Cambridge A Level History 9389 — 2019 May/June Paper 4 · Variant 3

1 ‘Marxist in theory but not in practice.’ To what extent is this true of Lenin’s government by 1924? [30]

Mark scheme: Question Answer Marks 1 ‘Marxist in theory but not in practice.’ To what extent is this true of Lenin’s 30 government by 1924? Ideas such as state ownership, the class struggle, the anti-capitalism theme, the hostility to imperialism, the need for world revolution and the ‘withering away of the state’ remained throughout the period. Lenin, of course, used Marx as a basis for almost all of this thinking, but he was aware from his early revolutionary days that it was very much a ‘work in progress’ and that it both could be and had to be adapted to suit the needs of a country like Russia. He was particularly aware that the huge, and potentially highly conservative, peasant population in Russia did not fit neatly into any Marxist formula. It could be argued that much of what Lenin did fitted into a broad plan for bringing about a Marxist state, or at least could be seen to be a means to that end. The aristocracy and monarchy were ended. The state assumed control of the economy. Capitalism was suppressed. There were positive moves towards social equality. The role of women improved. There were advances in both education and healthcare. There was the creation of a state planning system. The Comintern was set up to further the spread of revolutionary ideas. Brest-Litovsk and the creation of the CHEKA could be seen as legitimate actions to preserve the move towards the dictatorship of the proletariat. The suppression of the sailors at Kronstadt showed a different side of Leninism. The restriction on debate, the ban on factions and the growing authoritarianism do not fit in well with Marxism. The attempts to gain recognition from other nations and the trade deals could be mentioned, as could the spread of Moscow’s control over the nationalities. Certainly, people like the Poles and the Kazakhs felt that what Lenin was trying to do to them was very similar to what the Tsars did. Lenin’s critics at the time had considerable reservations about the ‘capitalist’ elements of the NEP, but again it could be argued that they were temporary measures needed to ensure the survival of the regime. Marxism envisaged a localism fundamentally different from the top down approach of the Sovnarkom. Marx did envisage conflict with capitalism and aristocracy but not so much conflict with supporters of the revolution.

2 How far did Mussolini rely on the use of terror to retain power? [30]

Mark scheme: 2 How far did Mussolini rely on the use of terror to retain power? 30 The focus of the response should be on maintaining power and not on its acquisition. Certainly there were some of the usual instruments of ‘terror’ there, such as a secret police, a compliant judiciary and a network of informers. There was an absence of much in the way of any legal restraint on his exercise of power. While there were the obvious examples of the murder of Matteotti and the work of the Squadristi and the Blackshirts in the early days of the regime, it is not usually equated with the methods used by either Hitler or Stalin. Mussolini’s regime only adopted totally barbaric methods of control in North Africa and Abyssinia and then after war was declared in the Balkans. There was always the fear that his regime might use harsh methods, but moderate imprisonment and exile and some doses of castor oil seemed to be his more restrained methods. When pressed to take tough measures against the Jews, he was reluctant to act prior to 1938. Arguably terror simply was not necessary as much of Italian public opinion was either apathetic towards him or supported much of what he did, at least until the disasters of war and the German alliance highlighted his many failings. The élites largely supported him and the Roman Catholic Church was sympathetic to his anti-communist stance. Mussolini took great care not to offend conservative opinion or the views of the northern industrialists and southern landowners. His propaganda was largely effective and his control of the media was also very helpful in supporting his regime. Careful manipulation of the media, populist gestures like the ‘Battles’, conciliation with those who might oppose him, the lack of any viable alternative after the Liberal governments had discredited themselves, the support of the King and the endless divisions amongst those who opposed him were probably more important than the use of terror.

