emerged from the war without a very clear, well worked out conception of the role it would play in the post-war world. In the process of dealing with a series of ‘crises’ that arose as a result of Soviet actions in 1945–46, America’s policy-makers slowly elaborated a series of ‘worst case‘ predictions about Russian intentions. By 1947–48, these predictions reflected what had by then become a fairly widespread set of assumptions about Russian behaviour. The core assumption was that Soviet Russia was a dangerous country, motivated essentially by its official Marxist- Leninist political ideology – an ideology that was expansionist and intent on converting the world to its beliefs. By definition this was seen as completely opposed to the American way of life, and thus a real threat to the freedom, liberty and economic wellbeing of people throughout the world. A second assumption, consequently, was that any country close to the Russian zone of influence was inevitably a target for communist penetration. However, the United States did not arrive at this view all at once. While Moscow’s behaviour during the war confused and exasperated American policy-makers, preoccupation with waging the war led the president and his advisors to believe that something could be worked out with the Russians. Roosevelt realised that Russian power flowing into the vacuum left by the defeat of Germany would have to be accepted. As Kennan would later write, no one could have denied Stalin ‘a wide military and political defence zone on his western frontier except at the cost of another war, which was unthinkable’. The public declarations of ideology made by both sides created problems. Whereas in private both countries would have been prepared to consider a ‘spheres of influence’ policy, which in Eastern and Western Europe (if not in Germany) involved some acknowledgement of each other’s interests and sensitivities, that is not what they said in public. Privately Roosevelt spoke the language of spheres of influence, but official American foreign policy was couched in terms of one world, open only to democratic values. Roosevelt and Truman believed the American people would not tolerate conducting the nation’s business in the language of Europe’s traditional diplomacy, but by encouraging misleading expectations they paved the way for growing public disenchantment with what the Russians were doing and, in the process, unwittingly played to Moscow’s suspicions. Roosevelt’s death cleared the way for a revision of strategy that he himself would probably have executed in time, but perhaps not in as confused and abrupt manner as was actually done. Ironically, Truman at first embraced a policy of mutual trade-offs in the belief that he was following Roosevelt’s lead, but in doing so only convinced the Russians that he was departing from it. As the Cold War developed steadily, the available evidence indicates that policy-makers on both sides had not been following confrontational blueprints from an early stage; rather, they gradually lost faith in the strategy of collaboration without having anything clear-cut to put in its place. Over time the basic assumptions each side had developed about the other were allowed to dictate policy. In the case of America, the basic assumption was that Russia’s intentions were revolutionary. As for Russia, it assumed fundamental capitalist opposition. As a result, each side’s attitude and approach toward the other underwent significant changes from the summer of 1945 through to the winter of 1947–48, leading the two countries down the path to the all-out confrontation that would follow. What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]

Mark scheme: 3 The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950 40 Interpretation/Approach The main interpretation is that neither side deliberately started a cold war, and that its cause was the mutual misunderstanding that the two sides had of each other. Showing complete understanding of the Interpretation will involve discussion of both these aspects. Though the extract has more material on the USA, there is enough also on the USSR to sustain the argument that both/neither was responsible for the misunderstanding that led to the deterioration of relations after the war. Overall, the extract advances a clear post-revisionist view, and no other ‘label’ could be accepted as a conclusion in Level 5 or Level 6. Some candidates will see the extract as revisionist and, if properly argued, such answers could achieve Level 4. Arguing traditional/orthodox is unsustainable and would be limited to Level 3. Glossary: Candidates may use some or all the following terms: Traditional/Orthodox interpretations of the Cold War were generally produced early after World War Ⅱ. They blame the Soviet Union and Stalin’s expansionism for the Cold War. Revisionist historians challenged this view and shifted more of the focus onto the United States, generally through an economic approach which stressed the alleged aim of the US to establish its economic dominance over Europe. Post-revisionists moved towards a more balanced view in which elements of blame were attached to both sides. Since the opening of the Soviet archives post-1990 there has been a shift to attributing prime responsibility to Stalin – a post-post-revisionist stance which often seems very close to the traditional view, but which often places great importance on ideology. What counts is how appropriate the use of this kind of terminology is in relation to the extract, and how effectively the extract can be used to support it.

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