Cambridge A Level History 9489 — 2023 Oct/Nov Paper 3 · Variant 3

1 Read the extract and then answer the question. The narrative of events from the assassination to the decisions of August demonstrates the importance of individuals and their actions. Our comprehension of the choices that lay before those involved in the crisis enables us to grasp the values, the hopes, and the fears of those whose decisions led to the catastrophe. Blind ‘historical forces’ did not devise ultimatums or mobilise millions. Men of flesh and blood did. Assumptions about honour and prestige, the past and the future, determined all the decisions they made. The statesmen responsible for guiding the policies of the Great Powers believed, ultimately, that they could not appear to be weak. Weakness would erode the prestige of their state; without prestige, they would no longer command respect; without respect, they could be ignored. Their study of the past had taught them that the great could decline. The only safeguard against decline, decay and disappearance was strength of purpose. For Austria-Hungary to admit that it lacked the toughness or determination to put an end to Serbian propaganda and plots would be an admission that it was no longer a Great Power. For Russia to admit that it could do nothing to stop Serbia from becoming an Austrian satellite state would confirm that it was an empire in decay, incapable of exerting itself in the Slavic sphere and of protecting its brothers in the Orthodox Church. There were, however, many choices made between 28 June and 4 August. The choices were made by men of experience and intelligence, and they made their choices consciously, rationally, on the basis of national interest, on the foundations of the fears they faced in the present and on their hopes for a better future. Few were eager for war – or at least for the great European war they got in August. Most of the men who mattered in Austria-Hungary were prepared for war with Serbia but believed it unlikely, given Germany’s support, that Russia would go to war to defend fellow Slavs. Most Germans who mattered agreed with this assessment. They were mistaken. Their mistakes came from a mix of wishful thinking and deliberate blindness – that Russia was not yet prepared and would back down; that Britain cared nothing for the fate of Serbia; that France would not back Russia without a guarantee of British support. Every one of their assumptions proved to be mistaken, but they rushed ahead anyway, confident that – in spite of everything – they still enjoyed a military advantage, and fearful that this advantage would slip away if they waited too long. Austria-Hungary, with Germany’s support, seized the initiative. Russia, France and Britain reacted to it. Their statesmen and diplomats proved to be as mistaken and misguided as those of the Triple Alliance. Europe had been through many crises as bad as this one – and some that seemed worse. Serbia, they believed, would be disciplined, punished in some manner or other. Indeed, Serbia deserved to be punished. Surely, they thought, it would not take an unprecedented intellectual effort on the part of Europe’s statesmen to devise a formula that would satisfy Austrian honour and limit the chance of Serbia upsetting the balance of power in the future. They all trusted that Germany would restrain Austria from going too far; even some Germans thought this should be their role in the crisis. On almost every day of the July crisis a solution seemed to be at hand. No one knows what would have happened had different decisions been taken. War was not planned, but neither was it accidental. What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the origins of the First World War to explain your answer. [40]

Mark scheme: Question Answer Marks 1 The Origins of the First World War 40 Interpretation/Approach The main interpretation is that the historian blames decisions taken by individuals, and the mistaken assumptions made by all the nations. Showing complete understanding of the Interpretation will involve discussion of both these aspects. This is an interpretation that rejects the significance of ‘impersonal forces’ and asserts the primacy of human agency in causing war. Different decisions could have been taken and would possibly have avoided war. Indeed, everyone assumed that a major war would be avoided, but they were wrong, mainly because they were driven by a fear of appearing weak. All countries’ statesmen were as misguided and mistaken as each other, but Austria-Hungary and Germany are seen as the initiators of a process to which the Entente powers reacted. Seeing Austria and Germany alone as being blamed would indicate lack of understanding. Glossary: Early post-WW1 interpretations tended to blame Germany, but quickly a reaction against this occurred, with a variety of interpretations blaming other nations. This may be termed revisionism. The turning point in the historiography was Fischer’s work of the early 1960s which went back to blaming Germany – sometimes known as anti-revisionism. Since then, there has been a vast variety of interpretations, looking at the importance of culture, individuals, contingent factors, etc., with no clear consensus, though most historians would still place a significant burden of responsibility on Germany.

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2 Read the extract and then answer the question. Between 1939 and 1941, several key Nazi agencies, including the SS and the Führer’s Chancellery, were engaged in developing policies to change radically the population of the occupied parts of Poland. Content removed due to copyright restrictions. The genocide of the Jews developed almost unnoticed as the outcome of everything that occurred before it: the failed resettlement project, the inability to defeat the Red Army, and the skill acquired in killing the handicapped and shipping masses of people from one part of the Nazi empire to the other. What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40] Section C: The origins and development of the Cold War