3 To what extent was a desire to increase his own power the reason for Stalin’s collectivisation policy? [30]

Mark scheme: 3 To what extent was a desire to increase his own power the reason for 30 Stalin’s collectivisation policy? From a strictly socialist perspective, collectivising can be viewed as a valid idea. Agriculture needed to be made to serve the interests of the state and the people as a whole, and not be used as a means of making a profit by a few. Russia had the potential to not only feed its own people well, but had the ability to produce a surplus to earn valuable foreign currency and also allies. State ownership could also mean that economies of scale could be introduced, land utilised more effectively, and mechanisation could improve productivity. Old fashioned methods could go and the standard of living of all, both in rural and urban areas, could rise. There would be enough food to feed a growing urban population which could expand industry. Manpower would be freed from the countryside to work in factories. There was ample theory to justify collectivisation. The only ones who might oppose on theoretical grounds were those whose investment and property would be lost, and those who felt that there was no evidence anywhere that state control of agriculture might actually work. The thinking behind so many of Stalin’s policies, both before and after 1929, can easily be attributed to personal ambition and the destruction of both actual and imagined opponents. They were so often vehicles for his ambition and paranoia. The elimination of the Kulaks would mean the ending of both an actual and a potential threat to his power. It could lead to an increase in living standards for all which could only reflect well on his leadership and enable him to embark on rapid industrialisation which could also increase his authority and status. The obsessive focus on the Kulak ‘enemy’ and the obvious and appalling damage done by collectivisation (he was well aware of the terrible impact the policy had on the Ukraine, for example) suggest that personal factors were predominant. Good advice from loyal supporters all indicated that slowing the pace would achieve his objectives – this was ignored.

4 To what extent did Hitler become Chancellor because of the failings of Weimar’s leaders? [30] Depth Study 2: The History of the USA, 1945–1990 Answer any two questions.

Mark scheme: 4 To what extent did Hitler become Chancellor because of the failings of 30 Weimar’s leaders? The focus of the response should be on the 1928–33 period. There is no need to go beyond his appointment as Chancellor. Certainly the failings of Weimar’s leadership were to play a key role in Hitler’s rise to power. The reluctance of the moderate Right and the Centre to unite, let alone work with the Left, to stop Hitler was a major factor. The Communists and the Socialists would not work with each other, let alone with the Centre. Schacht provided Keynesian solutions to the terrible problems of unemployment (later implemented by Hitler) but there was no will by men like Brüning and Schleicher to implement them. Hitler’s illegal methods, using the SA to break up opponents’ meetings, for example, could have been successfully prosecuted, but there simply was not the will to do so. The police and judiciary were often too sympathetic to the Nazis and their aims and tolerant of their methods. In the final stages of 1932, there was the feeling by men like Von Papen that Hitler could be managed and utilised for their own ends. The Weimar system could be partially blamed. A PR electoral system like that adopted tends to reflect political instability (current opinion suggests that it does not cause it). Hindenburg was simply not up to the task and defending democracy was not part of his thinking. Germany had been used to decades of authoritarian rule and a genuine democracy was a very recent, and rather discredited, arrival. There are many other factors which can be considered. Hitler was an outstanding orator. His use of mass media was superb and with Goebbels he had a supreme manipulator. Many of the élites supported him. The army was neutral or supportive, always a major factor in German politics. 6 million unemployed and memories of the hyperinflation of the ’20s helped, and the deflation of the early ’30s was even more devastating. Hitler’s insistence on remaining ‘legal’ was critical; he had learned that lesson in Munich. Conservative Germany would not support an ‘illegitimate’ take-over of power; he had to do it ‘legally’ and he did. He offered hope and national redemption and he got his message over with force and clarity.

5 ‘A vast boom of consumer spending.’ How far does this explain the economic growth of the 1950s? [30]

