Cambridge A Level History 9389 — 2021 May/June Paper 3 · Variant 3

1 Read the extract and then answer the question. We have questioned the widespread and long-standing assumption linking the ‘triumph of industry’ to imperialist expansion, and have emphasised instead the role of finance and services. These activities have long been either underestimated or ignored by historians, yet they arose before the Industrial Revolution, continued to expand during the nineteenth century, and maintained their dynamic after manufacturing had entered its long period of relative decline. The representatives of British industry were less wealthy than their counterparts in the City of London, made their money in ways which did not meet the approval of their social superiors, and exercised only limited political influence at a national level. Of course, to the extent that British finance and services were funding the distribution of British manufactures, the two had an important interest in common. But the City’s activities were not simply an offshoot of industry; still less were they bound to it. The international order that was erected on the basis of free trade and the gold standard served the purpose of finance and services rather better than it did those of manufacturing: the increasing scale and complexity of multilateral trade relations gave the City opportunities and commitments that extended far beyond the distribution of British manufactures. Moreover, where a choice had to be made, policy invariably favoured finance over manufacturing. The City’s needs came first in exercising informal influence, in acquiring territory and in formulating the principles of colonial administration. This argument carries wider implications for the influence of pressure groups on policy-making. What is usually referred to as ‘the business lobby’ needs to be broken down to account for the differences of the kind we have identified between the City and industry. The contrast commonly drawn between officials and business loses much of its validity because it is apparent that an important segment of the non-industrial business elite consisted of gentlemen who moved in the same circles and shared the same values as those who had political power. Imperial and imperialist policies did not emerge from a conspiracy by a secret minority but from the open exercise of authority by a respected elite who had the deference of those they governed. Shifting the basis of causation has also required us to reconsider some of the standard categories and chronological divisions of imperial history. Linking imperialism to industrialisation has produced a number of well-known landmarks: one is the idea of an informal empire in the mid-Victorian era followed by the defensive imperialism of a declining power; the ‘new’ imperialism generated by the crisis of advanced industrial capitalism in the late nineteenth century is another. But the expansionist tendencies we have identified suggest a very different picture. In the mid-Victorian era informal empire was more an ideal than a reality. British manufactures were only just beginning to penetrate countries overseas, even at a time when foreign competition was still very limited, mainly because trade was still awaiting the help it required from British finance and commercial services. It was not until the second half of the century, when free trade had been installed, that investment began to accelerate and transport improvements started to deliver the benefits of cheap, bulk carriage. Only in the late Victorian period were these forces felt in earnest. In other words, Britain’s informal influence was growing at precisely the time when it is conventionally thought to have been in decline. Moreover, the most important examples of territorial acquisitions in the late nineteenth century were outcomes of these expansionary tendencies, not rearguard actions fought to delay decline. What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the British Empire to explain your answer. [40]

Mark scheme: Question Answer Marks 1 The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c.1850–1939 40 Interpretation/Approach The main interpretation is that imperialist expansion was driven more by the needs of the City than those of manufacturers, and that the informal empire to which this gave rise emerged in the late nineteenth century, not earlier as is usually assumed. Showing understanding of the Big Message will involve discussion of both these aspects. By stressing the role of finance rather than manufactures, the writers identify flaws in traditional views of the chronology of imperial history, seeing a continuing expansion of British interests in the late nineteenth century, not a decline. Glossary: the two main areas of interpretation have been (i) on whether imperial policy was determined at the centre (the metropole) or at the periphery (in the territories of the empire). This can involve debates on who was making the decisions at the centre (the ‘official mind’, ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ etc) or at the periphery (the ‘man on the spot’): and (ii) on whether the British Empire was characterised by a preference for formal (i.e. direct rule over annexed territory) or informal (i.e. indirect control mainly through and for commercial interests). What counts is how appropriate the use of this kind of terminology is in relation to the extract, and how effectively the extract can be used to support it.