Mark scheme: 2 The Holocaust 40 Interpretation/Approach The main interpretation is that the historian blames the failure of resettlement plans, confirmed by defeat in Barbarossa, for the emergence of the Holocaust. Showing complete understanding of the Interpretation will involve discussion of both these aspects. From 1939 the Nazis were developing policies towards the Jews that were murderous, but not genocidal. The Holocaust was not planned but emerged from a set of contingent factors. The interpretation makes no mention of Hitler, but it is clear that the historian thinks that there was no genocidal intent before late 1941. Prior to that, policy towards the Jews was confused, improvised and failing. If a label is used for the historian’s approach, in L5/L6 it could only be functionalist. Any other label will be L4 at best. Glossary: Candidates may use some/all of the following terms: Intentionalism – interpretations which assume that Hitler/the Nazis planned to exterminate the Jews from the start. Structuralism – interpretations which argue that it was the nature of the Nazi state that produced genocide. There was no coherent plan but the chaotic competition for Hitler’s approval between different elements of the leadership produced a situation in which genocide could occur. Functionalism – sees the Holocaust as an unplanned, ad hoc response to wartime developments in Eastern Europe, when Germany conquered areas with large Jewish populations. Candidates may also refer to synthesis interpretations, i.e. interpretations which show characteristics of more than one of the above. What counts is how appropriate the use of this kind of terminology is in relation to the extract, and how effectively the extract can be used to support it.

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3 Read the extract and then answer the question. The Cold War was a strange war. We call it a ‘cold’ war because each great power was using every technique at its disposal, short of actual war, to counter the objectives of the other. The United States and Russia acted in this manner because each believed the other was out for world domination and might start a third world war. Neither side, as far as we can tell, ever seriously contemplated an attack on the other. The United States had the atomic bomb and Russia had a great army. Each felt insecure. But once the tension started, each nation considered the moves of the other as offensive. Consequently, each power tightened control over its sphere of influence. A vicious, escalating circle of move and counter-move had begun, fed by the distorted perceptions of the leaders and peoples of each country. Soviet blindness resulted from years of communist indoctrination. But many in the West had similarly poor insight. They had swung from popular affection for Russia to hysterical anti-communism. Americans were angry because they felt betrayed by Russia, and guilty because of what was happening in Eastern Europe. Each move by Russia was interpreted as part of an elaborate scheme to dominate the world. With the advantage of hindsight, Stalin’s objectives in this period seem actually to have been much less ambitious. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union must bear the major share of guilt for the Cold War. It was Stalin’s growing appetite for territory and power which finally provoked the West to action. The Soviets had legitimate security needs and Western leaders were willing to grant these. But Stalin did not stop there. At a certain point his demands began to look illegitimate. In addition, Stalin’s techniques for controlling the areas the Red Army had occupied looked questionable. Perhaps Stalin began to communise the East European countries just to ensure they were friendly to Russia. Perhaps he was not simply pushing Marxism–Leninism. But to the people involved – and to the West – communism was communism regardless of why it was imposed. Why didn’t Soviet Russia put its faith in the United Nations? Why was Stalin’s concept of security so different from that held by Roosevelt? True, Russia had seen the League of Nations fail to stop Germany. But Roosevelt had offered to merge American and Russian might with that of the other Western Allies to preserve world peace. Stalin was unmoved. It has been argued by some historians that Stalin’s mistrust of the West and its international organisation stemmed basically from his difficulties with the Western powers during the war, and particularly with Truman’s abrupt termination of Lend-Lease. Certainly, there could have been some cause for suspicion, but this could hardly have justified the belief that the West was determined to destroy the Soviet Union. Roosevelt had gone out of his way to treat Stalin decently and even generously. Moreover, US armed forces were being rushed home from Europe. What was Stalin afraid of? In fact, Stalin feared the Western Allies from the day the war began – and from long before. His ideological conditioning, added to his personal insecurity, led him to believe that all capitalist statesmen were fundamentally opposed to the very existence of the Soviet Union. He could hardly rely on an international security organisation which consisted of a solid bloc of capitalist states ranged against one socialist state – the Soviet Union. There wasn’t much the West could do to prevent the Cold War except appeasement, and there’s no real reason to assume appeasement would have worked any better on Stalin than on Hitler. What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]

Mark scheme: 3 The Origins and Development of the Cold War 40 Interpretation/Approach The main interpretation is that, despite the mutual hostility that characterised the Cold War, the historian blames Stalin for causing it, as his actions and ideology left the West no option but to resist. Showing complete understanding of the interpretation will involve discussion of both these aspects. Despite the fact that the first paragraph of the extract seems to characterise the Cold War as ‘move and countermove’ between the two great powers, the true focus of the interpretation is on Stalin, and on attributing the main share of the blame for the Cold War to him. He is portrayed as pushing the West into resisting his expansionist policies and rebuffing Western attempts to work with him. His hostility was derived from an ideologically based view of the West. The only ‘label’ acceptable at L5/L6 is post-post-revisionist, given its stress on Stalin, ideology and its failure to exonerate the West. Post-Revisionist and Traditional can be L4 if Stalin’s blame is properly argued. Revisionist would be L3 max. Glossary: Traditional/Orthodox interpretations of the Cold War were generally produced early after WW2. They blame the Soviet Union and Stalin’s expansionism for the Cold War. Revisionist historians challenged this view and shifted more of the focus onto the United States, generally through an economic approach which stressed the alleged aim of the US to establish its economic dominance over Europe. Post-revisionists moved towards a more balanced view in which elements of blame were attached to both sides. Since the opening of the Soviet archives post-1990 there has been a shift to attributing prime responsibility to Stalin – a post-post-revisionist stance which often seems very close to the traditional view, but which often places great importance on ideology. What counts is how appropriate the use of this kind of terminology is in relation to the extract, and how effectively the extract can be used to support it.

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