Mark scheme: 5 ‘A vast boom of consumer spending.’ How far does this explain the 30 economic growth of the 1950s? Both Truman and Eisenhower were in favour of the government encouraging economic growth. Much of the credit for the economic boom of the 1950s can be attributed to Eisenhower. He was able to combine low taxes, balanced budgets and public spending effectively to promote growth. One of the basic principles of the Eisenhower administration was fiscal responsibility; that is, the government has a duty to stimulate economic growth and raise productivity without benefiting any one special interest. He believed that an unbalanced budget promoted inflation, which increased domestic problems and weakened national defence. He believed in low taxes but fought tax cuts if he felt they would fuel inflation. Some Republicans had felt that Eisenhower should roll back Roosevelt’s New Deal, but these reforms had been both popular and successful. Eisenhower decided to keep social security and to cover another 10 million people who had originally been omitted from the programme. He also invested federal money in the Interstate Highway System to facilitate transport across the country. There was also a growth in the housing sector. Mass demobilisation after the war resulted in a shortage of 5 million homes. The government supported the growth of the suburbs, establishing a partnership with private industry. The federal government introduced policies that revolutionised home building and lending, subsidised home ownership and created the infrastructure enabling people to live in these areas. Low interest loans allowed families to buy new homes. The ‘affluent society’ is often used to describe the 1950s; consumerism played a huge role in economic growth. The post-war baby boom led to a population increase, leading to increased consumer spending. Rising income and increasing public welfare resulted in more spending and the growth of the economy. When consumer goods became available again after the war, people wanted to spend. By the 1950s, Americans consumed a third of all the world's goods and services. Americans in the 1950s began to use and throw away. Consumerism was driven by advertising which made people want to spend more. With the massive growth in suburban populations, people needed to buy automobiles. Families of all income brackets were buying televisions at a rate of five million a year. Fashion, clothing and domestic products like washing machines were all part of the consumer boom. The middle class American family in pursuit of the American dream was investing heavily in material goods. People in the 1950s were also prepared to buy now pay later. In 1950, the Diner’s Club card, the first credit card, was introduced and was followed quickly by other cards. People borrowed to buy houses, cars, appliances, and even swimming pools. Buying on credit stimulated the economy; it helped to keep people in jobs. The economy overall grew by 37% during the 1950s. At the end of the decade, the average American family had 30% more purchasing power than at the beginning. Inflation, which had wreaked havoc on the economy immediately after World War II, was minimal, in part because of Eisenhower’s persistent efforts to balance the federal budget.

6 ‘Changes in US society in the 1960s and 1970s were revolutionary.’ How far do you agree? [30]

Mark scheme: 6 ‘Changes in US society in the 1960s and 1970s were revolutionary.’ How far 30 do you agree? There were revolutionary changes taking place in the 1960s and 1970s; traditional values were rejected by young people as inadequate for society’s current difficulties. Protest movements began to be organised to fight against injustice and for equal rights for all people. Rather than achieve their aims through the ballot box they resorted to more direct protest including public marches, sit-ins and rallies to attract more support. The success of the civil rights movement increased the political activism of African Americans, reflecting the changing social position of black people. Other movements included protests against American involvement in the Vietnam War; the women’s movement fighting for equality; the gay rights movement and the environment movement. ‘The Feminine Mystique’, written by Betty Friedan and published in 1963, urged women to establish professional lives of their own. The student protest movements were comprised mainly of white college students. Students for a Democratic Society led protests against the Vietnam War. The Youth International Party became an anarchist political movement. Some young people rebelled by growing their hair long and wearing unconventional clothes, and expressed their dissatisfaction through music. Woodstock became a symbol of the hippies’ rebellion against traditional values. Timothy Leary, a former university professor, urged young people to ‘tune in and drop out’. This meant they should use drugs, for example, LSD, and leave school or their job. In 1969 the Stonewall Riots occurred in New York and in 1970 the first ‘gay pride’ rally took place in San Francisco. The activism of the 1960s continued into the 1970s. The environment was an important issue and in 1970, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act followed by the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act in 1972. Women continued to campaign for both political and economic equality through such organisations as the National Organization for Women. However, many Americans rejected Leary’s offer to ‘tune in and drop out’ in the 1960s; they took no part in the social revolution and continued leading normal lives of work, family and home. College-educated white people were the main group campaigning for revolutionary change which they usually abandoned once they had left college. In his election campaign of 1968, Nixon often spoke of the ‘forgotten American’; he spoke of serving those who ‘obey the law, pay their taxes, go to church, send their children to school, love their country and demand new leadership’. He won the support of the middle and working classes who felt left out of politics. A year later, Nixon outlined to the nation his plan to win the Vietnam War; he made a plea ‘to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans’. He spoke of the silent majority of hardworking Americans and a ‘loud minority’ of protestors. In 1972, Congress approved the Equal Rights Amendment stating that equal rights under the law shall not be denied on account of sex but it failed to win ratification. In 1973, in the Roe v. Wade decision, the Supreme Court struck down laws that limited a woman’s access to abortion in the first three months of pregnancy. However, those opposed to abortion, the ‘Right‐To‐Life’ movement, campaigned for a constitutional amendment to ban abortion. Congress Medicaid funding for most abortions was cut off by Congress in 1976. The religious right also began to emerge as a powerful force.