2 Read the extract and then answer the question. Nazi genocide, also known as the Final Solution or the Holocaust, can be defined as the mass murder of human beings because they belong to a biologically defined group. The Nazi regime applied a consistent and inclusive policy of extermination only against three groups of human beings: disabled people, Jews and Gypsies. In the 1930s the regime moved to exclude members of the three designated groups from the national community. The German government rapidly enacted laws that clearly isolated, excluded and penalised them. Members of all three groups faced the brutality of the state: disabled people were sterilised against their will, Gypsies were forced into so-called Gypsy camps, and Jews faced escalating harassment designed to force their emigration. The coming of war made more radical forms of exclusion possible. There had already been indications that the cover of war would be used to escalate persecution. Consequently, after September 1939 the Nazi regime implemented killing operations – the most radical form of exclusion. The so-called euthanasia killing operation was the first to be implemented, and thus disabled people became the first victims of Nazi genocide. The chronology of Nazi mass murder unambiguously shows that the killings of disabled people, initiated in the winter of 1939–40, preceded those of Jews and Gypsies. But the chronological sequence is not the only connection between these killing operations. A closer analysis shows us other links: decision-making, personnel and technique. In short, euthanasia served as a model for the Final Solution. The way Nazi leaders reached the decision to kill disabled people tells us a great deal about how they decided on the Final Solution. Killing those with disability had been advocated as early as 1920, and during the 1930s some government and party healthcare functionaries had championed that radical policy. However, no killing operations could commence until Hitler gave instructions to implement the euthanasia programme. The bureaucrats needed a written authorisation from the Führer for their own protection as well as to obtain the collaboration of physicians and government agencies. This authorisation was prepared, and Hitler signed it in October 1939. One copy of this authorisation has survived. Thereafter Hitler continued to make all the important decisions, and was consulted whenever changes to the policy were needed. I am convinced that the same process of decision making accompanied the implementation of the Final Solution. Although no testimony has survived to document this, it seems certain that Hitler commissioned the SS and police to kill the Jews. However, unlike euthanasia, there was no written authorisation. The reasons for this seem self-evident. Too many persons had read the Führer’s euthanasia authorisation, and widespread knowledge about the killings could thus implicate Hitler. Obviously, he refused to sign another such document. Still, Heydrich needed some sort of written commission to compel the cooperation of other government agencies. As we know, it was provided by Hermann Göring, but, as with euthanasia, Hitler kept himself informed about the progress of the killing operations, and major decisions needed his approval. Unlike those with disability, whose relatives could and did cause problems, and the Jews, whose social contacts in Germany and abroad had to be considered, the Gypsies were seen as so marginal that their murder did not require written authorisation. Nevertheless, even here some policy decisions forced Hitler to serve as the final judge over their fate, as when in 1942 Bormann complained that Himmler had reprieved some Gypsies from extermination for research purposes. It is probably no coincidence that thirteen days later Himmler issued his decree that all Gypsies should be sent to Auschwitz. What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40] Section C: Topic 3 The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950

Mark scheme: 2 The Holocaust 40 Interpretation/Approach This extract is about how the Holocaust is defined. The main interpretation is that it comprises more than just the Jews, and that for all the groups affected a common decision-making process directed by Hitler was applied. Showing understanding of the Big Message will involve discussion of both these aspects. The historian places Hitler at the centre of decision-making: nothing could happen without his authorisation. Candidates will probably conclude that this makes the interpretation intentionalist. The role of war as a contingent factor is also present, but not developed. Arguing for functionalism alone cannot be allowed at L4/L5. Glossary: Candidates may use some/all of the following terms: Intentionalism – interpretations which assume that Hitler/the Nazis planned to exterminate the Jews from the start. Structuralism – interpretations which argue that it was the nature of the Nazi state that produced genocide. There was no coherent plan but the chaotic competition for Hitler’s approval between different elements of the leadership produced a situation in which genocide could occur. Functionalism is closely related to structuralism. It sees the Holocaust as an unplanned, ad hoc response to wartime developments in Eastern Europe, when Germany conquered areas with large Jewish populations. Candidates may also refer to synthesis interpretations, i.e. interpretations which show characteristics of more than one of the above. What counts is how appropriate the use of this kind of terminology is in relation to the extract, and how effectively the extract can be used to support it.