7 How far, in the 1980s, did the US Supreme Court protect the rights of ethnic minorities? [30]

Mark scheme: 7 How far, in the 1980s, did the US Supreme Court protect the rights of ethnic 30 minorities? In the 1980s there were a number of setbacks for ethnic minorities; Reagan’s presidential campaign ignored most of their issues and interests; he resented affirmative action. As affirmative action cases were decided in court, judicial appointments were very important. Reagan appointed four Supreme Court justices: Sandra Day O'Connor, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy. These justices were appointed because of their apparently conservative beliefs. He cut funding for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the civil rights division of the Justice Department. Reagan believed that the government promoted reverse discrimination and stated that it should relax its efforts to reach employment equality on behalf of blacks and other minority groups. He also believed that compensating minority groups for past discrimination with hiring quotas, numerical goals, and timetables ought to be eliminated. As a result of those cuts, the EEOC filed 60 percent fewer cases by 1984 than it had at the beginning of the Reagan administration. On May 19 1986, the Supreme Court in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education ruled against an affirmative action decision. A school board had mandated that white teachers should be laid off before non-whites. The Court held that the policy’s benefits to minorities could not justify the injury it caused to whites. Justice Powell, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor concluded that the layoff provision violated the Equal Protection Clause. Two important Supreme Court rulings in the late 1980s also weakened affirmative action. The 1988 case Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust overturned the 1971 Griggs v. Duke Power Co, shifting the burden of proof in employment discrimination cases from employers to plaintiffs. In the 1989 case Wards Cove Packing Company v. Antonio, the Court ruled that a plaintiff could not simply show disparate impact to prove discrimination but must show that a particular employment practice created the existing disparity. However, there is evidence to show that the Supreme Court did not always rule against affirmative action. In 1980, the Supreme Court ruled in Fullilove v. Klutznick that modest quotas were reasonable, upholding a federal law that 15% of public works funds be set aside for qualified minority contractors. In 1980, in the Supreme Court case United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, it was ruled that their land was illegally seized and the government owed them over half a billion dollars in repairs. This was one of the first times the government recognised their wrongdoings and mistreatment towards American Indians. In Connecticut v. Teal (1982) it was held that an employer is liable for race discrimination where any part of its selection process has a disparate impact on black applicants or employees. This decision made clear that the fair employment laws protect the individual and therefore fair treatment of a group is no defence to an individual claim of discrimination. Price Waterhouse v. Watkins (1989) held that if a plaintiff shows that discrimination played a ‘motivating part’ in an employment decision, the employer can avoid liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would not have made the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory motive.

Depth Study 3: International History, 1945–1991 Answer any two questions.

Mark scheme: 8 Evaluate the reasons why US policy towards China failed in the period from 30 1945 to 1950. The USA did not want the Communists to win the civil war which resumed at the end of World War II, believing that it would endanger the ‘open door’ trade policy established with China decades before. Another fear was that communism would spread to Japan. State Department officials warned Truman of the danger of co- operating too closely with Chiang; he was corrupt and unpopular with the people. Truman’s aim was a negotiated peace allowing the Nationalists a part in the government and removing the need for intervention. In 1945, a conference between Mao and Chiang backed by the USA failed to find a solution with Chiang refusing to make concessions particularly over the industrialised areas of Manchuria. Truman sent 50 000 troops to try to help Chiang to establish control once the Soviets had left. In December 1945, General Marshall was sent to China with the hope of negotiating a cease-fire between the KMT and the CCP and of building a coalition government. However, the two sides were unwilling to compromise; they were not prepared to give up the territory they had seized following the Japanese surrender. In the spring the truce ended and in January 1947 he was recalled to the USA. He realised that large-scale armed intervention would be necessary to end the civil war. However, on his return he was appointed Secretary of State and opposed American intervention in the Chinese Civil War. He and General McArthur held different views on this with Marshall opting for a Europe-first approach and limited war rather than total war. In February 1948, Marshall testified to Congress in a secret session that he had realised from the start that the Nationalists could never defeat the Communists in the field but he believed that the cost to the USA of an all-out war would be out of proportion to the results obtained. The USA clearly underestimated the determination of Mao. He appointed loyal generals whose tactics contributed greatly to the Communist success. The ordinary soldiers in the army were treated with respect while thousands of Nationalists deserted and joined the Communists. Mao’s generals were able to transform small guerrilla bands into a conventional army by 1947 and by the end of January 1949 most of China was in the hands of the Communists. Chiang Kai- shek and the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan. As the USA became involved in the Korean War in 1950 on the side of South Korea, there was further criticism of Marshall. In the debate over what to do about the changed military situation in Korea following the second, and massive, Chinese military intervention in late November 1950, Marshall opposed a cease- fire with the Chinese and refused to abandon the South Koreans. He also refused to negotiate with the Chinese arguing that it was almost impossible to negotiate with the Communists but at the same time Marshall sought ways to avoid a wider war with China. General MacArthur charged that the post-war Marshall mission to China committed ‘one of the greatest blunders in American diplomatic history, for which the free world is now paying in blood and disaster’. Critics of the Truman administration portrayed the loss of China as an avoidable catastrophe. Senator McCarthy was a particularly vocal critic accusing Marshall of being directly responsible for the loss as well as Communists.

9 ‘It was the US government’s excessive fear of communism which caused the globalisation of the Cold War.’ How far do you agree? [30]

Mark scheme: 9 ‘It was the US government’s excessive fear of communism which caused 30 the globalisation of the Cold War.’ How far do you agree? The USA greatly overestimated the threat posed by communism, in particular through the assumption that there was a monolithic communist plot with the aim of world domination. This excessive fear led to containment, roll-back, belief in the ‘domino effect’ and the determination to maintain nuclear superiority. This fear, in turn, led to American involvement in Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, the Middle East and South America, escalating regional issues into Cold War crises. In reality, there was no monolithic communist plot, the Sino-Soviet split making such a thing impossible. Both China and the USSR played a far less direct role in Korea and Vietnam than the USA, for example. The USA had a great deal to fear from the expansion of communism. Not only did it pose a threat to the USA’s economic interests (in SE Asia, for example, and the Middle East), but it also damaged the USA’s international prestige and controlling interest in the United Nations. While not directly involved in the Korean War, the USSR had given ‘permission’ for the North to attack the South. Moreover, both the USSR and the PRC played significant roles in the Vietnam War, supplying the Vietcong with the weaponry necessary to eventually achieve victory. In Cuba, the USSR created greater tension by placing nuclear weapons close to the USA itself. Furthermore, the USSR exploited post-colonial problems in Africa in an attempt to spread its influence.