3 Read the extract and then answer the question. So what did Stalin want? His post-war goals were security for himself, his regime, his country and his ideology, in precisely that order. He sought to make sure that no internal challenges could ever again endanger his personal rule, and that no external threats would ever again place his country at risk. The interests of communists elsewhere in the world, admirable though these might be, would never outweigh the priorities of the Soviet state as he had determined them. Narcissism, paranoia and absolute power came together in Stalin: he was, within the Soviet Union and the international communist movement, enormously feared – and also widely worshipped. Wartime expenditures in blood and money, Stalin believed, should largely determine who got what after the war: the Soviet Union would, therefore, get a lot. Not only would it regain the territories it had lost to Germany during the war; it would also retain the territories it had taken as a result of the opportunistic pact Stalin had concluded with Hitler in August 1939. It would require that states beyond these expanded borders remain within Moscow’s sphere of influence. It would seek territorial concessions at the expense of Iran and Turkey (including control of the Turkish Straits), as well as naval bases in the Mediterranean. Finally, it would punish a defeated and devastated Germany through military occupation, harsh reparations, and ideological change. Herein there lay, however, a painful dilemma for Stalin. Disproportionate losses during the war may well have entitled the Soviet Union to disproportionate post-war gains, but they had also robbed the country of the power to secure those benefits unilaterally. The Soviet Union needed peace, economic assistance, and diplomatic acceptance from its former allies. There was no choice for the moment, then, but to continue to seek the cooperation of the Americans and the British. He therefore wanted neither a hot war nor a cold war. Whether he would be skilled enough to avoid these alternatives, however, was quite a different matter. For Stalin’s understanding of his wartime allies and their post-war objectives was based more on wishful thinking than on an accurate assessment of priorities as seen from Washington or London. It was here that Marxist- Leninist ideology influenced Stalin, because his illusions arose from it. The most important one was the belief that capitalists would never be able to cooperate with each other for very long. Their inherent greediness would sooner or later prevail, leaving communists with the need only for patience as they awaited their adversaries’ self-destruction. Stalin’s goal, therefore, was not to restore a balance of power in Europe, but rather to dominate that continent as thoroughly as Hitler had sought to do. He acknowledged, in a wistful but revealing comment in 1947 that ‘had Churchill delayed opening the second front until 1945, the Red Army would have come to France. We toyed with the idea of reaching Paris’. Unlike Hitler, however, Stalin had no fixed timetable. He had welcomed the D-Day landings in 1944, despite the fact that they would prevent the Red Army from reaching Western Europe anytime soon: Germany’s defeat was the first priority. Nor would he write off diplomacy in securing his objective, not least because he expected – for a time at least – American cooperation in achieving it. Had not Roosevelt indicated that the United States would refrain from seeking its own sphere of influence in Europe? Stalin’s vision was therefore a grand one: the peacefully accomplished but historically determined domination of Europe. It was also a flawed vision, for it failed to take into account the evolving post-war objectives of the United States. What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]

Mark scheme: 3 The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950 40 Interpretation/Approach The extract is about Stalin, and so therefore is the interpretation. The main interpretation is that Stalin wanted to make the USSR dominant so as to ensure its security, but was wrong in thinking that this could be achieved peacefully. Showing understanding of the Big Message will involve discussion of both these aspects. The historian accepts that in the short- term Stalin was willing to work peacefully with the West but thinks that this was based on the mistaken belief that the West would permit this. This does not really amount to a traditional view, which would portray Stalin as much more aggressive, but could be allowed in L4 on the first part of the main interpretation. Neither is it post-revisionist as it focuses almost exclusively on Stalin. There is enough to see it as post-post-revisionist, which is probably the only ‘label’ that will work at L5 Glossary: Traditional/Orthodox interpretations of the Cold War were generally produced early after WW2. They blame the Soviet Union and Stalin’s expansionism for the Cold War. Revisionist historians challenged this view and shifted more of the focus onto the United States, generally through an economic approach which stressed the alleged aim of the US to establish its economic dominance over Europe. Post-revisionists moved towards a more balanced view in which elements of blame were attached to both sides. Since the opening of the Soviet archives post-1990 there has been a shift to attributing prime responsibility to Stalin – a post-post- revisionist stance which often seems very close to the traditional view. What counts is how appropriate the use of this kind of terminology is in relation to the extract, and how effectively the extract can be used to support it.