10 To what extent was the USSR more responsible than the USA for ending the period of détente in the 1970s? [30]

Mark scheme: 10 To what extent was the USSR more responsible than the USA for ending 30 the period of détente in the 1970s? Throughout the period of détente, the USSR continued to enhance its influence in the Third World (in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, for example). To American right-wing politicians, this was clear evidence of the USSR’s continuing ambition to spread communism. Despite agreeing to the Helsinki Accords of 1975, the USSR continued to violate human rights. To many in the USA, this was a clear sign that the USSR could not be trusted and that negotiations were, therefore, pointless. This problem was enhanced by the USSR’s lack of effective leadership as a result of Brezhnev’s ill-health; this made decision making slow and laborious, which, to right-wing Americans, was perceived as prevarication. Determined to maintain a pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan, the USSR invaded in 1979. This is commonly seen as the act which ended détente and began the Second Cold War. Unwilling to let the USSR get away with another intervention in a foreign country, Carter immediately withdrew the USA from SALT II, cut off trade contracts with the USSR and encouraged a Western boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980. Carter also increased arms spending, which included nuclear weaponry. Despite this, Carter’s perceived weakness in dealing with the ‘Soviet threat’ led to his defeat by Reagan in the 1980 presidential elections. Détente had initially suited the USA; defeat in Vietnam, high inflation and a large budget deficit meant that the USA needed to reduce its intervention in world affairs. Even staunch anti-communists, such as Nixon and Kissinger, had supported the move to détente, preferring negotiation to confrontation. However, by the time Carter became president in 1976, right-wing conservatism was regaining strength in the USA. The view that détente was too soft on communism began to prevail. Carter increased supplies of arms to anti-communist groups and governments in the developing world (for example, El Salvador and Nicaragua). Although he reached agreement with Brezhnev on the SALT II Treaty in June 1979, opposition to the Treaty was already mounting in the USA and it seemed unlikely that the Senate would ratify it. With Brezhnev’s health failing, negotiating with the USSR became slow and difficult, so it was easier to adopt a more hardline stance. When Islamic militants occupied the US embassy in Teheran in 1979, the incident seemed to symbolise American impotence in world affairs; this led the right-wing to call for a tougher foreign policy. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was, therefore, the last straw for Carter, who immediately withdrew SALT II from the Senate. With the USSR already threatened by the spread of Muslin Fundamentalism, the USA’s threat to support anti-Soviet factions in Afghanistan could be seen as a key reason for the USSR’s decision to invade Afghanistan.

11 Evaluate the reasons for the introduction of the Hundred Flowers Campaign. [30]

Mark scheme: 11 Evaluate the reasons for the introduction of the Hundred Flowers 30 Campaign. There are two main historical interpretations of Mao’s intentions in introducing the campaign. The first is that Mao’s aim was to promote socialism and improve relations between the Party cadres, intellectuals and the new group of technicians which had emerged from the industrial changes brought about by the Five Year Plan which began in 1953. He was convinced that open discussion would clearly confirm that his government was right to see socialism as the way forward for China. After all, he could claim that under his leadership China had recovered from the ravages of war: communications had been restored, inflation was under control and the economy was improving. He was surprised, therefore, when both the CCP and he personally were so heavily criticised. The extent and nature of this criticism was all the more concerning because Mao had witnessed Khrushchev’s speech denouncing Stalin and the uprising in Hungary. It was only then that Mao reversed course and began taking action against dissidents. The campaign therefore stemmed from an error of judgement on Mao’s part. It is probable that Mao’s claim that the campaign was a deliberate plan to expose dissidents was simply his way of saving face when the campaign backfired. An alternative interpretation is that the campaign was a deliberate plan to identify and deal with dissidents. From its inception in 1956, the campaign was a calculated plan to expose Rightists, counter-revolutionaries and those who posed a threat to Mao’s government. The campaign encouraged constructive criticism of the government’s communist policies, and Mao gave assurances that contributors would not be punished. Yet, in the summer of 1957, Mao began an anti-Rightist movement, effectively a purge of those who posed a threat to the government’s control. Between 300 000 and 550 000 people were identified as Rightists, most of them intellectuals, academics, writers and artists. They were publicly discredited, lost their jobs and some were sent to labour camps. As a result, it discouraged dissent and made intellectuals less willing to openly criticise Mao and his government in the future. Mao himself implied that the campaign had deliberately set out to identify and deal with dissidents, claiming that he had ‘enticed the snakes out of their caves’.